
THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

APRIL, 1944

25¢



LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLLAND M. SMITH, USMC



OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTO

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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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THE MARINES LAND AT CAPE GLOUCESTER

The Cape Gloucester Campaign

The Capture of the Airdrome and Hill 660

By Captain Frank O. Hough, USMCR

PRECEDED by the most intensive and best-timed preparation yet achieved by a major offensive in the Pacific, the U. S. Marines' attack on western New Britain has proceeded with scarcely a hitch in the face of enemy opposition and natural conditions which might well have checked or stalemated any thrust less thoroughly planned and efficiently executed.

In a nutshell, the Cape Gloucester campaign stands out as a difficult job made to appear easy through splendid cooperation between the services, backed by the magnificent fighting ability of a veteran combat outfit.

Air preparation began approximately a month before the actual landing. Units of the First Air Task Force showered bombs relentlessly on the Cape Gloucester Airdrome, our major objective, and the strong enemy base in the Borgen Bay area, about eight miles to the east. For the forty-eight hours immediately preceding D-Day (26 December, 1943), this became a round-the-clock business, allowing the defenders little time for sleep and no opportunity for substantial rebuilding of demolished defensive works.

The actual landing was preceded by an intensive naval bombardment by the escort vessels lasting for approximately an hour. This was followed immediately by an air attack of stepped-up intensity, concentrated upon the landing beaches, defensive installations and primary objectives of the attack. To those witnessing the fury of this preparation, it seemed impossible that anything could possibly stand up under it. Their suspicions were quickly confirmed upon reaching shore: practically nothing had stood up under it.

The day was clear and windless; a condition many of us never expected to see again during the days that followed. The first two waves hit the beach promptly on schedule and without opposition, their small craft veiled in a prodigious smoke screen that had been laid over a stretch of terrain extending from Target Hill on the east across the entire beach area and several hundred yards out to sea.


The terrain on which the landing was made was subsequently described by Major General William H. Rupertus, USMC, Task Force Commander, as the most difficult in his experience or that of anyone he knew. Here were no broad stretches of hard sand, flanked by neat groves of evenly spaced coconut palms. An incredible tangle of shell-blasted jungle grew nearly to the water's edge. The leading waves, struggling shoreward through high-breaking surf, hacked their way inland with machetes. But the unloading of the great cargoes of supplies and equipment on that narrow, wave-lashed strip of sand appeared at first glance an impossible task. Veterans of Guadalcanal, remembering the chaos on that beach, muttered words which were not to be construed as prayer.

Here the carefully planned combat loading of the LST's paid dividends. Immediately the landing ramps were down, amphibian tractors and great bulldozers made their way ashore and commenced smashing lanes through the jungle to the Japanese-built shore road which connected the airdrome and Borgen Bay. Engineer personnel were already at work widening and improving this road. In a matter of minutes, trucks fully loaded before embarkation were proceeding to predetermined dump areas.

The terrain presented problems seldom equalled in any warfare. Low, relatively level land ran inland from the beach to a depth ranging from a few hundred yards to more than a mile, giving way to high, sharp ridges and patches of shoulder-high kunai grass, rising with increasing steepness to the 6600-foot volcanic cone of Mt. Talawe.

The low coastal plain was labeled "damp flat" on the preliminary maps. This proved to be a gross understatement: the torrential rains had reduced the entire region to one great morass. The road required constant maintenance of the most rugged sort, with bridging and rebridging at frequent intervals, while regions any distance inland could be negotiated only by amphibian tractor.

Two landing beaches were situated on the north shore of the island, between the airdrome and the Jap base at Borgan Bay. The 800 yards that intervened between them was believed to be an enemy bivouac area and prepared defensive position. This surmise proved correct. The intensity of the preparation, however, had shattered many of the strong points and caused the defenders to depart hurriedly. Considerable quantities of food, medical supplies and ammunition were captured in this area, together with a number of dual-purpose artillery pieces, many of them



Marines made two landings around Cape Gloucester. The principal operation was conducted on the western shore of Borgen Bay (1) and a subsidiary one took place west of the cape (2). Simultaneously, marines occupied Long Island (3), dominating Vitiaz Strait. The landings at Cape Gloucester gave the Americans a second foothold on New Britain—the first was in the Arawe area (4). They threatened the enemy supply lines to Rabaul (5), put Kavieng (6) within reach of our land-based air power, and led to the capture of the Admiralty Islands (7).



There was a road of sorts . . .

intact. Several enemy stragglers were killed and, during the course of subsequent mopping-up operations, three prisoners were taken.

The plan of attack developed with almost clockwork precision. The mission of the first wave was to establish a perimeter defense line around the beachhead, extending approximately 5000 yards along the shore and reaching inland to a maximum depth of about 1500 yards. The several elements moved at once toward positions previously assigned as a result of painstaking aerial surveying and careful tactical planning. The unit assigned to take Target Hill, anchor of the eastern or left flank, advanced with such speed despite the difficult terrain that they reached their objective before the demoralized defenders were able to man the positions they had quit under the battering from sea and air, with the result that this dominant elevation fell with no more than token resistance. All elements quickly secured their assigned sectors, and before nightfall their supporting artillery was in position behind them.

The second wave moved westward, passed through the right flank sector of the perimeter defense and advanced toward the airdrome, primary objective of the entire operation. The forward elements of this force encountered the first substantial enemy resistance about 1100. This consisted of a strong road block composed of an integrated system of pillboxes. As the terrain was suitable, the first two tanks to come ashore were sent up immediately in support. These made short work of the road block, and the advance continued without further opposition to the area designated as the first phase line. Here defensive positions were established and the command reorganized for the next day's attack.

Enemy attempts to interrupt the invasion by air had been largely neutralized by bombing attacks by our air force on all fields within practicable bombing distance. This could not prevent the enemy from trying, however. Their largest-scale effort occurred on the morning of D-Day when a large flight of fighter-escorted bombers were detected approaching. These were intercepted by our fighters approximately 70 miles offshore, with disastrous results: 53 Japanese planes were destroyed outright, with 19 probables, our loss being only four P-38's.

The only flight actually to reach the invasion scene arrived about midafternoon: fighters and medium bombers, estimated between a dozen and twenty in number. They came in low and fast, strafing and bombing the beaches and LST's, most of which were withdrawing. Oddly

. . . but most of the going was through thick jungle





. . . and a swamp optimistically labeled "damp flat."

enough, considering the crowded condition of the beaches and recklessness of the attack, little damage resulted to either party.


To judge by his behavior, the enemy's first reaction was complete bewilderment. During the night several hostile aircraft flew over and dropped flares to illuminate the area, but neither bombing nor naval bombardment followed.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the main landing, a smaller force had been put ashore at another location, around the cape and nearly due south of the airdrome. The object was to cut off enemy retreat in that direction and to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might attempt to send up from the south. This landing also was effected without opposition and a beachhead quickly secured. Patrols working outward made sporadic contact with enemy patrols, but no major action occurred in this sector until 30 December.

The advance toward the airfield was resumed the following morning (27 December). The original plan had been to support this force with elements holding the western sector of the perimeter, but this proved impractical when enemy infiltration of the vacated positions necessitated returning these elements to the line. The division reserve could not be expected on the scene for at least two more days, but since the attacking force was meeting only weak, sporadic sniper opposition, it was decided to continue the advance, regardless. Torrential rainfall, measuring up to 16 inches in a single day, washed out roads and bridges, bogged down the troops. Yet by nightfall this unit was well ahead of schedule and digging in about a mile and a half from the airdrome, having advanced some three and a half miles.

During the afternoon the enemy showed signs of recovering from his first shock and launched two counterattacks against the center of the beachhead perimeter, which were beaten off without too much difficulty. These were followed during the ensuing night by four more of increasing intensity, but nowhere was the line even dented. A patrol going out after daylight counted more than two hundred Japanese dead in front of the position. Our loss was one man wounded.

December 28 saw the heaviest fighting on the airdrome front. The advance continued with only minor opposition until early afternoon, when a road block of really formidable proportions was encountered. Forward elements suffered casualties and were pinned down by heavy machine-gun fire. The nature of the terrain at this particular spot made it impossible to bring flame throwers close enough to be effective. But again the terrain could be



The galleys were knee-deep in muddy water.

made usable for tanks. Once more the 32-ton General Shermans were brought up, and again the action was short and decisive.

One notable feature of this action was the number of enemy artillery pieces captured intact, with ample ammunition available. These were mostly the old model mountain gun, 75mm., a slightly outmoded weapon but entirely practical for use in an operation of this nature. Yet only one instance was observed of the Japanese even attempting to man one. This occurred when a crew in a dugout emplacement fired pointblank into one of the tanks at a range of ten feet. The shell barely nicked the armor of the General Sherman before the gun and its crew were crushed under the treads. Altogether the Japanese are believed to have lost upward of 350 killed in this short struggle. The exact number is impossible to determine as many of the pillboxes were blasted beyond recognition, their occupants buried in the debris.

THE airdrome fell the afternoon of the following day, 29 December.* After a slow, careful advance over terrain that varied from neck-deep swamp to steep ridges and ravines, the forward elements formed with the tanks at the edge of a broad kunai patch. Supported by a heavy artillery barrage, with the tanks' 75's and machine guns

*On the last day of 1943, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commander of the 6th Army, of which the Marines were a part, proudly announced: "I have the honor to present the Cape Gloucester airdrome to the Commander-in-Chief as a New Year's present."

The pack howitzers proved useful.





Machine guns and carbines were invaluable.

blazing, the assault columns swept across the last thousand yards with an irresistible drive that many times the estimated defending force could not have halted even momentarily. By 1630 they were digging in on the nearer air strip, a full day ahead of the original schedule.

The division reserve had commenced landing at dawn this morning. The advance elements moved into action immediately. By noon they began a tortuous advance through swamps on the left flank of the assault force advancing to the airport along the beach.

Describing a wide arc, they moved through the ridges south and west of the air strips and at 3 p.m. commanded the northwest approaches. At 7:25 p.m. on 29 December these elements joined units of the original assault force in taking the twin air strips.

Remnants of enemy forces, withdrawn into the foothills of Mount Talawe during the airport assault, came forward during the night of 29-30 December and occupied prepared positions fronting the defense perimeter south and west of the strips.

Rain-soaked Marines of the reserve units moved forward at dawn on 30 December and engaged enemy troops which were in the process of bringing artillery to bear on the newly captured air strips. The assault was focused on the enemy-held series of razorback ridges south and west of the strips. Some sharp fighting resulted in which tank support was invaluable, but the issue was never in doubt.

By nightfall what remained of the enemy were in full retreat. A new perimeter defense line was established well up in the ridges and, save for a little random mopping up, the vital airdrome was secure.

While all this was taking place, the secondary landing party was attacked heavily by an enemy force moving up from the south. The ensuing action, known as the Battle of Coffin Corner, began shortly after midnight and lasted until dawn of 30 December. The assault was repulsed bloodily, the enemy leaving 78 dead on the field and retiring in disorder. Evidently this broke the back of enemy strength in this sector, for this unit encountered no more organized opposition and rejoined the main force on 11 January.

WHILE the fall of the airdrome marked the end of one phase, the campaign as a whole had merely reached a turning point. The major objective had been taken, but it was now necessary to insure protection of this conquest against counterattack by the overwhelming forces of the enemy known to be at Rabaul and many nearer points on the island to the eastward. This required wiping out of Japanese forces and installations in the Borgen Bay area and

The "General Shermans" demonstrated their worth.





This tank pauses in a hollow where a four-day battle has been fought.

Field pieces bogged down in the morass.



establishment of a strongly placed defense line beyond artillery range of the airdrome. The drive in that direction which occupied the ensuing two weeks produced some of the heaviest and most bitter jungle fighting ever seen on this or any other island.

Later, in drawing the inevitable comparison, General Rupertus commented that, while it would be difficult to say that the Japanese fought any harder here than on Guadalcanal, they most certainly enjoyed far better leadership. Major General Matsuda (soon promoted to Lieutenant General), veteran of China and Bataan, evidently foresaw the pattern of coming events. Instead of wasting more men and material in further futile attempts to crack the beachhead perimeter or reinforce the obviously untenable airdrome, he spent the time drawing all available troops in this part of the island into the area through which the attack must inevitably advance. Thus, when the new attack commenced, the Marines found themselves following a route which had been especially prepared for their reception.

The Japanese soldier is at his undisputed best in defensive fighting in deep jungle. He is suited to it by temperament and training: his dogged tenacity, his fanatical willingness to fight to the death, his consummate skill at camouflage are prime assets; his lack of imagination and mental flexibility cease to be liabilities when his only orders are to hold until he is killed.

To stage the attack toward Borgen Bay, the beachhead perimeter cordon simply swung to the eastward, pivoting on Target Hill, and formed in an offensive line facing in the new direction. Almost at once they came up against the enemy's prepared positions, skillfully placed to take every advantage of what is quite possibly the worst terrain over which an attack has ever been staged. This was known technically as "cross-compartment" fighting: *i.e.*, driving at right angles to the watershed, over successive swamps, streams and ridges, rather than following the natural course of valleys and high ground.

The advance moved forward with what seemed to some exasperating slowness—but it continued to move. Time after time, units fought their way across streams and swamps only to encounter seemingly impregnable strong points which obliged them to retire to their previous positions for night security. Enemy snipers infiltrated under cover of darkness and had to be cleaned out behind the lines before the attack could be resumed. Fanatical counterattacks served further to delay progress, but at huge cost to the enemy. Units lost contact with their neighbors in incredibly tangled terrain where visibility of twenty feet was considered extraordinary. Elements moving over easier terrain were obliged repeatedly to wait for others to come up, and hours, even days, had to be devoted to rectifying and consolidating the lines.



But the airport is taken, and engineers immediately go to work on it.

In many places the height and density of the forest trees rendered artillery and mortar fire ineffective. Frequently undergrowth was so thick that it was impossible to lob a hand grenade into an emplacement ten feet away. Engineers performed prodigies to bring tanks up to wipe out a single strong point, only to perform more prodigies to get them forward to the next one. Continued torrential rains overflowed the naturally swampy ground so that only amphibian tractors were able to get through with supplies and to evacuate the wounded.

For two solid weeks the Marines sweated and fought and died in that hellish tangle; men who had been fighting off counterattacks for a week before the drive even started. By the time their objective was achieved and their relief arrived, many had been on the lines continuously for twenty-four days with no shelter against rains such as they had never imagined possible; with no clothes other than those on their backs; without hot food, even coffee.



Lieutenant Colonel John E. Weber (right) receives a report from a company commander.

THE new defensive line it was wished to achieve ran in a generally southwesterly direction along a series of low ridges, anchored firmly on the seaward side on a dominant elevation known as Hill 660. This hill rises sharply from the damp coastal flat more than a mile due south of Target Hill, to an elevation of 660 feet, whence the arbitrarily applied name. From the inland side the approach lies across a series of short, abrupt ridges and ravines to the main slope.

On the seaward side the slope drops almost sheer from a razorback crest to within 100 to 300 yards of the shore of Borgen Bay. Attacking Marines had no accurate knowledge



A jeep, serving as an ambulance, needs assistance.

of this terrain. Unlike gaunt Target Hill, the crest and slopes were obscured from aerial reconnaissance by thick "rain forests" characteristic of the region. Giant trees festooned with heavy vines loomed above dense, uncut jungle. As it continued in Japanese possession until the very end, Marine patrols had been unable to reconnoiter the entire area successfully.

It soon became apparent that the strategic importance of the right flank ridge was enormous; that without it in our possession the capture of Hill 660 was impossible.

The task of taking this vital elevation fell to the rearmost elements of the former division reserve which had been moved into this sector immediately upon landing. And take it they did in a bitter nine-day battle. The climax came 10 January. Troops had already crossed a natural gorge aptly named "Suicide Gully." Repulsing five Japanese counterattacks in a single night's fighting, the Marines made a frontal assault up an incline with a pitch of some 40 degrees at the steepest. And the ridge fell, but only after savage hand-to-hand fighting in which all terrain advantages were held by the enemy.

The gruelling drive exacted its toll of the weary Marines, but it began to become apparent that the strain on the defending Japanese had been even greater. Following a desperate last-ditch struggle on 11 January, resistance collapsed on the inland sector. Our units moved forward with virtually no opposition. By the evening of the twelfth the new defense line had been consolidated along the ridges, and patrols working forward reported no further prepared position within threatening distance. The stage was set for the final assault upon the key position.

This commenced on the morning of 13 January. By the time it was finished, it had provided another epic in Marine Corps history and a fitting climax—the high point, literally and figuratively—of the Cape Gloucester campaign.

The main attacking force advanced from the southwest crossed the difficult approaches without meeting undue opposition. A final ridge slope dropped sharply to a deep ravine, from which the hill proper slanted up at an angle almost precipitous. Men crawling on hands and knees slung their weapons and grasped at the undergrowth to inch themselves upward over a rain-slicked slope so steep that standing erect was all but impossible. They had progressed perhaps one-third of the way to their ultimate objective when a sudden fury of machine-gun fire pinned them down.

Two light tanks managed to get up to the ridge by midafternoon. Their further advance was checked by a combination of the steep slopes and enemy machine guns firing down the draw, while the thickly wooded terrain rendered

The American flag is raised on Cape Gloucester.





Major General William H. Rupertus (right), reads a message of encouragement to his men at the flag-raising ceremony.

their fire ineffective from this distance. Thus, the advance elements remained immobilized for the rest of the afternoon while patrols worked to the right in hope of finding more passable terrain or the enemy's flank, or both.

In the meanwhile, an oddly composed force had been working against the enemy's other flank, along the low, more or less flat, land that borders Borgen Bay. This was made up of a weapons company, supported by rifle elements, two half-tracks, two light tanks and an engineer platoon with a bulldozer. Overcoming all resistance, they pushed on to a point approximately 1600 yards in advance of the forward lines and established themselves in a strong position between an impassable swamp and the sea at the southeastern base of the hill, completely blocking support from or retreat toward the main Japanese force. Here they secured for the night and all the following day, though subjected to occasional long-range sniping and machine-gun fire from the hill.

HILL 660 was taken on 14 January, though exactly how this was done remains something of a mystery. The defending force had been estimated at approximately one reinforced platoon, though the number of dead found later and the extraordinary quantity of automatic weapons destroyed or captured indicated that this was a gross underestimate. Marine officers studying the situation after the capture declared that with what the Japanese had on the scene they could have held that height against an entire division.

The attack developed from a generally southwesterly direction, sweeping upward over slopes little less difficult than those on which they had been pinned down the previous afternoon. Weary men crept, crawled, and staggered forward; men reduced to the verge of exhaustion by three weeks of incessant fighting, of iron rations, torrential rains, and broiling suns. There was no logic or reason to it; according to all rules of "the book" they should have been annihilated before they were halfway up. Fire that should have been withering, considering the number of weapons involved, failed to do more than slow their progress. Perhaps the artillery barrage that morning had been

Weary and dirty, after 23 days of fighting, these veterans are headed for a well-earned rest.



extraordinarily effective, though those which had preceded it for the past week had produced no appreciable results. Perhaps the sight of those grim men who would not be stopped proved the last straw to defenders whose morale had been strained close to the breaking point already.

Whatever the cause, the Japanese made few suicidal stands that day. And by the time an early, storm-clouded dusk brought an end to operations for the day, the Marines had secured the narrow, razorback crest and the enemy were in full retreat.

The larger body of the Japanese survivors clung to the northern slope of the hill. A smaller body, fleeing down the precipitous western slope, found themselves cut off from their own lines by the reinforced weapons company which had pushed so far ahead the previous day. Most of these were killed during the night and early morning trying to break through or by-pass this force; the remainder were driven into the swamp.

Consolidating the hill position, moving up a forward observation post and generally rectifying the line occupied most of the following day. That night the Japanese attacked the hill savagely. Whether this was a genuine counterattack or merely an effort of the force on the north slope of the hill to break through is not certain. In either case, it proved suicidal, as perhaps it was intended. The entire force was wiped out quickly and decisively. As events proved, this was the last attempt of any importance made by the Japanese during the campaign.

Patrols operating in front of the lines during the following week met only sporadic weak resistance from stragglers and isolated units throughout the Borgen Bay area and in the mountains that rimmed it in. That the enemy's resistance was broken was evident. The airdrome was secure beyond reasonable doubt. In all western New Britain, no cohesive force remained to oppose us.

AN interesting postscript was provided by the capture of Lieutenant General Matsuda's command post, well up in the ridges behind the bay. This proved to be a well-built village of lumber-and-thatch officers' quarters, barracks, and mess halls, complete with corduroy roads and walks, in sharp contrast to the squalid, half-starved conditions to which the fighting troops at the front had been reduced. General Matsuda's own home was by far the most elaborate and comfortable building yet seen on the island, including a finely furnished bedroom, office, prayer room with altar, kitchen, living room and toilet facilities, in addition to a deep dugout which showed signs of considerable use. For some not immediately apparent reason, no effort had been made to destroy installations, equipment, or personal effects, though there was no other indication that the place had been evacuated in undue haste.

The general himself, however, made good his escape. By means of several well-executed delaying actions, he managed to withdraw with him a force estimated at approximately battalion strength, perhaps 1,000 men. Some 3,100 were known to have been killed, probably at least an equal number wounded. Doubtless many starving stragglers and fragments of units still survived after a fashion, scattered among the hills and jungles. Only this single force remained effective by any stretch of that definition out of the estimated 8,500 to 10,000 troops detailed to hold this vital region.

Or to die trying.

Participating Units

THE first wave of the Cape Gloucester attack was composed of the Seventh Marines commanded by Colonel Julian W. Frisbie. This unit formed the perimeter defense during the first phase. Target Hill was taken by 1-7 under Lieutenant Colonel John E. Weber; central sector was held by 2-7 under Lieutenant Colonel Odell M. Conoley, who beat off the heaviest counterattacks; right sector held by 3-7 under Lieutenant Colonel William R. Williams.

The attack on the airfield was carried out by two Battalions, First Marines, commanded by Colonel William J. Whaling: 1-1 under Lieutenant Colonel Walker A. Reaves, and 3-1 under Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Hankins. These were subsequently supported by two battalions of division reserve (Fifth Marines, Colonel John T. Selden): 1-5 under Major William H. Barba, and 2-5 under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt.

The force that landed on the other side of the cape consisted of Landing Team 21 (2d Bn., 1st Marines), under Lieutenant Colonel James M. Masters, Sr.

The drive toward Borgen Bay was handled by the Seventh Marines, reinforced by 3d Bn., Fifth Marines. This was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David S. McDougal until 7 January when Lieutenant Colonel McDougal and his executive officer, Major Joseph S. Skoczylas, were both wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt took command with Major Robert H. Dillard as executive officer.

The unit assaulting Hill 660 was 3-7 under Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. Buse, Jr., former Assistant D-3, who assumed command on 7 January. The unit which cut off Hill 660 on the seaward side was commanded by Captain Joseph E. Buckley and consisted of Weapons Company, Seventh Marines, plus two rifle platoons from 1-7 and a pioneer platoon from 2-17.

The patrol which captured General Matsuda's command post was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller, Executive Officer, Seventh Marines.

In the Big League Phase

By Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC

IMPENDING developments of tremendous scope and far-reaching potentialities are looming upon the horizon in the Western Pacific. The bold and staggering strokes recently delivered by fleet units under Admiral Nimitz in the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas strongly indicate that the Pacific war is entering its new phase—a phase that may develop into the decisive one.

The great sea and air power amassed by the United States in this vast combat area has, almost overnight, altered the whole course of the war. It may have altered Japan's plans for trying to hold the huge sprawling empire she has seized. It certainly has altered the situation in Tokyo, where the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy were summarily kicked out of office after the devastating raid on Truk.

But before the present phase of the war in the Pacific started with the attack on the Gilbert Islands last November, the war had gone through three earlier phases.

First Phase: Holding the Line

THE disaster at Pearl Harbor, which served as a curtain raiser to the first phase of the war in the Pacific, was followed by attacks, in rapid succession, on the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island. Guam fell almost immediately while our garrisons on Wake held out for nearly three weeks. Our Philippine forces hung on for a long determined defense but were ultimately overpowered. The campaign in the Philippines was paralleled by the naval campaign of the Java Sea in which the Allied forces waged a losing fight against superior Japanese forces.

While these losing battles were being fought, constructive measures were being taken for ultimately starting our offensive against Japan. Matters of primary consideration were the replacement of air and other losses in the Hawaiian Islands, the developing of outlying defense positions in the Central Pacific and the securing of South Pacific positions which would ensure our communications with Australia. Marine defense battalions and aviation units were rushed to reinforce Midway, Johnson, and Palmyra Islands while Army forces, a part of which had been on their way to the Far East at the outbreak of the war, were landed in Australia and elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific.

The Second Brigade of Marines, in January 1942, began to prepare for the defense of the island of Tutuila in the eastern Samoan Islands. Our Army sent detachments to occupy the Fiji Islands, Christmas and Canton Islands, and Bora-Bora. As soon as equipment and shipping could be made available, the Third Brigade of Marines was rushed to occupy and prepare for defense of the Western Samoans. That brigade later extended its control to Wallis Island and over several islands of the Ellice group. Detachments of the Army, in the meantime, were being pushed farther to the southwest and occupied New Caledonia and several other smaller islands. By June 1942, the First Marine Division had arrived in New Zealand and other American troops had reinforced Australia; these measures, at least for the time, assured our communications with Australia.

While all this was being accomplished, our naval forces carried out a more or less continuous hit-and-run warfare with the Japanese Navy to prevent the development of enemy bases too close to our line of communications and, on several occasions, we broke up concentrations of enemy forces obviously bent on further advances to the south.

By the middle of May 1942, the Japs apparently had had enough of these vigorous strikes and decided to try to catch our Pacific Fleet off guard and to make a determined effort to capture Midway and possibly attack the Hawaiian Islands. The defeat of the Japanese naval forces in the Battle of Midway was the result. This appeared to have ended their hopes for cutting our communications to Australia but did not deter them from further efforts to push their defensive positions farther to to the southeast. The Japanese, also, succeeded in taking several of the outer Aleutian Islands and created a threat toward Alaska and the northwest part of the United States.

Despite the fact that their forces were spread extremely thin throughout the Southwest Pacific, the forces of the Allies were even thinner and the Japanese forward push continued throughout the spring of 1942. They had relatively little strength in the Bismarck-Solomons area, but they sent a small force to hold Tulagi and began developing an airfield on Guadalcanal in the early summer of 1942. If that air base were fully developed and put into operation by strong Japanese air units, it would constitute a serious threat to us in the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, as well as in southeastern New Guinea and in northern Australia. Although the First Marine Division had gone to the Southwest Pacific before it was ready for offensive action and it expected to have several months additional training, the high command decided to use it to seize the important air base on Guadalcanal to prevent its use by the Japanese, and to serve as a foothold for future operations against them.

Second Phase: Guadalcanal

THE landing of the First Marine Division was effected without great difficulty on Guadalcanal but there was severe fighting around Tulagi. This opened a second and critical phase of the Pacific naval war. The landing had scarcely been accomplished when a disastrous night naval battle resulted in our losing heavily in cruisers and destroyers. Our troops in the eastern Solomons, by this weakening of their naval support, were seriously threatened with having their sea communications cut.

For more than six months the campaign of Guadalcanal went on with unabated fury as an almost continuous ground, air, and sea battle—even with submarine activities. While our forces were attempting to improve their grip on

what was, at times, an all but beleaguered position, the Japs made many strong efforts to drive us from it. Incident to these efforts of the Japanese to land strong reinforcements, or our trying to do so, there ensued a series of hard fought but mostly indecisive naval battles. Some of these took the form of duels between aircraft carrier task forces, each trying to destroy the other's carriers, while others took place as night battles in the waters adjacent to the Marines' position on Guadalcanal. Every time the Japs succeeded in landing reinforcements, they attacked the Marines' position but were always thrown back with heavy losses and all but annihilated. It was not until after the three-day naval battle of November 12-15, 1942, that the Japs gave up trying to land major units and discontinued their strong naval efforts.

In the meantime, the air warfare had gone on almost continually over Guadalcanal with the Marine forces attempting to build up a strong air defense to control the vicinity, and the Japs attempting to keep down our air force so that we could not interfere with their sea communications and other operations designed for the reconquest of the island.

After these naval battles, the Japs resorted to running in only light vessels with reinforcements and supplies but we were able to push in huge quantities of supplies and reinforcements and we substantially built up our air power. As a result, the combined Army and Marine Corps forces on Guadalcanal were able to take the offensive and drive the Japanese from the island. In the meantime, the Japs were playing a losing game with General MacArthur's forces for the control of Eastern New Guinea.

The determined effort of both the Japanese and the Americans in the campaign of Guadalcanal resulted in both sides suffering heavy naval losses. This took place at a time when desperate efforts were being made to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open, and to build up, not only our own naval strength, but to replace Allied shipping losses suffered at the hands of German submarines. Shipping was a critical item throughout the world, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. The vast fleet of landing craft equipment now in use had not yet been distributed and the problem of unloading ships without modern port facilities made the building up of supplies in all theaters of operation extremely difficult.

The colossal naval building program we had initiated just prior to entering the war was beginning to show results by the delivery of new ships of all types, but they were not yet ready for use in active operations. Then, too, the Japanese had been entrenching themselves in the Aleutian Islands, creating a threat to our northern flank. The naval high command determined to head this off, and carried on a campaign throughout the late spring and summer of 1943 that drove the Japanese from the Northern Pacific.

Third Phase: Advancing Our Bases

IN the meantime, a third phase of the war started. Our forces in the South Pacific had begun to gather strength, both ground and air, and prepared for a northwestern advance along the Solomon Islands into the Bismarcks. After giving up their strenuous effort to retake Guadalcanal, the Japanese then evacuated the Russell Islands which the American forces moved into on February 21, 1943.

We continued to develop ground and air facilities, not only on Guadalcanal but in the Russell Islands. The Japanese tried to break these up by air attacks but with little result. As our ground and air strength increased in this area, we assumed the offensive in aerial warfare. In a three-day battle, early in March, the Army Air Forces of MacArthur's command annihilated a large Japanese convoy attempting to supply and reinforce garrisons along the east coast of New Guinea. By that time, our air strength was beginning to develop rapidly but the amphibious forces were not ready until June to begin advancing our bases. They occupied positions in the New Georgia group and prepared them as airfields and other facilities for further offensive action. Meanwhile, the air warfare mounted in scope and fury as both sides made determined efforts to control the skies.

Munda was next attacked, to take from the enemy an important airfield; after a campaign lasting several weeks the entire island of New Georgia was captured. The remaining islands of the New Georgia group were then taken. Our air and sea facilities were pushed forward and strong preparations were made for still more important advances. Throughout the late summer and fall of 1943, vigorous air action and a few minor naval battles gradually gave the American forces control of the sea lanes and mastery of the air.

On November 1, 1943, the First Marine Amphibious Corps landed at Cape Torokina on Bougainville and seized sites for important airfields and naval facilities well in advance of a great many positions still held by the Japanese. The beachhead was rapidly developed for the use of all types of planes. From positions there and in eastern New Guinea, our air forces were able to furnish coverage for a landing of troops on the south coast of New Britain. This was shortly followed by the landing of the First Marine Division at Cape Gloucester on the northwest coast of that island. These operations, with further advances on New Guinea and to islands in the Bismarck sea, opened the pass between New Britain and New Guinea.

As we were able to advance our airfields, the Japanese were forced to retire theirs. The process has continued until now the Japs are all but driven from the entire area. Short of Truk, which is a prohibitive distance away for any planes but long-range bombers, they have no islands to which they can retire their air units. True, they could retreat up the northwest coast of New Guinea, as they have been doing under relentless pressure from MacArthur's mixed Allied forces. But this offers a dismal prospect for them, too.

Their bases at Madang and Wewak have already been under heavy air attack. The eventual mopping up of all the Solomons and the Bismarck archipelago will free both seasoned amphibious units and hard-hitting Marine air squadrons to help further isolate all the Jap bases in upper New Guinea.

With all this virtually accomplished, and the northern flank well secured by the smashing of the enemy in the Aleutians, the way was cleared for the opening of the big league phase of the Pacific war.

While these preliminary operations—the campaigns in

the North and the South and the Southwest Pacific—were being successfully carried out, Uncle Sam was girding his loins for further and greater action.

The Atlantic had been virtually cleared of German U-boats; Italy had capitulated, thus removing any potential nuisance from her fleet; it was no longer necessary to hold strong fleet forces available for possible Atlantic action. In addition to this our ship-building program, in all categories, was setting almost miraculous records, giving us supply ships that surmounted logistic difficulties, and landing craft for the use of highly trained and experienced expeditionary forces.

Many new carriers were commissioned, and planes of all types were rolling off the assembly lines, while eager young pilots waited to fly them. Huge reserves of supplies were amassed, with bottoms to move them.

Fourth Phase: The Big League

AT last the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was ready for a big league effort. Starting with decidedly inferior forces in the Pacific, the United States had stubbornly fought up-hill to equality and finally to preponderate superiority in sea and air strength.

The time had come for audacity. We could strike at will wherever we chose among the enemy's widely scattered bastions in the Western Pacific. Of course, we had yet to breach the outer ring of his defenses, but once through this, our Pacific Fleet—described by observers as the mightiest ever assembled on all the oceans of the world—could roam at will, hitting with terrific force when and where it pleased.

To our strategic planning could now be applied the old and proved naval principles of the control of a vast ocean area by overwhelming sea power. To these principles, of course, had been added the influence of greatly superior air strength.

The Gilbert Islands were first seized as a springboard for attacks on the Marshall Islands; unfortunately, heavy losses were suffered by the Marine landing forces. But in the far-flung operations incident to the capture of the Gilberts, all of our forces had experiences and made studies that were followed by intensive training periods. We organized our methods and perfected to a high degree the team-play of all elements involved, from the operation of reconnaissance planes to the landing and the developing of air and sea bases for further operations.

The over-all effect of control of the sea, with the enemy's local air forces all but obliterated, was appreciated in the planning of the bold strokes. A deep thrust to the western Marshalls was made by the seizure of the Kwajalein Atoll, followed soon afterwards by pushing farther west to Eniwetok. These daring moves were made with such vastly superior forces that the enemy fleet did not dare oppose them.

The sudden advance threw the Japanese completely off balance throughout most of the Western Pacific. The Japs did not at first appreciate what the far-reaching results of the bold stroke were.

Not only did our naval and air superiority permit the raiding of several small bases farther to the west, but it permitted the devastating attack on Truk where nearly 40 vessels were sunk or damaged and more than 200 airplanes destroyed. Shortly there followed a further sweep north to the Marianas where several vessels were sunk, planes destroyed and numerous base facilities devastated.

The Japanese are well aware of the fact that we were able to raid deep into their island empire even in the early months of the war when we had only a few carriers. Now with our vastly superior force of carrier-borne planes, these raids have assumed such great importance that they may result in the complete cutting of all the enemy sea lanes in the Western Pacific except those which hug the coast of China. Not only has our ability to strike so deeply seriously disrupted Japanese communications, but it has made it very dangerous for the Japanese to reinforce their outlying positions.

The new situation may be most embarrassing to them, especially if we are able to prevent the rebuilding and the reinforcement of such positions as Guam and Truk. We may even be able to prevent reinforcement of the Pelews.

Basic Principles

THE powerful blows of the air, naval and amphibious forces in the Central Pacific appear to have demonstrated several important basic principles about the prosecution of the Pacific naval war.

(*a*) Our powerful force of carrier-borne aviation, with the aid of long-range patrol planes and bombers, can, in due sequence, effectively neutralize any effort the Japanese air forces can make from isolated island bases in the Central or Western Pacific.

(*b*) With the thorough preparation by bombing and navy gunfire, amphibious forces can land and take highly fortified small islands from the Japanese and with the aid of engineer troops can quickly convert them into naval or air bases for our use.

(*c*) Task forces of fast battleships or heavy cruisers supporting aircraft carriers can make destructive raids deep into the sea areas of the Western Pacific which were heretofore considered completely under Japanese control.

From all this and in accordance with the well known principles of superior naval and air power, it is evident that our combined forces can penetrate still farther to the westward and take and hold bases if they can effectively neutralize Japanese air power in the general vicinity and prevent interference by elements of the Japanese Fleet until such time as the forces ashore can consolidate their positions and develop their own defenses.

During the critical stage of effecting this development, naval coverage is necessary and, if the position is within flight range of Japanese air forces, air protection is also necessary. Protection against the former can be furnished only with superior fleet forces while protection against the latter can be provided only by local fighter coverage operating either from the ground or aircraft carriers.

It is evident that as soon as fighter strips can be completed, fighter protection can be provided from the ground and the aircraft carriers which may have been providing temporary protection can be withdrawn. Fields for torpedo and dive bombing planes can be built soon after the fighter strips are in use, but fields for long-range bombers require more time to develop.

No position can be taken and successfully held unless

MARINE CORPS ACES

As of 10 March, 1944

No.	Name	Number Planes Shot Down
1.	FOSS, Joseph Jacob, Major *Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Flying Cross.*	26
2.	BOYINGTON, Gregory, Major	26
3.	HANSON, Robert M., First Lieutenant *Air Medal (spot).*	25
4.	WALSH, Kenneth A., Captain *Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal.*	20
5.	ALDRICH, Donald W., Captain	20
6.	SMITH, John L., Lieutenant Colonel *Congressional Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Order (England).*	19
7.	CARL, Marion E., Major *Navy Cross.*	18½
8.	THOMAS, Wilbur J., Captain *Navy Cross, Distinguished Flying Cross.*	16½
9.	SWETT, James E., Captain *Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Flying Cross.*	14
10.	CUPP, James N., Captain *Distinguished Flying Cross.*	13
11.	MARONTATE, William P., First Lieutenant *Navy Cross, Gold Star in lieu of Second Navy Cross.*	13
12.	SHAW, Edward O., Captain *Distinguished Flying Cross.*	13
13.	FRAZIER, Kenneth D., Captain *Navy Cross (spot award).*	12½
14.	DOBBIN, John Francis, Lieutenant Colonel *Navy Cross.*	12
15.	SEGAL, Harold E., Captain *Distinguished Flying Cross.*	12
16.	SPEARS, Harold Leman, Captain	12
17.	BAUER, Harold W., Lieutenant Colonel *Air medal awarded posthumously.*	11
18.	DE LONG, Philip Cuniffe, First Lieutenant	11
19.	GALER, Robert E., Lieutenant Colonel *Congressional Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, Distinguished Flying Cross (England).*	11
20.	CONGER, Jack E., Captain	10
21.	MORGAN, John L., Jr., Captain *Distinguished Flying Cross.*	10

Nine each:

DONAHUE, Capt. Archie Glenn (DFC); MANN, 2nd Lt. Thomas H., Jr. (NC); MAGEE, 1st Lt. Christopher L. (NC).

Eight each:

CASE, Capt. William Northrup (DFC); DE BLANC, Capt. Jefferson J. (NC, AM); EVERTON, Maj. Loren D. (NC); HOLLOWELL, Capt. George; JENSEN, 1st Lt. Alvin Julius (NC, AM); POST, Maj. Nathan T. (DFC, gold star for second DFC); OVEREND, Maj. Edmund F.

Seven each:

CROWE, Capt. William E.; HABERMAN, Capt. Roger A.; HAMILTON, WO Henry Bernard (NC); LOESCH, 1st Lt. Gregory K. (NC); MC CLURG, 1st Lt. Robert W. (DFC); NARR, 2nd Lt. Joseph L. (NC); REINBURG, Maj. J. Hunter (DFC); GUTT, 1st Lt. Fred E. (DFC).

Six each:

BAKER, Capt. Robert M.; BOLT, 1st Lt. John F., Jr.; DILLOW, Capt. Eugene (DFC, AM); FISHER, 1st Lt. Don Holms; HALL, Capt. Shelden O. (AM); FRASER, Capt. Robert B. (DFC, AM, N&MCM); OWENS, Maj. Robert G.; PAYNE, Lt. Col. Frederick R., Jr. (NC, AM); POND, 2nd Lt. Zenneth A. (NC); PRESLEY, 1st Lt. Frank H. (NC); STOUT, Maj. Robert F. (NC); THOMAS, 1st Lt. Frank C., Jr.; TROWBRIDGE, Capt. Eugene A. (NC); VEDDER, 1st Lt. Milton N. (AM); YOST, Lt. Col. Donald K. (SS).

Five each:

CARLTON, Capt. William A.; CHANDLER, 1st Lt. Creighton; DAVIS, Lt. Col. Leonard K. (NC); DAWKINS, Capt. George E., Jr.; DOYLE, 2nd Lt. Cecil J. (NC); DRURY, Capt. Frank C. (NC); ELWOOD, Maj. Hugh McJ.; FINN, Capt. Howard (DFC); FONTANA, Maj. Paul J. (NC); FORD, Capt. Kenneth M.; HACKING, Capt. Albert E. (DFC); HUNDLEY, 1st Lt. J. C.; KENDRICK, 1st Lt. Charles (DFC); KUNZ, Maj. Charles M. (NC, DFC); LAIRD, 1st Lt. Wayne W. (DFC); LONG, Capt. Herbert Harvey (DFC); PERCY, Capt. Gilbert (DFC, AM); PIERCE, Maj. Francis E., Jr. (NC, AM); PITTMAN, 1st Lt. Jack; POSKE, Maj. George H.; POWELL, Capt. Ernest A.; SCARBOROUGH, Capt. Hartwell V., Jr. (DFC, AM); SEE, 1st Lt. Robert W.; SNIDER, Capt. William N. (DFC); SYNAR, Capt. Stanley (DFC, AM, gold star for second AM); WEISSENBERGER, Maj. George J. (DFC, AM).

As explained last month, the service does not keep an official box score of individual planes shot down by pilots. This list was compiled at Marine Corps Headquarters from various records on file there, and is as accurate as possible, as of the date indicated. Several names of aces who made their records in the Guadalcanal campaign, or who brought over records of established planes shot down in China, have been added to the list. There are 82 names on the present list. Corrections and additions will be welcomed, and will be incorporated in revised lists if authenticated.

it can have a secure line of communications—furnished intermittently if necessary—and unless it can defend itself against enemy sea and air attacks.

There is always the possibility that fleet operations supporting such forward thrusts of our landing forces will bring on general fleet engagements and the supporting naval forces must always be in sufficient strength to meet such contingency.

It is apparent from these considerations and from the fact that island ladders such as the Solomons, along which we can advance by short steps, will not be available in the immediate future except along the northern coast of New Guinea, that in the immediate future all advances in the Pacific will have to be made to considerable distances in the more open regions of the Western Pacific. Our main forward steps now must be similar to those which have been effected in the Marshall Islands, in which the big fleet will play an important part.

As the advance continues westward, fleet bases will become a major consideration, as will the ability to maintain communications and to keep supplied the numerous forces involved. As important bases are taken from the enemy and strongly consolidated for our own use, a line of communications farther into the Western Pacific will be secured and our expeditionary forces will be able to push on to the Philippines and eventually to the coast of China where the war will assume another and probably more important phase. Or perhaps we'll attack the mainland of Japan.

Securing the Marshalls


By Captain Clifford P. Morehouse, USMCR

THE seizure of the Marshall Islands, begun with the capture of the Kwajalein Atoll on February 1-4, 1944, was continued by the taking of Majuro, Eniwetok, and Wotho. This gives the United States a row of strong-points directly up the center of the Marshall group and partially neutralizes the islands of Wotje, Maloelap, Mille, and Jaluit, still held by the Japs. It seems only a question of time before these are either taken or rendered valueless to the enemy.

Actually, Majuro Island was taken at about the same time as Kwajalein but the news was withheld for security reasons. While Jap bases in the eastern Marshalls were kept fully occupied by American air raids, Majuro was taken by the Marines without opposition and refitted as a refueling base for our Fleet. Equipment and facilities taken with the capture of the island made it possible to use Majuro immediately as a base for operations so that it became unnecessary for fleet units to make the 4500-mile round-trip to Pearl Harbor for that purpose. Thus, the raids on Truk and Saipan were probably made possible by the capture of this island and its secret use as a staging area.

Majuro was seized by a small Marine unit of the Fifth Amphibious Corps after reconnaissance forces, landing in rubber boats, had made sure that the Japanese had withdrawn. Warehouses, power tools, and other equipment fell into American hands intact—a fortunate circumstance of which the Central Pacific naval command made full use.

It seems likely that Majuro may be developed as one of the strongest naval operating bases in the Pacific. It is understood that during World War I, when the Marshalls were



Aerial reconnaissance view of Jap-held Engebi Island, Eniwetok Atoll, where Marines have landed in another giant offensive step on the "Road to Tokyo."



Marines of the Twenty-second Regiment await the word to attack on Eniwetok. One of the Marines at the left carries a flame thrower.



Group of Marines and Coast Guardsmen proudly display a captured Jap battle flag picked up by one of them during American invasion of Engebi Island, Eniwetok Atoll.

MARINES TAKE ENIWETOK



From emplacement on beach of Eniwetok Island, Marines of the Twenty-second Regiment open up with machine gun on Japs 400 yards up the beach.

←

Garden plots, a slit trench, a tip of the air strip and numerous bomb craters are shown in this photograph made by a United States Navy carrier-based plane over Engebi Island, 31 January 1944.





↑

Utter desolation describes the scene on Engebi Island near the Jap airfield after American naval shelling and air bombardment had leveled this once important Jap base on the Wake Island-Truk supply line.

German colonies, the German high command had chosen this site as the most logical base in the Central Pacific but neither the Germans nor the Japanese developed it to its full extent.


The attack began on February 17. On that morning a strong naval task force threw more than 1,000 tons of shells and bombs into the main Japanese position on Engebi Island at the north end of the Eniwetok Atoll. Here were located the principal airfields, radio station, and other important enemy installations.

Following the preparatory barrage, the hard-hitting battalions of the 22d Marines, under the command of Colonel John T. Walker, stormed and completely took control of the key Japanese air strip in exactly six hours and five minutes. So thorough had the preparation been that only a few mortars and machine guns remained to be silenced though snipers caused some casualties and it was necessary to wipe out many pockets of shell-shocked fanatical Japanese making suicidal resistance.

After Engebi, the Marines and Army troops of the 106th Infantry stormed Eniwetok Island at the south end of the atoll. Subsequently, both groups closed in on Parry Island, where, after sharp fighting, the last enemy resistance was overcome on February 22.

Thus, in six days one of the most strategic positions in the Central Pacific was secured for the United States. Nearly the entire enemy garrison of 2,000 was destroyed with American losses totalling about 150 dead and 350 wounded.

The attack on Eniwetok was commanded by Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner with the Marine and Army landing forces under the command of Brigadier General Thomas E. Watson, USMC. The 22d Marines were operating as a detached unit, not connected with any division.



ENIWETOK IS AN ATOLL CHAIN OF 38 MINUTE ISLANDS
(Map by courtesy *Life Magazine*)



U. S. troops land without opposition on strategic Majuro Atoll in the Marshalls.

Early in March the Navy reported the capture of Wotho by Marines with little enemy resistance. Wotho lies between Eniwetok and Kwajalein, serving as a connecting link in the chain of American strong-points now running through the center of the Marshall group.

Completion of the conquest of the Marshall Islands will be of great significance to the strategy of the Allied nations. For one thing, these islands are a part of the prewar Japanese empire and so their capture causes the enemy to lose "face" in the eyes of his own people. For a second, it shortens the supply lines to the Southwest Pacific by some 500 miles. Third, and perhaps most important of all, it provides a base 2,200 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor from which naval and air operations may be carried that much farther into enemy territory.

Slowly but surely American forces are moving closer to the Japanese homeland. There is much territory still to be recovered and probably the hardest fighting lies in the future; nevertheless, the initiative has now clearly passed to us and it is Tojo who must worry about where the next American blow will be struck.

Kwajalein Airfield Named for Marine

THE airfield on Roi-Namur Islands, Kwajalein Atoll, in the Marshall Group, has been named Dyess Field in memory of Lieutenant Colonel Aquilla James Dyess, USMCR, killed February 2 while leading the assault to capture the final Japanese stronghold there.

Well over six feet tall and powerfully built, red-haired Lieutenant Colonel Dyess led his command into a headlong attack on strong Japanese positions. The attack was successful, but a Jap machine gun cut Colonel Dyess down, killing him instantly.

Lieutenant Colonel Dyess was a graduate of Clemson College, Clemson, South Carolina, and ran Augusta Lumber Company prior to being called into active service from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1940. He is survived by his widow, Mrs. Conner C. Dyess, and by a young daughter, Conner.

Bombing T


In a Silo

By Colonel Robert L. Sc


As Told to Lieutenant Colonel Horac

A famous Army ace, author of the best-seller "God is My Co-Pilot," tells about the almost miraculous celestial Navigation Trainer.

WAY back in the early Snafu days when the Army Air Corps took over government air mail contracts—1934—one of our pilots had flown from Elko to Reno and on down into the Sacramento river valley. Near his destination he ran into the familiar, heavy Tule fog for which that region is famous. He tried to get down at Oakland and was forced to try Livermore, both of them without success. The fog was as thick as old pea soup and the pilot knew that hills rimmed the airports. Tired and hungry, he turned his ship back northeast and sought the more level land of the valley of Sacramento. Even there the Tule fog was like dark ink which had been poured into the lowlands between the High Sierras and the coastal range.



The celestial navigation instructor briefing and plotting a course problem for the student.



Inside the "plane." The instructor is checking the navigation log. The pilot is at the far left.

Night had fallen, and with a diminishing fuel supply he gritted his teeth and went into the zero-zero visibility of the mist. His throttled engine let him down lower and lower towards that unknown, somewhere in the rice fields of northern California. The damp slipstream rushed past his face as he peered from behind the windshield. It moaned in the flying wires of the old Douglas as she settled closer to the earth. Then the branches of a tree whipped past, brushed the under wings. The wheels struck the rough ground and bounced. Then all was smooth; the ship stopped after having rolled only a few feet. It was rather like rolling into feathers which wadded up under the wheels until they couldn't roll any more. And then, he just sat there a minute waiting for the crash in the stygian darkness; his reflexes tried to make him believe that he was still moving.

Very gingerly he crawled from the ship and dropped his chute at the junction of wing and fuselage. He peered about him, but could see only darkness and fog. Then he stamped his feet on the solid earth, and felt his way to the tail of the ship. He stepped forward like a blind man then, with arms held out in front, groping in the blackness. He aimed his body by the tail section of his plane and cautiously advanced his feet. One – two – three steps and his hands touched a cold brick wall. Deliberately now he retraced his steps to the empennage and felt his way around the wings again. Then he maneuvered out the left wing to its end, and stepped forward to strike another wall. A cold sweat broke out on him—was the wall everywhere?

He found his wing again, worked along it to the wheels, then the propeller and out in front of the nose of his plane, less than five feet—and ran into another brick wall. Almost hysterical now, he found the other wing, pointed his body breathlessly this time, walked out and bumped into another wall!

In desperation he crawled beneath his ship with his one known object, the chute, and finally fell asleep, exhausted. When he woke, the dim light of dawn was filtering down through his prison roof. It was then that he realized he had landed his plane in a silo!

That story will always raise eyebrows, and certain sceptical listeners will swear that all pilots are drunks and tellers of tall tales. We in the air services have listened and laughed, but we appreciate the predicament of being caught in the Tule fogs. It is an horrendous ordeal. But today we are flying in very similar silos. . . .

gTokyo

a Silo

ert L. Scott, Jr., USAAF

Lonel Horace S. Mazet, USMCR

All illustrations with this article are official photographs of the United States Army Air Forces.

NOT long ago, I took off in a four-engined ship, maneuvered to altitude and crossed oceans and seas to Africa, crossed that continent too, then the Arabian sea, India, Burma, China—and then I bombed Japan! You think this fantastic? Our young pilots are doing it every day.


Down in the Florida Everglades a unique institution known as the School of Applied Tactics for the Army Air Corps, called for obvious reasons "Afsat," trains pilots for overseas. There our air corps combat cadres on their way to action around the globe in this war are taught synthetic methods of bombing, climbing to forty thousand feet via compression chamber, escaping from "ditched" aircraft like the pseudo-Fortress in the lake there and flying in a "silo." In this school nothing is left to the imagination. Here Jap and Nazi planes are shot at without their being able to return the fire. We do it with moving picture machines and with mirrors. Now I have been shot at by the Nipponese fighter pilots and I'm quite frank in admiting that this method is more realistic than some of the battles in which I have participated. I break out with perspiration when my tracers converge on the phony Zeroes, and I nearly squeeze the trigger of my stick when that moving-picture Nip turns his ship in toward mine with all cannons blazing. Then suddenly, if my aim is true, his ship flashes red all over and I know I've made another kill.

Recently there have been completed several peculiar looking buildings that rise from Florida's flat, sandy terrain. They look just like the familiar grain silos of our Middle West, or the friendly red elevators of Saskatchewan. These are some forty feet high, cylindrical, with hemispherical domes that revolve, making the whole thing look like a silo—or perhaps an observatory.


Investigating these buildings for the first time, I strolled through the open door and found an air-conditioned classroom. With the door closed a heavy darkness pushed in on me, and I thought of that apocryphal pilot who landed his mail plane in the other silo, so long ago. But when the lights flashed on I saw the Celestial Navigation Trainer—a glorified Link Trainer—rising from a concrete base.

Three steel bars met above the center of a base, forming a pyramid. Down below one saw that the whole device could be moved around on the terrain plate. This revolved three hundred and sixty degrees. A drift mechanism introduced a wind of any desired velocity or direction into the trainer. There were gear boxes, radio compasses, cloud projectors, low vacuum turbines, electric motors and everything to simulate movements of an airplane in three dimensions. High above, I saw the "ship," mounted on the fuselage-supporting tower by means of the column and the triangular base anchored in concrete, resting on the revolving platform.


This fuselage was attached to the top of the column by a universal joint that permits the pitching and banking of simulated flight. Beneath the airplane was a screen which receives the projected terrain plate on which the changing images represent any part of the earth's surface. This projection, normally, appeared as viewed from an airplane at ten thousand feet, but other views will give the illusion of any desired altitude. Another moving plate projects images of clouds in any desired intensity upon this same screen to give the realistic illusion of adverse weather and various navigation or bombing problems. Drift from antici-



View down through astrodome opening, showing navigator's station and projection of terrain plate on screen below.



Here is the celestial dome, with the student sighting on collimated stars with sextant.



Side view of the fuselage. The student navigator is using the astro-compass, while the instructor watches. The pilot is in the center front.

pated crosswinds or resultants of headwinds or tailwinds can be introduced, requiring corresponding changes in flight navigation.

Above the ship swung the hemispherical dome, lined with chicken wire, holding the twelve stars used for navigation. Actually they are collimated lights. Also available are scaled outlines of the constellations. This dome may be rotated on machined rollers over the dome rail to simulate the passage of time or changes in longitude during a long flight—or move down on the dome rail to show the desired latitude. The center of the sphere, top half of which is represented by the dome, falls within the fuselage of the trainer and thus the navigator can determine accurately the altitudes of the collimated "stars" by using his bubble sextant, and his own position on the "flight."

At an operator's desk in a lighted booth under the ship various switches and dials control the dome and terrain plates; here also are the controls of the radio to introduce problems of actual flying conditions, simulating two radio stations necessary for obtaining a "fix" within the ship. An automatic recorder traces the flight path.



Operator's desk with recorder (crab) in position to trace course over graticule.

THE cockpit of the trainer was a duplicate of a regulation four-engined bomber. I entered it with my crew that first day and we sat in our usual places for a raid: pilot, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, and radio operator. We started the engines. There came the same rushing, roaring noise as though real engines were bursting into life. I felt their steady vibrations. Every instrument was represented on the panel in front of me. Over the radio I heard the operator tell us that all was clear for the take-off. I checked the fuel gauges which actually functioned in the normal manner.



A general view, showing structural steel work, base of tower with turning motor, and dive and climb bellows (top).


The operator called that the dome was set for our flight and he threw the time and navigation switches. That set the dome in motion to correspond exactly to actual changes that would be visible to an observer moving at the same speed and in the same direction as the simulated flight of our trainer.

Now a motor began to turn the dome from east to west, the longitudinal drive turned the dome at a rate equal to the change in longitude. This of course depended on the east-west course and the ground speed. At the same time the latitude drive moved the dome up or down at a rate equal to the change in latitude caused by the north-south course of the ship. Automatically the dome gear box compensated for the apparent motion relative to the star positions caused by this imitation aerial voyage.

All the sensations of flight flowed over me as I took off in the silo. I saw trees rushing back towards us on the

lighted projection in front of the windshield. I almost ducked as the trees went by close underneath when we simulated a full-load take-off. We were on our way to a far distant target. Now as I watched, the first navigation chart was projected on the screen. Hours began to drag by, and I watched my fuel being consumed to the steady drone on the engines. I adjusted my throttles for best economy, for we had a long trip ahead. I set the turbos and the manometers for best gasoline-air mixture and even tuned the radio for a broadcast to help pass the time. Later on, I noticed that the local radio in Orlando, Florida, was realistically fading in my ears!

Then the operator tuned in on the radio station of our first destination: Trinidad. The RDF needle became more and more sensitive as we approached South America. In seven hours the coast of the southern hemisphere slid un-




Selecting a terrain plate.

der the ship on the projection screen, seemingly coming up out of the blue-green Caribbean.

We had been averaging three hundred miles an hour and I noted when Port of Spain flashed beneath us that we even observed the proper military *corridor of approach*, for this was an actual training flight. After landing at Waller Field we climbed down the ladder to the ground while our ship was being serviced. Coffee would taste mighty good now. For after all, we had been in that cockpit nearly eight hours.


We walked through the dim light into the open sunshine. The terrain was just as green as I expected Trinidad to appear, but the pine trees looked very much like the familiar Florida variety. It was over my second cup of coffee that I realized we were merely practicing a simulated flight and still very much present in Florida, for a sergeant nabbed me to sign a desk-full of papers I had quite forgotten about.

As the days went by I took longer navigation flights, and finally reached Africa. All along on that trip I'd look at the dark heavens where the simulated stars were covered



Student shooting a fix from the navigator's compartment of celestial navigation trainer with sextant. In foreground is astral compass.

by an overcast. The trackless waste of darkness that stretched below us could be either the ocean or the black jungle. Every now and then I'd hear a voice. "Okay, Joe—turn on the stars!" Then overhead would twinkle the friendly collimated lights that our navigator needed. His sextant light flashing for a few seconds enabled him to



The sergeant in the foreground is sliding a terrain plate into the carriage. The corporal is showing a cloud projector disk.

shoot our position. I could see the Big Dipper almost on the horizon and I knew we were nearing the equator. There would be Cassiopea and the Pleiades too. It was hard to realize that all this was man-made until suddenly, a rude voice would sing out, "Turn out the stars!" and overhead they flickered and went out as if at the touch of a Master Hand.

Once more it would be dark and lonesome. There would be, then, just the steady drone of the engines as we pitched and tossed in the mechanical, simulated storm far above a non-existent sea, isolated and remote.

Daylight would come and I began to tense, for the ter rain was that of the approaches to Tokyo. As we made our corrections to arrive over the initial point for our bombing run, I heard the rude voice call out "Turn on the clouds!" At once part of the earth below was hidden, and dark status clouds drifted across the screen. I could see the world only through these moving holes in the clouds. But suddenly through a rift in them I spotted the island that was our initial point. I turned on the corrected heading and our target lay dead ahead, with all the landmarks that I had studied for so long on my maps that they were strangely familiar to me.

I called my bombardier on the interphone, "It's yours, George. Take it away!" From this moment on he would fly the ship to target. I heard the rough voice call now, "Put in the wind drift!" and the clouds seemed to drift athwartships. I knew then that the operator was giving us realistic weather.

Now we were approaching the target lined up in the bombsight. The bomb bay doors opened and I noticed my heart start beating faster. I tensed visibly, and the ship lurched when I involuntarily pulled back on the wheel just a bit.

Then George called *"Bombs away!"*

I took the controls from the Iron Mike. It seemed just like the time we dropped eggs over Rangoon. I half expected to see Zeros with their circular red insigne gleaming in the sun over Japan. But my eyes met only darkness. Then suddenly the city of Tokyo spread out beneath us, and I ducked my head, for ack-ack should have been bursting thick around our ship. I knew right then that the only device this inventor had missed was an automatic gadget down on the floor shooting Roman candles at us while the operator touched off a few giant crackers.

Then our bombs struck after the proper interval, and there flashed on the screen below a little light which showed their point of impact. On target! The illusion was so real that I yelled as loud as I could, for the bombs had blasted a direct hit on the Emperor's Palace. Good Lord, they would commit wholesale hara-kiri in Tokyo tonight!

The excitement at this point has been too much for me. I take evasive action anyway for a few minutes on the return flight, but I am almost completely fagged out. So I turn over the controls to the younger co-pilot who didn't see it all, and try to make my nerves behave.

We wend our way over Kamchatka to Fairbanks and the snow on the screen is so realistic that I catch a cold. I'm suffering from "simulated aeroembolism" anyway, because we were bombing from twenty-two thousand feet and in the excitement over Tokyo I bit my oxygen tube in two. I just don't feel up to flying back today.

I know from experience that the illusion of having been on a momentous flight will persist even in the face of common sense. After such flights I have been strongly tempted to peek at evening papers, just to make sure that Tokyo was not bombed that day by an Army four-engined bomber. These celestial navigation trainers are so close to the real thing that their value in training bomber crews cannot be overestimated, and it is by no means beyond the realm of possibility that in future months green crews just graduated will train in these "silos" so effectively that they will be permitted to take off and bomb a target thousands of miles away with accuracy and devastating effect.

It is to be hoped that most of them will make the Tokyo flight.

Victory Ahead

THANKS to the teamwork between the armed forces, we have carried the war today to a point where we can see certain victory ahead. It may be a long time coming, and it may be costly to achieve, and certainly we have no right to take things easy or indulge in self-congratulations. But I think we should look back briefly on what we have done since Pearl Harbor and take stock. The strides we have made have been a rude shock to our enemies, and ought to be a source of gratification to ourselves. In retrospect, the tasks and the accomplishments of these years have been truly herculean.—General Thomas Holcomb, USMC.

TARAWA

The Story of a Battle

Reviewed by Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR

A SOLID and worthy contribution to contemporary war literature is to be found in Robert Sherrod's book, *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle.** The author was there himself, throughout the whole bitter struggle, as a correspondent for *Time* Magazine. He was among the vanguard to hit the beach during the first few hours of that awful week. He waded ashore from the outer reef while machine gun bullets whipped the water around him into froth and men died within arm's reach on every side.

His book is extremely well written. It deserves to rank with that of his *Time* and *Life* colleague, John Hersey, *Into the Valley*, which described in more or less the same manner a tragic incident in the early part of the Guadalcanal campaign of 1942.

Sherrod makes no claim to being a military strategist; he admits that he was paralyzed by fear, sickened by the overwhelming stench of death. But he does an exceptional job of reporting and pays high tribute to the Marines who won the battle, one of the goriest per square yard in the long history of the Corps.

SOME of the outstanding passages of the narrative are quoted here:

During the wait at Base X we met the men who would run the Tarawa show: Rear Admiral Harry Hill, the lean, handsome commander of the Southern (Tarawa) Amphibious Force; Major General Julian C. Smith, sensitive, kindly Marylander who commanded the Second Marine Division; and Colonel Merritt A. Edson, chief of staff of the division.

"We cannot count on heavy naval and air bombardment to kill all the Japs on Tarawa, or even a large proportion of them," said Colonel Edson, to the more-than-mild surprise of some of us who had been listening to the claims of some battleship gunnery officers—one claimed there would not even be a land mass for the Marines to land on after the big guns had finished with Tarawa.

"Neither can we count on taking Tarawa, small as it is, in a few hours. You must remember the inevitable slowness of ground action," added Edson. "Some of the battalion commanders think we can take it in three hours, but I think it may take a little longer. These Nips are surprising people."

I asked General Smith about his division. He was very proud of it. "I think they will do well. They are a fine bunch of fighting men.

"There's one thing about an operation of this kind that most people don't realize," Julian Smith continued, "and that is the vast amount of preparation involved. There are a million things that must be attended to before the division commander can say, 'Ready.'

"Look at the special training the men had to get—beachhead landings, night fighting, various kinds of new equipment. Then the equipment had to come from many thousands of miles. Some of the ships we are going to use weren't even built when we started preparing. Some of the LST's (landing ships for tanks) we will use won't meet us until we get outside Tarawa. I'm afraid the people back home do not know what careful planning and precise timing are required to fight even one battle in a war."

Before we left Admiral Hill's battleship, Merritt Edson spoke up, "One more thing I forgot to tell you. The troops on Tarawa are a special navy landing force—what the newspapers call Jap Marines or Imperial Japanese Marines. That means they are the best Tojo's got."

Sherrod pays high tribute to Colonel David M. Shoup, who led the combat team in the landing and directed all the ground fighting from the narrow beachhead for the first two days:

He was an interesting character, this Colonel Shoup. A squat, red-faced man with a bull neck, a hard-boiled, profane shouter of orders, he would carry the biggest burden on Tarawa. On his judgment and his ability would depend the lives of several thousand men and, ultimately perhaps, whether or not we won the battle.

He had joined the Marines as a second lieutenant soon after he finished college in 1926. He had served in the usual Navy yards and aboard the battleship *Maryland*, and in Shanghai, Pekin, and Tientsin. Early in the war he had commanded a battalion in Iceland, and lately he had been Operations Officer of the Second Division. He was the tough Marine officer in the best tradition, and he had the greatest faith in the Marines' ability to succeed in anything they undertook.

I WAS curious to know what various officers thought the effect of the naval gunfire and aerial bombardment would be. Obviously, the ease or difficulty of our task depended on the number of Japs killed or stunned by the preliminary bombing and shelling. When I asked General Julian Smith at Base X, he wouldn't even attempt a guess at first. He finally said he wouldn't count on more than one third of them being killed before the Marines hit the beach. As indicated above, Colonel Edson was bearish on the effect of the high explosives: "Where the Navy gunnery officers make their mistake is in assuming that land targets are like ships—when you hit a ship it sinks and all

**Tarawa: The Story of a Battle.* By Robert Sherrod. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc. 183 pp. $2.00.



Dmitri Kessel Photo

Robert Sherrod, war correspondent and editor, author of the new book, *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle,* one of the best covered battle stories of the war because the author lived through every minute of it.

is lost, but on land you've got to get direct hits on many installations, and that's impossible, even with three thousand tons of shells and bombs." One day on the *Blue Fox,* I went up to see Colonel Shoup and tried to pin him down for an estimate.

"Well," said Dave Shoup, "if there are three thousand Nips on the island, I'd say not more than seven hundred will be dead when we get ashore. But the degree of their ability to function will be something else. The bombing and shelling will tear up their communications, for one thing, and they won't fight effectively without communications.

"What worries me more than anything is that our boats may not be able to get over that coral shelf that sticks out about five hundred yards. We may have to wade in. The first waves, of course, will get in all right on the 'alligators' (amphibious tractors), but if the Higgins boats draw too much water to get in fairly close, we'll either have to wade in with machine guns maybe shooting at us, or the amphtracks will have to run a shuttle service between the beach and the end of the shelf. We have got to calculate high tide pretty closely for the Higgins boats to make it."

Immediately after the official announcement of the heavy casualties at Tarawa, there was, in the United States, a wave of ill-informed criticism charging that the officers in charge had bungled the show by not properly taking into account these reefs and tides. The foregoing should pretty effectively scotch such charges.

The author describes graphically the tension during the last few hours before they climbed down the nets into the landing boats. The officers in charge of the operation naturally did not want a civilian correspondent entrusted to them to be placed in too great jeopardy; so they assigned Sherrod to the fifth wave, probably thinking that by the time he reached shore the beachhead would be fairly secure. But it didn't work out that way at all. Sherrod continues:

It was nearly nine o'clock when the fifth wave arrived at the boat rendezvous and began circling to wait for our turn to go in. I looked around the ramp to see what was on the beach. For the first time I felt that something was wrong. The first waves were not hitting the beach as they should. There were very few boats on the beach, and these were all amphibious tractors which the first wave used. There were no Higgins boats on the beach, as there should have been by now.

Almost before we could guess at what bad news was being foretold, the control boat came alongside. The naval officer shouted, "You'll have to go in right away, as soon as I can get an amphtrack for you. The shelf around the island is too shallow to take the Higgins boats." This was indeed chilling news. It meant something that had been dimly foreseen but hardly expected: the only way the Marines were going to land was in the amphtracks ("alligators") which could crawl over the shallow reef that surrounds Betio. It meant that the landings would be slow, because there were not enough amphtracks for everybody, and we would have to use the emergency shuttle system that had been worked out as a last resort. And suppose the amphtracks were knocked out before they could get enough men ashore to hold what the first wave had taken? And suppose the Marines already ashore were killed faster than they could be replaced under this slow shuttle system?

An amphtrack bobbed alongside our Higgins boat. Said the Marine amphtrack boss: "Quick! Half you men get in here. They need help bad on the beach. A lot of Marines have already been killed and wounded." While the amphtrack was alongside, Jap shells from an automatic weapon began peppering the water around us. "Probably a forty-millimeter," said one of the calmer Marine officers.

But the Marines did not hesitate. Hadn't they been told that other Marines "needed help bad"? Major Rice and seventeen others scampered into the amphtrack and headed for the beach. I did not see them again until three days later, when the battle was over.

THE next amphtrack crew said they would take us in to where we could wade the rest of the way, but amphtracks were getting so scarce he couldn't take us all the way. We jumped into the little tractor boat and quickly settled on the deck. "Oh, God, I'm scared," said the little Marine,

a telephone operator, who sat next to me forward in the boat. I gritted my teeth and tried to force a smile that would not come and tried to stop quivering all over (now I was shaking from fear). I said, in an effort to be reassuring, "I'm scared, too." I never made a more truthful statement in all my life. I was not petrified yet, but my joints seemed to be stiffening.

The fifteen of us—I think it was fifteen—scurried over the side of the amphtrack into the water that was neck-deep. We started wading. No sooner had we hit the water than the Jap machine guns really opened up on us. There must have been five or six of these machine guns concentrating their fire on us—there was no nearer target in the water at the time—which meant several hundred bullets per man. I don't believe there was one of the fifteen who wouldn't have sold his chances for an additional twenty-five dollars added to his life-insurance policy. It was painfully slow, wading in such deep water. And we had seven hundred yards to walk slowly into that machine-gun fire, looming into larger targets as we rose onto higher ground. I was scared, as I had never been scared before. But my head was clear. I was extremely alert, as though my brain were dictating that I live these last minutes for all they were worth. I recalled that psychologists say fear in battle is a good thing; it stimulates the adrenalin glands and heavily loads the blood supply with oxygen.

Sherrod finally reached the precarious hold the Marines had on the beach:

From the water's edge to the seawall there was twenty feet of sand and brown and green coral. These twenty feet were our beachhead. The Japs controlled the rest of the island, excepting this pocket—twenty feet deep and perhaps a hundred yards wide—which had been established by the Second Battalion of the Eighth Marine Regiment, the farthest left of our three assault battalions, plus two other pockets which had been established as fragilely by the other two battalions. The beginning at Betio did not look bright. But several hundred Marines had gone over that seawall to try to kill the Japs who were killing our men as they waded ashore. They went over—though they knew very well that their chances of becoming a casualty within an hour were something like fifty per cent.

A Marine jumped over the seawall and began throwing blocks of fused TNT into a coconut-log pillbox about fifteen feet back of the seawall against which we sat. Two more Marines scaled the seawall, one of them carrying a twin-cylindered tank strapped to his shoulders, the other holding the nozzle of the flamethrower. As another charge of TNT boomed inside the pillbox, causing smoke and dust to billow out, a khaki-clad figure ran out the side entrance. The flamethrower, waiting for him, caught him in its withering stream of intense fire. As soon as it touched him, the Jap flared up like a piece of celluloid. He was dead instantly but the bullets in his cartridge belt exploded for a full sixty seconds after he had been charred almost to nothingness. It was the first Jap I saw killed on Betio—the first of four thousand. *Zing, zing, zing,* the cartridge-belt bullets sang. We all ducked low. Nobody wanted to be killed by a dead Jap.

That first awful day finally drew to a close. Sherrod and another correspondent dug themselves a primitive shelter for the night:

I was quite certain that this was my last night on earth. We had twenty feet along perhaps one-sixteenth of one half of one side of the island. The Japs had the rest. Although we had landed a lot of troops—perhaps two thousand—by this time, they were crowded into such a small space that we did not have room for foxholes to hold them all. And if the Japs counterattacked, what could we do except shoot at them from behind our seawall until they finally overwhelmed us?

During the first night the Japs, apparently because their communications had been disrupted and many of their men undoubtedly had been stunned, had not counterattacked. Probably as many as three hundred Japs, we learned later, had committed suicide under the fierce pounding of our naval guns and bombs.

Meanwhile, the Marines had landed Colonel Shoup's combat team reserve battalion, the first battalion of the Second Regiment. During the night considerable quantities of ammunition, some artillery, some tanks (light and medium), and other supplies had also been brought in.

Our casualties had been heavy on the first day, but well over half the dead, and practically all of the wounded, had been shot, not in the water, but after they had reached land and climbed the seawall. Those wounded more than lightly in the water had little chance of reaching shore. The amphibious operation up to that point, therefore, could have been called better than successful. The hell lay in the unexpectedly strong fortifications we had found after we landed.

The second day was even more critical than the first, but toward the end of it the tide finally turned in our favor.

On the third day Sherrod wrote in his notes:

This was the day the Japs fell apart. There were many factors in this rout. Another company of light tanks and a few thirty-two-ton tanks had a field day with the Japs, who cowered in their pillboxes and waited for death. Armored half-tracks, mounting 75mm. guns, paraded up and down Betio all day, pouring high explosives into pillboxes, carrying Marine riflemen who killed Japs wherever they dared stick their heads up. The men with the flamethrowers killed many hundreds in their fortifications or outside their fortifications. Our line across the island had held during the night, preventing any fresh Japs from filtering toward the scenes of the toughest fighting. On the third day the question was not, "How long will it take to kill them all?" but, "How few men can we expect to lose before killing the rest of the Japs?"

This desire to lend a helping hand is one of the most touching things in and around a battle, where every man

wants to help every other man. I have seen men, when asked for a cigarette, feel the inside of the pack, find only one left. They bulge out the pack, proffer the last cigarette, then pocket the empty pack so the other man will not know that he is accepting all there is.

On Betio the drinking water is almost undrinkable—the five-gallon cans had been filled in New Zealand many weeks before and the heat of the South Pacific had caused some of the enamel lining to dissolve into the water. Thus, the only palatable water was that which each man brought in his two canteens from his transport. Yet, I have seen several men give their last drink of water to a comrade, with the untrue remark, "Oh, I've got some more in my other canteen." What a pity Americans at home cannot display the same unselfish attitude toward each other and toward the men who fight for them!

THE Japs from the tail end of the island, despite three days of merciless pounding, were able to stage their "Banzai!" attack. Having cautiously stayed hidden in their holes for three days, the emperor-worshipping brown men now threw away all caution in anticipation of inevitable death. Screaming "Marine, you die!" and "Japanese drink Marines' blood!" they rushed Company B in what seemed like overpowering numbers. The line wavered, and in one place it cracked momentarily. Lieutenant Thomas telephoned Major Jones, "We are killing them as fast as they come at us, but we can't hold much longer; we need reinforcements." Said Jones, "We haven't got them to send you; you've got to hold." Company B held. At least three hundred Japs died in their fanatical charge. Company B's feat was one of the most heroic on Betio. The red-eyed, grime-coated Marines who stumbled out of the front line next morning, more dead than alive, muttered, "They told us we had to hold . . . and, by God, we held." That line, I reflected, might be added to the Marine Corps Hymn.

Perhaps thirty feet back of the seawall, four Marines lie dead outside a larger pillbox. There are six dead Japs inside. Still thirty feet further inland three dead Japs lie inside another pillbox, and there are three Marines lying around the pillbox. It is not difficult to see that the Marines were determined to keep on killing Japs while the breath of life remained in them, whether that last breath was drawn in the water, at the barricade, or at some undetermined point inland. What words can justify such bravery in the face of almost certain death? They died, but they came on. Those machine guns were killing other Marines out in the water, and who ever heard of one Marine letting another down? It isn't done.

"There was one thing that won this battle," says Major General Julian Smith, "and that was the supreme courage of the Marines. The prisoners tell us that what broke their morale was not the bombing, not the naval gunfire, but the sight of Marines who kept coming ashore in spite of their machine-gun fire. The Jap machine-gun fire killed many Marines in the water and on the beach. But other Marines came behind those who died. They landed on the beaches, they climbed the seawall, and they went into those enemy defenses. The Japs never thought they would lose this island. Their men were told a million of us couldn't take it."

In a final chapter labelled "Afterthoughts" Sherrod sums up his findings. Among them are these:

Tarawa, it seemed to me, marked the beginning of offensive thrusts in the Pacific. Tarawa appeared to be the opening key to offensive operations throughout the whole Pacific—as important in its way as Guadalcanal was important to the defense of the U. S.-Australian supply line.

Tarawa was not perfectly planned or perfectly executed. Few military operations are, particularly when the enemy is alert. Said Julian Smith: "We made mistakes, but you can't know it all the first time. We learned a lot which will benefit us in the future. And we made fewer mistakes than the Japs did."

Tarawa must have given the Japanese General Staff something to think about.

The lessons of Tarawa were many. It is a shame that some very fine Americans had to pay for those lessons with their lives, but they gave their lives that others on other enemy beaches might live. On Tarawa we learned what our best weapons were, what weapons needed improving, what tactics could best be applied to other operations. Our capacity to learn, after two years of war, had improved beyond measure.

The facts were cruel, but inescapable: probably no amount of shelling and bombing could obviate the necessity of sending in foot soldiers to finish the job. The corollary was this: there is no easy way to win the war; there is no panacea which will prevent men from getting killed. To me it seemed that to deprecate the Tarawa victory was almost to defame the memory of the gallant men who lost their lives achieving it.

After two years of observing the Japanese, I had become convinced that they had only one strategy: to burrow into the ground as far and as securely as possible, waiting for the Americans to dig them out; then to hope that the Americans would grow sick of their own losses before completing the job. Result: a Japanese victory through negotiated peace. It seemed to me that those Americans who were horrified by Tarawa were playing into Japanese hands. It also seemed that there was no way to defeat the Japanese except by extermination.

These excerpts naturally fail to do justice to the excellent job of reporting and writing that Sherrod has done. But perhaps they will whet the appetite of all Marines to read this stirring tribute to their gallant brothers-in-arms who fought at Tarawa. And, speaking of gallantry, it should be remembered that the author was there, too, through every bloody minute of it. The fact that he was armed only with pencil and notebook did not lessen his personal danger when men were dying all around him.

A Guy Named Hawkins

By Robert Sherrod

Correspondent of *Time*

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The landing strip on bloody Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll had been named Hawkins Field before the bulldozers had finished scooping up the dead Japs and filling the bomb craters. Here is the story of how and why it was given this name, written for* THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE *by a reporter who lived through that bitter engagement. Mr. Sherrod's new book, "Tarawa—The Story of a Battle" is reviewed at length elsewhere in this issue. In the book he pays tribute to the gallant fighting spirit of the entire Marine Corps. In this story he proffers a wreath to the memory of one brave Leatherneck who gave his life in the winning of that battle.*

WILLIAM DEANE HAWKINS was born April 19, 1914, in Fort Scott, Kansas. He died of wounds, a first lieutenant of the United States Marine Corps Reserve, November 21, 1943, on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll.

Anyone who has ever been in combat knows that it is almost impossible to grade bravery. Who can judge that one man who risks his life is more courageous than another? Who can say that a man is braver if he kills many of the enemy than if he lost his own life on the beach before he ever had a chance at the enemy?

The effectiveness of acts of bravery is something else. By this standard, I would say that the bravest man I have seen in two years of the Pacific War was William Deane Hawkins. When the going was toughest, when it was touch and go whether the Marines would take Tarawa, the figure of "Hawk" loomed above all the others I saw. The inspiration he instilled into other men was the essence of heroism. Hawk killed a lot of Japs—one of his men told me he knew Hawk personally accounted for six enemy machine gun nests—but the example he furnished his own men, as well as the other Marines on our perilous beachhead, was, in my opinion, a deciding factor in the most violent battle we Americans have seen. One colonel and one lieutenant colonel told me that Hawkins came as near winning a battle as any first lieutenant ever did.

After Hawkins died, on the second day of the three and one-half days' battle for Tarawa, Major General Julian C. Smith, the Second Marine Division's commanding officer, named the airfield on Betio for him. This was a rare honor; most airfields are named for flyers. But, as General Smith said, "It is the least I can do in tribute to a man like that."

Deane Hawkins' father was from Louisiana and his mother was the daughter of a Missouri doctor. When he was three years old, and his family was living in Los Angeles, the most important event of his life occurred: a neighbor, using the Hawkins' kitchen to do her washing, walked out a door holding a pan of scalding water; little Deane Hawkins ran into her and upset the pan. He suffered severe burns on a third of the surface of his body—his arms, his back, a shoulder, a leg.

One of the baby's legs was drawn and an arm was crooked so that he could not straighten them. The doctors wanted to cut the muscles, but the boy's mother was not sure. For a year she massaged the arm and leg every day for two or three hours. Finally, to the amazement of the doctors, the muscles lived again. A year after he was burned Deane Hawkins was cured, was learning to walk once more.

WHEN he was five, the Hawkinses again lived in Kansas. En route to Phoenix, they stopped in El Paso where his father, an insurance claim adjuster, was persuaded to settle. When Deane Hawkins was eight, his father died. His mother went to work, first as a secretary to the high school principal, then as a teacher of commercial subjects in El Paso Technical Institute.

Deane Hawkins' scars were always with him. By the time he was ten he was a fine swimmer, but one day he came home from the Y.M.C.A. unhappy and brooding. "Aw, mom," he said, "I don't think I'm going to the Y any more. When I take off my clothes, the kids all look and say, 'Oh, look at Deane!' " His mother reassured him. "Son, it's not your fault; you have nothing to be ashamed of." He went back to his swimming pool.

He wanted to get into the Navy, to study aeronautical engineering; he was always making plane models with doped cloth fuselages and rubber-band power plants. But he had no influence; he knew no congressman who would appoint him to the Naval Academy. So he persuaded two friends, James Colley, later of the Marines, and William Abbott, later a Navy pilot, to enlist with him with a view to taking the merit examination for Annapolis. The two friends got into the Navy. Deane Hawkins did not; he had scars. Said the recruiting chief: "I never hated to turn down anyone so much in all my life. You're the kind of boy the Navy wants." Deane went home. "They made it," he sobbed to his mother, "it was my idea and I didn't."

When he was eighteen he had a railroad job. He was working under a car when an engine bumped it. In scrambling from beneath the car, he dislocated a vertebra. When he took a physical examination before returning to work, the railroad doctor saw the scars and said, "Nothing doing; you are not a good risk." Later he tried to enlist in the Army Air Corps. The scars kept him out.

Deane Hawkins was a smart boy—at El Paso's Lamar and Alta Vista Schools and at El Paso High School. He skipped the fifth grade. He won the state chemistry essay contest, graduated from high school at sixteen, and was awarded a scholarship to the Texas College of Mines where he studdied engineering. Like most sons of the poor, he worked. After school and during summer vacations, he sold magazines and delivered newspapers; he was a bank messenger

and he made photostats for an abstract company. He was a ranchhand, a railroad hand, a bellhop. At seventeen he was skinny and six feet tall. He met a hotel guest who told him laborers were needed to lay a pipe line in New Mexico. In New Mexico the hiring boss laughed: "Sonny, two-hundred-pound men are collapsing on this job." But he gave the kid a chance, and Deane Hawkins worked twelve hours a day lifting, with the help of one full-grown man, four-hundred-pound creosoted pipe. When his mother saw her son a week later, she was horrified at the skinny boy, burned by wind, sun, sand, and creosote. "I'm all right now, mom," he said, "but the first day I thought I'd die."


He left Texas when he was twenty-one. He worked two and a half years in Tacoma, Washington, in a dank, underground office so unlike the Texas outdoors he was used to. He was married there and divorced. Then he went to work as an engineer for a Los Angeles title insurance company. He was there when Pearl Harbor happened. Before the war he had said, " I hate war. I don't see why the United States ought to get into it." But when the United States was forced into it, Deane Hawkins said, "I've got to go. I'm going to see if the Marines will have me." That was when he was at home, Christmas, 1941. He enlisted in Los Angeles. He was very proud when "the toughest outfit of them all" accepted him, scars and all.

"Hawk" was what all the Marines called him, from the time he entered boot camp until he died—when he died nobody from his own outfit could tell me his first name. When the Second Marines went overseas in June, 1942, Hawkins was a p.f.c. On shipboard he was promoted to corporal; by the time he landed on Tulagi in August, he was a sergeant, and before the Battle of the Solomons was a month old, he had been commissioned a second lieutenant. A Marine Sergeant wrote to his mother after Hawk's death: "When he was a sergeant, I knew he would make a fine officer. . . . Your son was born to lead and I would have followed him anywhere. . . . You see, 'Hawk' loved trouble. If there was a tough job to do, he'd ask for it."

From Tulagi and Guadalcanal, Hawkins sent his mother high-spirited, amusing letters; "I heard the darnedest argument last night. I woke up and was being carried into the jungle by two bugs. I heard one bug say, 'Shall we eat him here or carry him a little farther?' And the other bug said, 'Hell, no, let's eat him here before some big bug comes along and takes him away from us.' "

THE first time I saw Hawk was on a transport going to Tarawa from the South Pacific rendezvous. One afternoon we stood topside after chow, watching the miracle of the equatorial sunset: gold and flaming red, slate grey and solid blue streaks and green streaks in the sky. To the west, between our ships and the sunset, the outlines of some forty American ships of war grew dimmer. Hawkins was talking about his Scout and Sniper platoon. He was proud of that platoon. He said, as though he were announcing what time it was, "I think the thirty-four men in my platoon can lick any two-hundred-man company in the world." He continued:

"You know, we're going in first. We are going to wipe every last one of the bastards off that pier and out from under that pier before they have a chance to pick off the first wave. But one man had to stay behind to take care of our equipment. I asked for volunteers. Not a man in the platoon would volunteer to stay. My men are not afraid."



HERO OF TARAWA
First Lieutenant William Deane Hawkins, USMC for whom Hawkins Field on Betio Island is named.

The Scout and Sniper platoon consisted of troops chosen after Guadalcanal. They were devoted to Hawkins, and he to them. After Tarawa his second in command, Gunnery Sergeant J. J. Hooper, wrote to Mrs. Hawkins: "Lieutenant Hawkins' job on Guadalcanal was leading patrols behind the enemy's lines to gather information concerning the enemy; this information materially helped to terminate that campaign. . . . The whole platoon wants you to know that Lieutenant Hawkins was the best officer we ever did duty with."

The Scout and Sniper platoon came from eighteen different states—Wisconsin and California, with five each, were best represented. Their racial background was a ladleful from the American melting pot. Hooper from Milford, N. J., Davis from Tennessee, Gillis from Ipswich, Mass., Deka and Krzys from Cleveland, Leseman and Kloskowski from Wisconsin, Selavka from Connecticut and Allred from Sopuia, N. C., Putz from Forest Hills, N. Y., and Collins from Chatham, N. Y. Besides Hooper, there were three other sergeants, nine corporals, the rest privates first class. Of the thirty-four, six were killed, three wounded.

Going into Tarawa the platoon was divided into two groups, one commanded by Hawkins, the other by Gun-

nery Sergeant Hooper. Hawkins, accompanied by Lieutenant Leslie of the 18th Marines and four enlisted men, was first to set foot on the pier. The ramp they secured quickly. They set fire to two houses with flame throwers and cleaned out half-sunken Jap landing craft. As soon as his section could make its way ashore, Hawkins and his men landed and started over the seawall, going after the Japs who were killing Marines from succeeding waves.

The first time I saw Hawk ashore was the middle of the first afternoon. There was plenty of fire from machine guns and snipers, and the only relatively safe position was crouching behind the seawall. "Get down, Hawk, or you'll get shot," somebody shouted at the S & S lieutenant. The Hawk, who had come back for more ammunition, snarled, "Aw, those bastards can't shoot. They can't hit anything." Then he and the men with him leaped back on top of the seawall. "Hawk and his platoon have knocked out a hell of a lot of machine guns," an officer told me.

Lieutenant Hawkins had been wounded slightly during the landing. He got a bullet through one shoulder early the second morning, but he refused to be evacuated. "I came here to kill Japs; I didn't come here to be evacuated," he said. He and his men were busy that morning. Another lieutenant told me: "He is a madman. I'll never forget the picture of him standing on that amphtrack, riding around with a million bullets a minute whirling by his ears, just shooting Japs." Said a corporal: "I think the Scout and Sniper platoon must have more guts than anybody else on the island." He added: "We were out front and Morgan was shot in the throat. He was bleeding like hell and saying in a low voice, 'Help me, help me.' I had to turn my head."

Hawkins got his third and final wound later in the morning. It was in the other shoulder, and lower down, according to one of his men who told me about it. We thought for a while he would live. But he had already lost too much blood. He died during the night before he could rally enough to be evacuated to a ship.

If ever a man gave his life's blood for his country, it was William Deane Hawkins. His last words were, "Boys, I sure hate to leave you like this."

This Is Tarawa Today*

By Lieutenant Ellis M. Trefethen, USMC

THE part of Tarawa that is Betio is changed greatly today. The tangled morass of coconut logs and bomb-pitted sand has been leveled. Orderly rows of tents have risen to shelter the marines, the sailors, the airmen and the Seabees who man this outpost.

On the beaches, commanded still by the rusting muzzles of captured Japanese guns, shattered amphibious tractors and landing craft lie. Japanese barbed wire still guards the coral sands along the tidal flats. On Betio's network of roads, American trucks and jeeps travel, interspersed at times by battered, but still serviceable, Japanese right-hand-drive trucks.

The landing strip for which marines fought so fiercely, with every weapon at their command, today is operational —as the enemy well knows. On moonlit nights the enemy bombers come over at 20,000 feet and more. As they make their run on Betio, searchlights pin them to the sky for a brief moment and antiaircraft bursts in fine points of light about them.

This is the island where marine antiaircraft gunners have hammered up a signpost labeled "Tokyo," and painted another that reads "Golden gate in '48; breadline in '49."

This is where a bulldozer, digging into a pile of blackened earth, shattered timbers and twisted metal, rolls out the body of a Japanese soldier, recognizable only by the stained uniform. The smell of death still lingers in some sections of the island despite ocean breezes that sweep its narrow width.

Here is the largest of the several marine cemeteries on the atoll, not very imposing by standards of granite and turf, but marines and soldiers and sailors too, turn grim and proud when they pass. It is only a hundred or so feet long, and not very wide, measured from rough board fence to rough board fence on either side. The wooden crosses, two boards nailed together, are a weather-beaten gray. On some of them, standing at attention in ordered ranks, Japanese ideographs are visible, token that they once crated enemy war materials.


There are names on a few of the crosses, but most of them are blank. On the rough rail nearest the stand from which the brief but heartfelt services were held are three plaques, placed there by comrades of the fallen marines.

One plaque is in memory of "the valiant dead and sixty-eight missing" of an "amphibious tractor battalion." Another commemorates the heroism of the officers and men of the Special Weapons Unit.

The third is a poem of requiem by an unknown marine. It reads:

To you, who lie within this coral sand,
We, who remain, pay tribute of a pledge,
That dying, thou shalt surely not
Have died in vain.
That when again bright morning dyes the sky
And waving fronds above shall touch the rain,
We give you this—that in those times
We will remember.
We lived and fought together, thou and we,
And sought to keep the flickering torch aglow
That all our loved ones might forever know
The blessed warmth exceeding flame
The everlasting scourge of bondsman's chains
Liberty and light.
When we with loving hands laid back the earth
That was for moments short to couch thy form
We did not bid a last and sad farewell
But only, "Rest ye well."
Then with this humble, heartfelt epitaph
That pays thy many virtues sad acclaim
We marked this spot, and, murm'ring requiem,
Moved on to Westward.

*Condensed from the *New York Times Magazine*, March 19, 1944.



The three guns of the new tank fire in unison to send a solid stream of death at their target, shattering the night and the quiet with light and jarring sound.



Men crouched behind a sea wall and water buffalo on the beach on Tarawa. This is the earlier model without the fire turret, used for a variety of purposes.


Amphibious Tanks in Action


UPPER LEFT, center, and lower right are shown the new amphibious tanks, known as the LVT(A)1. Differing from earlier styles of the "water buffalo" in that it has a turret "superstructure," the armored vehicle boasts a 37mm. cannon and two .50-caliber machine guns for armament. Agile on land, the tank is doubly formidable through its outstanding features of being able to travel in water. Already the craft has played a contributing rôle in the successful invasion of enemy strongholds in the Pacific; as the Allied standards march west to Tokyo and east to Berlin, the squat, hard-hitting newcomer will appear in growing numbers on both sea and land manned by Marines and Army troops.

Lower left and upper right are shown LVT's in action in the battle of Tarawa.



ınd often presents almost as great a hazard as ud. But the water buffalo belies its name by ɔeeding over the dry, shifting dunes as easily as it does over firm ground.





↑ Water-borne, the LVT(A)1's characteristic silhouette is low, hard to hit, bristling with guns.

← Part of the first wave going in at Tarawa.

TANK TRAINING

By 2nd Lieutenant Frederick R. Jones, USMCR



A light tank on maneuvers at Camp Elliott comes face to face with its nemesis: an antitank gun.

TANKS have played an important part in this war, and will doubtless continue to do so. Experts may say that the tank is on its way out; but there are still missions for which the tank is indispensable, and training in the operation and tactics of the tank is an essential part of the Marine Corps picture. The center for this training is at Camp Elliott, in southern California.

Jacques Farm, at the southernmost limits of Camp Elliott's acreage, is headquarters for the Tank Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Denig, Jr. commanding. A tent encampment with headquarters in an old farmhouse surrounded by a sprinkle of semi-permanent sheds and stockades, Jacques Farm offers little in the way of comfort and convenience for its 1200-odd trainees. Hard, rugged, gruelling work is the order of the day here.

A tank school was activated at "the Farm," as it is known to tankmen, in August, 1942, under the command of Major W. R. Collins, and was organized as a battalion in February, 1943. The site selected—Jacques Farm—lies astride a dry, rocky creek bed, and in the shadow of bleak, stony hills and craggy slopes ideally suited to test the ability of tank crews. The farm was formerly used as a bivouac and training area for the 2nd Tank Battalion, and for the 2nd Marine Raiders.

The Tank Battalion at Jacques Farm was at the beginning of 1944 the only school for tankmen conducted by the Marine Corps. Every Marine tank unit, except for a few attached to the First Division, is manned and maintained by Jacques Farm graduates. Some of these tankmen were attached when units were activated; others have joined older units, as replacements.

With Colonel Denig at the helm the tank outfit has achieved almost complete self-sufficiency. The farm has its own "canvas quarters," mess and recreational facilities, branch post exchange, sick bay, barber shop, outdoor theater, classrooms, shops, and complete maintenance facilities for tanks and other mobile equipment.

Mission of the battalion is the training of both officer and enlisted personnel in all phases of tank operation and maintenance. Complete tank crews for both light and medium tanks—tank commander, driver, gunner, and radio operator—and crews of specialists to maintain them are graduated weekly, and are assigned to replacement battalions, tank units being organized in the States, or amphibious tractor units.

Hence, the Tank Battalion is really divided into two sections: Maintenance and Operations. The latter section is further broken down into five departments: Tactics, Driving Gunnery, Communications, and Mapping. The maintenance Section operates on a 12-week (576-hour) schedule, while the Operations Section courses take eight weeks (400 hours) to complete.

ONLY volunteers for tank duty are considered for assignment to Jacques Farm. From this list, men with highest ratings in their I.Q., mechanical aptitude, and radio operators aptitude tests are given preferential consideration. Previous experience with motor vehicles is weighed heavily in the applicant's favor, and any special qualifications in gunnery, radio operation, machine shop procedure or other related subjects are carefully considered.

Approximately 50 men per week report to the farm for training. These are divided into groups of 20, and are given a two-week elementary indoctrination course in tank procedure. During this period, each man is carefully observed by his instructors, and "catalogued" as to where he will best

fit in. Then, each is assigned to advanced training with either the maintenance or the operations section.

Since the Tank Battalion's inception in August, 1942, several thousand officers and men have been graduated, and assigned to duty with various tank units (both light and medium) here and overseas. Reports from the Pacific war zones state that graduates of Jacques Farm are giving an excellent account of themselves in combat.

THE men who show the greatest degree of mechanical aptitude during their two-week "blitz course" or indoctrination period are assigned to the Maintenance Section. New classes of 15 men each are begun weekly.

The training schedule calls for 25 per cent classroom instruction; the rest of the time is devoted to field and practical shop work. Graduates of this school are qualified to fulfill their assigned mission as trained tank mechanics.

The Operations Section is as old as the Tank Battalion itself. Each of its five departments—tactics, driving, gunnery, communications and mapping—deals with a vital phase of tank operation. To be a competent crew member, a tankman should be familiar with all of these subjects. At any time in combat, he may have to "pinch-hit" for a fellow crew member who has become a casualty.

Hence, men assigned to the operations section are divided into groups of 20, for instruction in each phase, and the groups are conducted on a round-robin schedule. New classes are begun weekly.

Initial indoctrination into tank operation and advanced tactical training are listed as the missions of the Tactics Department. This course, which serves as a framework for all other phases of operations training, consumes 66 hours, and consists of 25 per cent classroom instruction and 75 per cent field work on the Jacques Farm ranges.

Basic infantry subjects covered during this course are slanted toward the viewpoint of future tankmen. The close coöperation necessary between tank and infantry units, working as a combat team, is stressed continually.

Of great importance is the Driving Department. Its purpose is to teach students to operate light and medium tanks under battle conditions. The 90-hour course of instruction is conducted almost entirely in the field. A two-hour lecture on tank signals is the only material presented in the classroom. Graduates are qualified to operate any tank currently used by the Marine Corps, each man usually specializing in one particular type of tank.

The Gunnery Department is charged with the responsibility of training tank crews in the use, care, cleaning, and maintenance of all ordnance equipment in a tank.

This vital course, which consumes 178 instructional hours—almost half of the entire Operations Section schedule—consisting of 40 per cent classroom lectures on weapons and their functioning, and 60 per cent field work—dummy runs, manipulation exercises, and actual field firing of tank weapons.

Mission of the Communications Department is the training of tank crews in the use of radio and semaphore communications. Contact with both air and ground units is stressed. This is an 85-hour course; classroom instruction consumes 35 per cent of the time, while the rest is spent in practical application of fundamentals in tanks, radio-equipped jeeps, and at command post switchboards. Graduates of the Communications Department are qualified to operate any radio equipment found in Marine Corps tanks, and to send or receive messages by any of the other means available to tank units.

Finally there is the Mapping Department—charged with the task of imparting to all students in 35 hours a sound basic working knowledge of map and aerial photograph reading.

Students graduated from the Operations Section after their intensive eight-week course of training are qualified tank specialists with a particular job to do inside a tank—one for which their commanding officer deems them best fitted after observing them in all phases of training. But their instruction has been so well rounded that any man of a graduate tank group can double for any other man in a "rolling fort," should emergency make it necessary.




Medium tanks and provisions are brought ashore at a Southern California beachhead during amphibious landing operations.



On the right, Platoon Sergeant Chris Campisi, wounded in the Bougainville offensive, is being interviewed by Sergeant Marion D. Bailey, who is wearing a pack transmitter. Sergeant Campisi, shot in the shoulder, is boarding a transport plane for evacuation by air.

In the circle: First Lieutenant Don J. Fisher is interviewed before he can leave his plane after a fighter sweep over Rabaul.



Marine Battle Broadcasting System


WHEN the special events programs disappeared from the commercial networks with the advent of war, they did not become a casualty of war; they joined the Marines and are known as "Battle Broadcasting." These programs are bringing the biggest events in history right into homes thousands of miles from the scene of the conflict.

The small group of Marines assigned to the work had to discard most of the expensive and delicate equipment used by commercial networks because the intense heat, heavy rainfalls and high humidity covered the instruments with rust, mold and corrosion. Direct short wave broadcasts were ruled out, since the international broadcasting stations are far behind the lines and using them would defeat the principal purpose—which is on-the-spot accounts of battle action as described by the participants. Instantaneous electrical transcription was the answer, with the transcriptions being flown to the United States by air transport.




This automobile trailer, parked in a South Pacific jungle near an air base, houses the Battle Broadcasting equipment and a photographic darkroom. The broadcasting equipment is protected by padding or floated on rubber to prevent damage.

Natives of a South Pacific island serenade United States listeners via Battle Broadcasting. Sergeant Hardin was master of ceremonies, assisted by Leslie Gill.



Natives who participated in a broadcast are both embarrassed and pleased when they hear their own voices booming out from an electrical transcription. Leslie F. Gill, of Melbourne, Australia, liaison officer to the natives, is in the foreground.



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★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

Truk

THE much talked of mighty bastion of naval strength of the Japanese Empire, Truk, for many years has served as an important outlying naval base. Now it finds itself in a peculiar position. Not only has it been severely hammered, but it is now on the outer perimeter of the oceanic area of the western Pacific, which at this writing is still controlled more or less by the Japanese Navy.

A first class naval base in the front line of a theater of operations is in an extremely awkward position. Since our carrier task forces have once raided it heavily, it is obvious that they can do so again even more easily. The enemy's air and naval strength has been practically eliminated in the Bismarck Archipelago area and our positions to the east of Truk have been substantially advanced. The use that the Japs can make of Truk has obviously been seriously limited. Since we were able to sink a large number of vessels on our first raid it is obviously no place for surface vessels to hang around for any purpose whatsoever.

Truk was formerly used as the forwarding station for aircraft bound for the southern and eastern outposts, but now that it is itself an outpost it can have no possible air use except limited air facilities acquired for outpost positions. It is therefore apparent that the main purpose for which the base was developed—major fleet and air base—has been nullified by recent events. With our air facilities being advanced into the Admiralty Islands and, possibly before this appears in print, in other islands to the south of Truk that are even closer to it, it is obvious that Truk can be reconnoitered easily by long range planes from the south. The same can be said about our new outposts at Eniwetok.

With the radius of long range planes from either of our new outposts reaching far beyond Truk, it will be relatively easy to spot an approaching convoy of ships that the Japs are trying to send into Truk to relieve its garrison or rebuild its wrecked facilities. The sighting of such a convoy would of course alert naval carrier task forces to repeat the devastating raid of February 16, 1944.

It therefore appears that the supposed mighty "Pearl Harbor of the Western Pacific" has all but lost its usefulness to our enemies. Perhaps it too can "wither on the vine," until our naval forces are ready to capture it for an advanced naval and air base.

* * *

Lend-Lease

DESPITE the columns which have been written about the various ramifications of the lend-lease program, we wonder how many Americans appreciate its vast extent and importance. In our review section of this issue, we are publishing a review of the book by E. R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend Lease Administrator, in which he gives the over-all picture of two years of lend-lease. Some figures released more recently serve to bring the story up to date.

In an announcement made by the Foreign Economic Administrator, Mr. Leo T. Crowley, last month, it was revealed that almost 28,000 planes were sent from the United States to the air forces of our Allies between the passage of the first Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, and January 1, 1944. Of these, almost 7,000 were paid for in cash by our Allies, principally the British, and 21,000 were dispatched under lend-lease.

Three-fourths of the planes sent from the United States to our Allies have been combat types; the rest were training and transport planes. We have sent 9,800 bombers and 10,700 fighters to our Allies in every part of the world. Over 4,000 of these have been naval planes.

The Soviet Union has received more of our planes than any other country. The total to January 1 was 7,800 planes, of which over 5,000 were sent in 1943. Nearly all of the planes were of the combat type, principally P-39 fighters, A-20 attack bombers, and B-25 medium bombers. More than 3,000 of these planes were ferried all the way to the Soviet Union by air.

Russia has also received a tremendous number of American tanks and other mechanized weapons and vehicles. Up to January 1, 1944, we sent to the Soviet Union about 4,700 tanks and tank destroyers, 173,000 trucks, 33,000 jeeps, and 25,000 other military motor vehicles. In addition, we sent about 6,000,000 pairs of boots for the soldiers of the Red Army, together with large quantities of food needed to maintain the Soviet Army rations. Thus, America has had a vital part to play in the Russian victories on the Eastern Front.

No less important than the rapid increase in the lend-lease goods sent to the USSR is the corresponding decrease in the sinking of ships carrying these supplies. In 1942, of the ships carrying lend-lease goods to Russia, 12% were sunk by enemy action. In 1943, only one per cent of the ships were lost.

Increases in lend-lease shipments of planes, tanks, ammunitions and other war supplies to Great Britain have paralleled the rapidly rising power of the combined air offensive across Germany and advancing preparations for the coming invasion of Western Europe. During 1943 our shipments of munitions to the United Kingdom were three times the 1942 total, while lend-lease shipments of food have supplied a vital 10% of Britain's food supply. Aviation gasoline and lend-lease explosives have been an important factor in making possible the day and night bombings of Berlin, Frankfurt, and other German cities. At the same time reverse lend-lease aid has been furnished to us by the British Commonwealth of Nations, mostly in the form of goods, supplies, and services rendered to our armed forces and merchant marine overseas.

Lend-lease weapons have been used to equip many divisions of the new French Army, recruited in French North and West Africa from the local population and refugees from the homeland. French air squadrons equipped with lend-lease planes have been active in the Mediterranean fighting and more units of the reconstituted air corps will be trained and equipped under lend-lease in the United States and Africa. Thus, lend-lease has made it possible for the French outside Occupied France to carry the French flag once again against the Nazi enemy.

China, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the South and Central American countries have also participated in the lend-lease program on a large scale. All of these many aspects of the lend-lease program have been directed to the building up of the United Nations and the defeat of our Axis enemies.

When the whole story of World War II is written, the far-sighted lend-lease program will be found to rival in importance the military campaigns of which it has in fact been the backbone. Mistakes and extravagances there may have been, but that is inevitable in the conduct of so huge and unprecedented an enterprise. The value of the program as a whole to ourselves and our Allies surely outweighs these and makes lend-lease something of which Americans may well be proud.

General Vandegrift Honored

AT Brown University's Commencement exercises held in Providence, R. I., on February 28 the honorary degree of Doctor of Law was conferred on Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift.

In conferring the honorary degree on General Vandegrift, President Wriston read the following citation:

"Some must have the boldness to choose professions with no apparent future, so that capable leadership may be available when the unexpected happens and the predictions of men, accounted wise, are proved wrong. Thus when the war to end war was won, and we were promised a lasting peace, you remained faithful to your appointed task, expecting little gratitude, and getting, perhaps, even less than you anticipated. Through long years of self-discipline you matured steadfastness of purpose, strength of character, clarity of mind, efficiency in action, and both eloquence and economy in expression. Then, when statesmanship failed and a terrible crisis came, the patience, courage, and fortitude so long nourished in obscurity shone like beacons in a dark hour of our history. For your distinguished achievements, which exemplify the finest qualities of the service you adorn, we delight to honor you."

Colonel Thomason

IN the death March 12 of Colonel John W. Thomason, Jr., USMC, the Marine Corps lost a veteran and colorful officer, and contemporary literature lost one of its most skilled and engaging story-tellers.

His military career began in 1917 when he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps, after graduating from the University of Texas and working in the editorial department of the Houston *Chronicle*. He was in France with the famous Fifth Marines and received the Navy Cross and the Silver Star for gallantry in action at Soissons. In the interval between the two World Wars, he served at various Marine posts in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China and did a tour of duty at Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington.

It was during this period of more than two decades that he published a large number of magazine stories which were later gathered together in book form, under the title . . . *And a Few Marines*. The first series of these dealt mostly with Marines on duty in China. He had the rare knack of capturing on the printed page the spirit and mental outlook of the men in the ranks. His Sergeant John Houston was of a classic mould that green boots could well strive to emulate.

But, best of all, in his service stories he expressed well the peculiar mixture of mutual respect and affection existing between officers and enlisted personnel in the Marine Corps, and their interdependence and their possessive feeling about each other. This is a feeling which, naturally, few laymen can understand. No writer since Kipling has been able to put the professional fighting man so accurately and vividly on paper.

But this was not the only facet to Thomason as a writer. He also made important contributions to historical biography. His story of Jeb Stuart not only made the great Confederate cavalry leader live again but was literature in its own right.

Few readers will soon forget his violent tempered, fire-eating Methodist preacher, Praxiteles Swan, who came out of Texas as a chaplain with the men of the Lone Star State and fought with Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. This series of short stories was collected in a volume called *Lone Star Preacher*. He wrote another historical book about his native state, *Gone to Texas*.

In addition to his outstanding talent as a writer, Thomason was unusually gifted as an illustrator. His own drawings not only appeared with all of his own stories and books, but he also won high critical praise for his illustrations of *Adventures of Davy Crockett* and *Adventures of General Marbot*.

But despite his literary and artistic success, Colonel Thomason was first and foremost a Marine. Those of the Corps who find pleasure in books and who have not read him have cheated themselves out of a great deal of pleasure.

Announcing—
THE MARINE CORPS READER

THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION announces the early publication of *The Marine Corps Reader* by G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York. It has been in the process of preparation for a number of months and is now about to go to press. Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC, has acted as editor of the *Reader* and, with the aid of numerous other persons, has selected the material to be included in it.

The purpose of the *Reader* is to tell the story of the Marine Corps at war. In order to orient the reader, an introductory section on the History and Traditions of the Corps is first presented. This is followed by a section on Marines in Fact and Fiction, which contains a number of the best available stories about Marines; the section entitled Flying Marines presents the background and record of Marine Corps aviation in the war; Mobilizing for Global War contains a number of interesting articles about how the Marines prepared for the war; Pearl Harbor and After presents the Marines during the first few weeks of the war. A section entitled Guadalcanal contains the best available writing on the Guadalcanal campaign, and the final section, Closing in on Tokyo, includes articles about Marine participation in outstanding operations during 1943. An appendix is added, containing information of general interest about the Marine Corps. It will be about a 650-page book.

Many of the articles in the *Reader* are written by such well-known writers and officers as the following:

General Thomas Holcomb, USMC
Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, USMC
Colonel John W. Thomason, Jr., USMC
Captain John H. Craige, USMC, Ret.
Hanson Baldwin
John Hersey
Stanley High

Most of the articles were originally published in the *Saturday Evening Post, Life, Collier's* and other national magazines, or in the *Leatherneck* and THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE.

The book is a publishing venture of the Marine Corps Association, which has assumed all risk and responsibility not taken by the publisher; the Association will receive such profits as may accrue from the book. If the *Reader* sells satisfactorily to the publisher, the Association hopes to follow it with another *Reader* covering the further activities of the Marine Corps in the war. The editor believes that *The Marine Corps Reader* contains a valuable collection of stories and articles which every Marine will want to have in his library.

The publisher has stated that 6,000 copies will be printed initially and that paper is available for several thousand more copies if necessary to meet the demand. The *Reader* will be sold in the usual manner at bookstores. It is hoped that it will be widely sold through post exchanges and that it will receive wide distribution through Marine Corps and Navy libraries and recreation officers. Men on duty overseas are urged to have copies sent to their homes for their permanent retention or as gifts to parents or friends. Recreation officers are urged to place orders for early delivery.

The publisher has fixed the retail price of the book at $3.00 but will give a substantial discount in addition to the usual trade discount to post exchanges, recreation officers, and other service buyers in wholesale quantities, providing the order is placed prior to publication early in May.

The Marine Corps Association will handle individual orders for the books for its members and for other personnel of the Marine Corps. Because of the substantial discount to the Association for orders placed in advance of the book's publication, the Association can fill orders received with remittance prior to May 20 at $2.00 per copy. Thereafter the price of the book ordered through the Association will be $2.50 per copy.

Orders should be pooled as much as possible for purposes of sending in remittance. Any Marine sending in a pooled order for ten copies before May 20 will be given a free copy of the *Reader*. Copies bought from the Association will be mailed to any desired address. Address order and make remittance to the Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C. Please send check or money order. It is not desirable to send currency by mail; charge or C.O.D. orders cannot be accepted from individuals.

Marines Active in War Bond Program

MARINE CORPS activities are playing a prominent part in the upsurge of the Navy war bond program, which as of 29 February had piled up a record sales total of $466,170,089 since the program was established in October, 1941, with bond sales in February, 1944, alone of $30,302,419. Sales in February, 1943, were $15,007,106.

Among Marine Corps headliners in the bond program are the Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia, which has 95.2 per cent of its civilian employees signed up for bonds under the payroll savings plan, and the Richmond, Virginia, Depot of Supplies, where both uniformed and civilian personnel participated 100 per cent in a recent bond campaign. Marine personnel at this depot are putting 25 per cent of their pay into bonds. The Marine Base at San Diego has 100 per cent of its civilians signed up, and Parris Island has 95.3 per cent.

In the bond allotment program, also, have the Marines been amassing respectable totals. During February, Marine Corps allotments gained 9,322 for a grand total of 152,157. The over-all total of allotments by Marine, Navy, and Coast Guard personnel is now more than 1,340,000.

Psychology Picks a Pilot

By Lieutenant Mac Eldin Trawick, USNR

AT LEAST one interesting story of the war has not been told often enough. It is one about the race which has been going on between the development of an airplane which will fly faster and higher than ever before, and man's ability to control it as it is meant to be controlled—or, for that matter, to control it at all. The selection and training of Naval and Marine men who are picked to fly and fight has always been a matter of considerable concern to the services, but the methods and materials available in 1939 at the start of the war in the air were not enough.

There was a certain feeling of uneasiness among those who were in charge of the program at the time. They felt that the techniques which had been used up until then were inadequate for the job at hand. The old procedures which had been employed in pilot selection seemed deficient in at least two ways: in the first place they wasted time and money, and, in the second place, they were not geared to the problem of developing the great numbers of expert pilots in the short time that was expected of them. It was obvious that the processing of pilots through the selection and training periods had to become, in a short while, both measurably more exacting and infinitely more productive.

Traditionally, the method of picking pilot material had put a great deal of stress on physical perfection and on educational achievement. If an applicant had a physique which was average or better, and also possessed a college diploma, he stood a very good chance of being accepted as an aviation cadet. However, there was always a final interview to be reckoned with in the selection process. It is true that no one knew the exact talents which were essential to a good combat pilot, but many of the opinions expressed by the interviewers would now be considered unique and remarkable. One interviewing officer believed sincerely that no man could be a good pilot if he were an "only child" or the youngest in a family of five. Another was sure that no careful, painstaking persons such as stamp-collectors could ever be effective fighting pilots. A third discarded all men who were left-handed because, as he said, "I never knew a left-handed man who made a good aviator."

Interviewing as it was then carried out tended to become too personal and unreliable. No matter how genuinely concerned most interviewers were about doing a good job, they could not refrain from letting the hunches which originally they had taken so lightly become more and more fixed the longer they continued at the task. Increasingly they depended upon these unproven hunches and upon trick questions, and not infrequently the applicant was the loser. At some centers, large numbers of candidates were turned down primarily because of interview results.

From the start, picking a combat pilot was a difficult problem because such a man had no prototype. He was the product of a new age. He was the direct result of an invention which was no more than 40 years old. The make-up of his personality constituted a fresh field for research, and the research-task obviously would not be a simple one.

The job was put in the hands of a group of professional psychologists. Into the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery these men were brought to form an Aviation Psychology Section of the Division of Aviation Medicine. Fortunately they did not have to begin entirely without materials or plans. Work had already been begun on the job of pilot selection in 1939 by a committee of the National Research Council, under funds provided by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Naval aviators had been used by them as subjects in some of their tests for selection and training, and by December 7, 1941, thousands had been tested and their records made available to check the effectiveness of the testing technique. The job had been started.

The psychologists were not content to rely on their hunches as had been the interviewers who had gone before them. Instead, some 40 promising tests of all types were subjected to extensive trials. Each one was given to a large number of applicants and the scores were kept in a closed file until they could be compared with ultimate successes or failures in actual flight training. As it became obvious that a particular test had failed to distinguish between those who passed and those who failed in training, that test was eliminated from further consideration. Tests were retained for further investigation only if the results showed, first, that they could separate passers from failers and, second, that they did not duplicate one another. A series of cross-checks on very large groups of cadets finally reduced the original 40 to a combination of three tests which satisfied both of the requirements that had been set up.

THE three tests which finally came into use may be described as follows:

(1) The "Aviation Classification Test" is a typical test of general intelligence which has been given, wherever possible, naval aviation character by the use of non-technical aeronautical terms. It has been found by statistical survey that tests such as this one give an excellent prediction of ground school performance in the aviation training program. It is also recognized that men who score low on this type of test have serious difficulty in dealing successfully with complicated orders of any type.

(2) The "Mechanical Comprehension Test" has been called a "backyard physics" test. That is to say, it deals with the basic ability to handle familiar concepts of everyday mechanics rather than with the subject matter usually found in physics schoolbooks. Included are problem choices which deal with the best way to brace a screen door or to carry a large bundle or to rig a pulley.

(3) The "Biographical Inventory" is a questionnaire which seeks to accomplish with statistical accuracy among

groups what the experienced interviewer of *individuals* attempts to do by professional skill and intuition. The items it contains—elements of personal history and expressions of attitudes and interests—were originally part of a much larger number of questions drawn up by men who were experienced both in aviation training and in personal interviewing. Beginning in this way with many questions and items believed to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful aviation candidates, the number was successively reduced by eliminating those items which actually failed to show statistically significant differences between the passer and the failer groups. Ultimately there remained a collection of items which consistently and dependably did the job. No single item was heavily scored. Certain total patterns of response, however, were found to yield an almost direct relationship with probability of failure in training. In actual use, the reception accorded this test by the officers who were to use it as an aid was encouraging from the start. In part this was due to the close relationship between many items in the test and certain convictions long held by flight surgeons. Also, from the start, there were frequent dramatic "hits" at every station—for example, a particularly "good-looking" boy who had made a fine personal impression but who had scored low on the Inventory, would later prove to be very poor pilot material and have to be dropped from training. These instances did more to convince groups at large of the Inventory's efficiency than a host of statistical charts and computations.

After the development of chances-of-training-failure tables for these three tests, it was found to be possible to combine scores on the Mechanical Comprehension test and the Biographical Inventory above into Flight Aptitude Ratings. These rating were split into grades of A, B, C, D, or E, representing the measured probability of success in flight training for a given combination of scores.

There were many ways of presenting summaries of the interesting statistics that began to develop as the tests were given, but one of the most straightforward means was simply to state that in order for the Navy and Marines to get 1,000 completely trained pilots, the selection boards – if they made use of men with Flight Aptitude Ratings of *A* –would have to put 1220 men into the training program at the start. The training of these men would average about 229,000 hours. If, on the other hand, the Navy used men with Flight Aptitude Ratings of *E*, it would have to take in 2,273 trainees in order to procure the same 1,000 finished combat pilots, and the training-time which these men would require would approximate 294,000 hours. Aside from the financial cost of the training-time saved, is the important fact that the saving of 65,000 hours required training-time is sufficient to train 300 more pilots for duty on our fighting fronts!

To date, the tests have been set up to predict only success or failure in aviation training. They have shown considerable practical usefulness in the doing of this job. It is realized, however, that success in training is not necessarily a good predictor of what a pilot will do in combat. It is possible, certainly, that the best student pilots do not make the best "killers," and accordingly action is now being taken to obtain information about the battle-performance of many of the men for whom test scores are available. As soon as sufficient evidence of this sort accumulates, all of the previously mentioned tests, as well as many others, will be reworked in terms of their prediction of combat-performance. Within the near future it may be possible to construct actuarial tables showing the extent to which test scores will predict the value of a pilot under battle conditions. Such tables would permit the tests to be used to the best possible advantage, both in the selection of pilot-material among applicants at the start, and in the later determination of which trainees should complete the training program.

This, then, has been a story about how psychology learned to pick a pilot in a reasonably accurate way by means of a group of tests which would distinguish between applicants who fail and applicants who would succeed in the Navy's training course. Pioneer Naval aviation psychologists, with a single task in mind, had charted the way to fields of interest and responsibility as broad as those of psychology itself. They had charted the way to the numberless jobs which today are an integral part of the daily activities of 75 flight psychologists stationed at Naval Aviation Training Centers.

The story of pilot-selection is only a beginning. A tale could also be told of the application of similar techniques to the selection of flight instructors and aircraft gunners —of long hours in the air, recording "patter" that was good and bad, and of longer hours in a gunner's turret, learning the paths of bullets and the mysteries of leads and beads.

The work to put job-selection in the services on the most impersonal and efficient basis has gone on apace. Impersonality and efficiency pay dividends in selection procedures. They also pay dividends in training procedures —but that too is another story.

Service in Peace Time

IT should be regarded as an honor to serve with the armed forces in *peace*—as well as war—an honor that attracts the very highest type of man in the country. Modern war is an infinitely complicated business and we shall need the best brains in the country to direct our military establishments.—General Holcomb.

Out-Marining the Marines

Commandant Praises Women Reserves on Anniversary

By Lieutenant Elizabeth Tudor Scullin, MCWR

ON the occasion that marked the first anniversary of the Marine Corps Women's Reserve, Lieutenant General A. A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, addressed the enlisted women and officers of the Women's Reserve. ". . . You have out-Marined the Marines," he said. "Many Marines took part in the battles at Bougainville and Cape Gloucester, at Tarawa and Kwajalein, because you women had enlisted in the Marine Corps. In a very real sense, you may consider that you yourselves were present at those places; and if it were possible, I should like to see battle streamers carrying those names attached to your colors."

To all women Marines, stationed at Headquarters, at Marine and naval bases, and at posts and stations throughout the country, the message from their Commandant brought a glow of pride. And with good reason, for the way had not been easy. Theirs had been a two-fold job. First, to fulfill efficiently and capably their purpose, which is to free Marines to fight. Second, and perhaps more difficult, to prove themselves true Marines in the eyes of the men of the Corps.

Last of the services to open their ranks to women, the Marine Corps, steeped in tradition and fiercely proud of its reputation as the best fighting outfit, looked upon feminine counterparts with doubt and suspicion. But at their year's end, the women had become an integral part of the Corps. They had won over the majority of the men—even the old-timers. They had done what they set out to do.

On November 7, 1942, following the approval of the President, the wheels setting the Women's Reserve in motion were turned. On February 13, 1943, the nation-wide announcement of its organization was made. There were to be 18,000 enlisted and 1,000 officers in the new WR (there were to be no nicknames for the Marine Corps women). Fifty per cent of the total number were to be in aviation. Ruth Cheney Streeter was appointed director and commissioned as major. Recruiting began, and on March 13th the first officer candidate class reported for training at Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Mass. Eleven days later, the first enlisted classes moved into the Naval Training School (WR) at Hunter College, in New York City. So it was that the first few classes trained with the WAVES and SPARS of the Navy until overcrowded facilities necessitated the move to New River.

By July 15th all boot training was being carried out at Camp Lejeune. Upon completion of their training (enlisted women trained for six weeks, officer candidates for eight weeks), women were either assigned to active duty immediately or were sent to specialists' schools. Post troops at New River, Headquarters in Washington, D. C., and procurement and recruiting offices claimed the majority of the newly-trained Marines. Those sent to naval training stations for specialists' courses went to Lakehurst, N. J. for parachute rigging and aerography; to Atlanta, Ga. for control tower operator; and for Link trainer instruction, to Madison, Wis.; to Oxford, Ohio, for radio school; to Norman, Okla., for aviation machinist mate school; and to Bloomington, Ind., for storekeeper (naval supply) school. At New River, WR's received further training in motor transport, line NCO, quartermaster, cooks and bakers, signal, and paymaster schools.

These were the schools that laid the foundation for all training for women Marines. New schools were organized —celestial Link training, automotive mechanics, reserve officers training (refresher course for officers and further training in officer status for newly-commissioned women) and motion picture projector operation and repair. Other schools, such as quartermaster, control tower, and radio mechanic had served their purpose and were closed. By February, 1944, the women were far ahead of their enlistment quota set for that date. There were more than 30 detachments on the job aside from those assigned to recruiting and procurement offices, of which there are 97 in all. More than 3,000 women were on duty in aviation; more than 6,000 at other Marine and naval stations.

HOW do the women Marines use their training? How are they filling the jobs of those men who leave for combat duty? What, in other words, are they *doing?*

Women are doing the type of work for which their civilian life fitted them and which, at the same time, releases a man for duty elsewhere in the Corps. In addition, the WR's are self sustaining. The women themselves were the first to realize that the purpose of their existence would be defeated if men were detailed to do their maintenance work. In staff, line, and aviation units, therefore, an appropriate percentage of the total personnel is always delegated to overhead duties.

In the schools, the instruction staff is made up almost entirely of women. WR beauty operators are attached to every post. Women operate their own post exchanges, run their uniform shops, provide tailoring and alteration facilities. Their artists design utility clothes. At New River, an engineering course has turned out a number of women plumbers, electricians, painters, refrigerator mechanics, and sheet metal workers. Mess for women, one of the largest units in self-sustaining jobs, is handled by the women and, as in other overhead departments, is confined to women's units.

The women who graduate from the Cooks' and Bakers' School are not only very well trained for their wartime job —they are equipped to take advantage of the countless opportunities provided in postwar occupations that involve mass feeding. The natural antipathy for mess duty diminishes gradually as trained women report for duty. Assigned to almost all WR detachments, women cooks, bakers and mess-women prepare and serve WR food. They run their

own butcher shops and refrigeration sections for meats and vegetables and storage rooms for bread and cereals. Mess duty is placed on a rotating basis; at most stations, women who arrive from boot training are on mess duty four weeks pending assignment elsewhere. Except for the heavy maintenance work, which is done by men, the women are responsible for the entire operation. The chow itself differs only slightly from the men's. Unused to heavy, starchy food at midday, they juggled the Marine master menu a little and provided more salads and fruits for their less-active personnel. Despite the fact that the women have copied the mannerisms of the men as consistently as possible—from calling cadence to griping about chow—they find little cause for complaint when it comes to their food. On the contrary, they like to delude themselves into believing that the men are a little miffed by the superiority of WR chow.

PROCUREMENT, training and administration comprise the remainder of self-sustaining jobs, logically performed by WR's. By far the great majority of the women, however, are doing the men's jobs in the Corps.

Principal Marine Corps bases where women are stationed are: Parris Island, S. C.; New River, Cherry Point and outlying fields and Edenton, in North Carolina; Quantico, Va.; Washington, D. C.; Philadelphia (Navy Yard, Depot of Supply, and Supply Annex). On the west coast, under the Department of the Pacific, they are stationed at Headquarters, Department of the Pacific, at Depot of Supply, and at Headquarters of the Western Procurement Division in San Francisco; the Marine Corps Base (San Diego) and several air stations. Under the Fleet Marine Force at San Diego, they are on duty at Camp Elliott, Camp Pendleton, and the San Diego area. Air stations include Miramar, Santa Barbara, El Centro, and El Toro.

Commanding officers of Marine Corps activities request Women Reserve personnel from Headquarters in Washington, indicating the number of women needed and the jobs that must be done. There is, of course, a great demand for general clerical and stenographic personnel. But also on the lists are requests for cabinet makers, sign painters, chemists, and hotel clerks, as well as for specialist-trained women. The needs are fulfilled as readily and adequately as possible. Thus, at most bases, women are at work in offices of the provost marshal, in camp recreation, in engineering units, in communications and signal units, artillery battalions, and in almost all headquarters battalions. They are file and mail clerks, messengers, supply clerks, accountants, cashiers, telephones operators, draftsmen. Hotel clerks are billeted in hostess houses—common at many bases; a movie projector operator may be on duty at the recreation camp or in visual aid training classes for men and women. In the post exchange, women are clerks, accountants, assistant PX officers. Commissary clerks, bookkeepers, motor inspectors, sergeant majors—WR's—are scattered throughout the sprawling Marine Corps bases, working side by side with the men.

Women are filling station operators. In the quartermaster department they do clerical and administrative work, issue clothing and equipment to the men, take inventory, are familiar with the standard Marine Corps supply procedure that involves the paper work.

More and more women are being used in communications and message centers. They pick up and deliver messages for an entire post, driving trucks, bicycles, or motor scooters to do it. Graduates of motor transport school drive station wagons, buses—anything up to and including one and a half ton trucks, with either two or four-wheel drive. They would tackle the heavier ones if they could persuade their CO's to allow it. But heavier trucks would entail loading and unloading—jobs that must be done by men. At almost every post or station, dungaree-clad women Marines are familiar sights in the driver's seat of buses and "cattle cars." Men who previously operated these, along with the light trucks, were transferred to heavier duty or were released from home transport to duty overseas. The women added dispatch work to bus driving; they do light upkeep work such as checking tires, batteries, keeping records, etc. Although they have replaced a great many men, it will always be necessary to retain a certain number of men for the heavy work. In the light of what the men are doing, the women sometimes feel their jobs are unimportant. At Cherry Point, for example, it is sometimes necessary for the men to work out in the swamps and woods all night, hauling in a crashed plane by means of a huge crane, trucks, and, most important of all, strong, able men. But the really tough jobs have been made a little easier for the men because women have stepped into their shoes on the smaller-scale operations.

There are more than 200 specific jobs listed that women are equipped to handle, and are actually engaged in doing. They started with 30. Aviation is represented in those 200 classifications, and as aviation women expand their activities, additional jobs may open.

BECAUSE all WR's go first through boot camp at New River and are then classified as aviation or line personnel, the organization at Cherry Point did not get underway until June, 1943, when aviation WR's received their first assignment. It is now the clearing center for all aviation personnel and, as at New River, women are classified, trained, or assigned to active duty, whatever the case may be. In the classification process, a Marine may be sent to any one of the numerous specialist schools—aviation machinist, radio and communications or celestial Link trainer—or to the apprentice training classes at Cherry Point. Once a woman completes training, Cherry Point reclassifies and assigns her to active duty at air stations on the east or west coasts, or to Cherry Point and its outlying fields.

Specialists' schools are limited in size and the courses are long, so apprentice training has served to teach the women as they work. Such a system is used in Assembly and Repair, one of the largest sections at Cherry Point. Women are "strikers" for the kind of jobs they want for permanent duty. When they graduate, they repair instruments, a job peculiarly suited for their talents because of the fine detail involved; they overhaul engines, repair magnetoes, airplane starters, or turbo-superchargers and they do sub-assembly work. Their teachers are men or, in many cases, women who have graduated from aviation machinist or instrument schools or women whose civilian experience in factories has equipped them to instruct in riveting, sheet metal work, etc. Their classrooms are hangars, Dallas huts, or the wind-

swept aprons of the air fields. They have replaced men in the ground forces at all stations, doing repair and mechanical work. They spray-paint planes and parts of planes; they work in the salvage section where they strip all usable parts of damaged planes and ship them to Navy Supply. The men never cease to be surprised at a woman Marine's penchant for grease and grime. With seeming disregard for scarlet-tipped nails or fussy coiffures, an amazing number of women have rolled up their sleeves and plunged into the grubbiest kind of work with unmistakable enthusiasm.

All the jobs in Assembly and Repair, however, are not of the greasemonkey variety. Women log man hours of production work on aircraft engines. In the squadron offices they have replaced men one by one as payroll, muster roll, furlough, and classification noncoms. Blueprints, designs, and specifications for planes are kept up to date and filed in the technical library. Parachute riggers, graduates from Lakehurst, are on active duty in the A&R section.

Other training-working arrangements include the Photography School. Devoted exclusively to women, the course includes lab work, chemical mixing, developing, printing, washing, and drying prints. The storeroom for supplies and equipment is run by students and graduates of the course. At all air stations, their active duty jobs, after four months training, consist of taking progressive photos on the station —day by day or week by week pictures of construction and repair projects. They also prepare publicity pictures of WR activities for Public Relations. Plane crashes and pictures of damaged matériel are taken for subsequent investigations. Flown by men pilots, women handle a special light-weight aerial camera for aerial pictures, and they prepare mosaic maps of the terrain.

Because women were not expected to fill so many jobs in Synthetic Training, there were no specialist schools set up for that purpose except for the Link trainer schools. Instead, as apprentices, the women worked into almost every job in that field, not only at Cherry Point, but at all stations which possessed the necessary equipment. Later, organized classes were set up, with women as instructors, and the new celestial Link trainer instruction was established for enlisted women at Cherry Point and at Edenton. Officers take a navigation course in Hollywood, Fla.; operation and maintenance courses are given at Quonset, R. I.

The Link trainer school graduates were the first to move in at Cherry Point. At first, there were grave misgivings as to the ultimate effectiveness of women instructors. Not that the women were not capable and well trained, but it was felt that the men would resent being taught, of all things, blind flying. However, instruction which was begun on an experimental basis proved so satisfactory that all Link trainer instructors at Cherry Point are women. And there is no resentment on the part of the men; on the contrary, they were quick to have confidence in the skill of their teachers. They also realized that this, indeed, was the WR slogan put into practical use—the women were dominant in a field that once was limited to men.

Air gunnery instructors at Cherry Point are women. As a rule, they have had flight training or ground school courses in civilian life in order to step into the job. It is a "fixed gunnery" course; the students sit in a set-up fuselage of a plane, the instructor sits forward. They operate their own controls; the instructor flies the plane projected on the screen in front of them and the student tries to shoot it down by following through on his controls—aiming his plane at the target. It's a tricky device, and with the panorama on the screen whirling as the plane dives and the guns roar madly it takes skill and a cool head to operate correctly. "Free Gunnery" instructors teach men how to shoot from turrets. Here, again, the movie projector is used but the gun, not the plane, is aimed at the target. The women teach the men range and recognition, sights and aerial gunnery theory, deflection firing, and turret control.

IN a separate course on range and recognition, women are teaching groups of men, not only in classroom work, but also out on the field. In addition, they are teaching them how to instruct in range and recognition, so that the information will be more widespread at bases and in the field. This is one of the examples of women who, having learned from the men, do an about face and instruct other men how to teach the subject!

Control tower operators are assigned to every air station. At the offset, this was supposed to be the glamor job of the WR. High in the control tower, planes roaring overhead, a breezy pilot wisecracking over the tower radio—a slip of a girl, always a pretty one, swirled dials, snapped buttons, and directed traffic in an atmosphere supercharged with excitement. Maybe that's the way it is—in the movies. It's true that the control tower operator directs traffic. She may even be pretty. But it's against the rules to wisecrack over the radio, and it takes more than glamor to do the job. Her training schools her in standard approach procedure and Civil Aeronautics or the nomenclature of the job. But a great deal depends on her temperament. She cannot be excited easily; she must be levelheaded, sure of herself. She has to concentrate on details, yet be quick to make decisions at a moment's notice. She must not lack caution—a pilot's life may hang in the balance. If she is over-cautious, slow to let planes take off or land, the traffic on the field and in the air jams up dangerously. It's gruelling, demanding work in which a sense of proportion is vital. Women have made progress as control tower operators. They remain on the job as long as they can handle it, and quite a few have made the grade. It takes time before they can operate without the necessity of an experienced man standing by to take over when the going gets rough.

Control tower personnel is also assigned to clearance desks at air stations. Their job is to check on all planes taking off and landing at the field, all planes that fly within a specified radius of the field, and all planes that take off or land at outlying fields. Planes must be identified, logged; and, in the case of Cherry Point, information is forwarded to Washington, D. C., Clearance Headquarters, and to Wilmington, N. C., to the Army Interceptor Command. Pilots file flight plans at the clearance desk; pick up weather information there. It is in this type of work that women excel, and they staff clearance desks of Marine Corps air stations everywhere. Communications: teletype, coding and decoding at Operations, radio repair and maintenance, provide numerous billets for women. Operating the teletype, however, is not relegated to Operations alone at an air field. In administration offices, in public relations, etc.,

women who can operate the machine are greatly in demand.

Another man's job is that of aerographer. Women assist the men in using the theodolite and balloon for soundings; in map making they excel the men in inserting the fine lines and tiny figures of weather information. They do the work much more quickly and neatly than the men who previously had the job. They decode weather information and transfer it to maps, also prepare maps for readings of upper winds and air to 30,000 feet. They gather general weather observations and balloon soundings for transmittal on the teletype and they do the routine office work in the meteorological section.

So far, the jobs listed in aviation are more or less novel for women. This is true particularly in synthetic training or operations duty. For women are doing jobs that were not planned in the original program. It was not expected that women would serve as flight section crews—washing or painting planes, handling them on the aprons and in the hangars, choking wheels—nor was industrial training anticipated. For example, women were sent to the Doall machine tool factory and are now operating the machines in Assembly and Repair.

But the bulk of the work is the headquarters company duty—aviation, line or staff. The typing, filing, the shorthand, letters, vouchers, requisitions—the routine jobs—keep an organization moving and efficient. They are the foot-soldier jobs—slogging away day after day—that are responsible for equipment arriving when and where it should; the right report getting to the right person.

THE heart of the Women's Reserve is, of course, at Headquarters in Washington, D. C. Here it is that all activities are directed—quotas are set, training is scheduled, detail is planned, the rules and regulations governing duties and behavior are established. In many respects, the WR is self-sustaining in headquarters. Policy and major activities are evolved through coöperation between men and women officers of the Corps.

There are 1500 women stationed at Headquarters; their quarters are located near the Navy Annex in Henderson Hall. And in every section, every division of Marine Corps Headquarters, women are performing a variety of jobs. Theirs is a combination of line, staff, and aviation duty that could be found only at headquarters. At Henderson Hall, company commanders, company officers, recreation and post exchange officers are women who handle the barracks' administrative work. Fashioned after the organization of typical Marine barracks, the women live a civilian-military sort of life which has worked out very well. It is quite a sight to see platoon after platoon of women Marines march to work every morning—into the office jobs that combat-trained men had been holding down from the declaration of the national emergency to May, 1943, when the first women Marines arrived.

Previously, civil service employees and enlisted Marines carried the burden of the vast amount of paper work at Headquarters. There is a fixed number of civil service employees and a fixed number of military personnel, and those quotas are governed by budgetary allowances. If the civil service quota is not filled, there still remains the problem of work to be done. It is not reasonable to expect combat men, fresh from Parris Island, to waste away at a desk. But such was the situation before the women arrived. Added to this, the natural expansion of the Corps in general and the new activities that cropped up, demanded more and more personnel. The Women's Reserve filled in just as rapidly as women were available. And slowly but surely, the men were released.

It is difficult to realize how rapidly Marine Headquarters has grown, but in some sections, where previously a job was handled by "one officer, a civil service man, and two enlisted Marines" (the sort of statement that is heard over and over again), there are now as many as ten or fifteen women working at top-speed, eight hours a day. In the Casualty Section, in Dependency Allowances, in muster roll departments, the Target Practice Division, Plans and Policies—everywhere there are women Marines. They are filing, typing, taking dictation, operating mimeograph and duplication machines—filling the shoes of the men who need not sit back while their fellow Marines fight at Tarawa, Gloucester, or the Marshall Islands. Fingerprinters, draftsmen, chaplain's assistants, photostaters may have done the same kind of work in civilian life, but most of them agree that even the deskwork at Headquarters has the Marine Corps atmosphere that serves as an added incentive. And a Marine Corps atmosphere happens to be just what they want.

Officers of the WR have an opportunity for varied work at Headquarters. In addition to their duties as assistants for Women's Reserve, in which case they are responsible for the enlisted women in their sections or on the compound, they have moved into key jobs as assistants to men officers, doing work that involves the men of the Corps. One woman is an analyst for vacuum tubes and batteries in the Signal Section. Another serves as recorder on a Marine Corps advisory board in connection with promotions for the men. In the War Bond office WR officers and enlisted women promote the sale of and prepare war bonds for distribution to Marine Corps personnel. Addressograph and graphotype machines are operated by them for that purpose. There are aviation supply officers, and chemical engineers; women assist men in recording allocation and strength of Marine Corps personnel, aircraft, material. Statistical work, historical research, industrial engineering (a WR officer makes inspection trips of bases designing buildings), legal advice—all are fields that have been opened to women who, after a process of understudy, gradually assume greater responsibility and replace men.

TO DATE, WR Public Relations has been a self-sustaining unit. To the women engaged in writing releases, distributing stories, pictures and information about WR activities, goes much of the credit for the dignity of Women Reserve recruiting as well as the rapidity with which quotas were filled. Women public relations officers are attached to procurement offices throughout the country and at bases where women are stationed. They follow the standards set up by Marine Corps Public Relations—preparing the local, home-spun type of material for publication in home-town papers. Too, they are responsible for educating the women about the Marine Corps—the traditions and customs, the training and achievements of the men in the Corps.

The men have been teachers in Marine lore as well as

classroom instructors. They can take the credit, to a large degree, for the way the women snapped into line. Although they may be unaware of it, their actions have influenced greatly the manner in which women identified themselves with the Corps. There are few women who, at one time or another, were not reminded by their Marine kibitzers that "that isn't the way we do it in the Marine Corps!" Just as many women can remember that shaky feeling when they first appeared in uniform and were subjected to the watchful scrutiny of their male associates. "The shoulder tab goes *under* the collar. . . ." "The anchor points in at *this* angle. . . ." "That isn't the way to tie a field scarf. . . ." And the old-timers would fuss over the way the women looked, much like proud mothers who send their kids off to school for the first time. But they liked the uniform—and they were proud that the women of the Corps looked smart.

The women were apt pupils. And those things they were not taught specifically they learned by observation. They have copied the men down to the last detail—they have made a science out of walking, talking, and looking as much like Marines as it is femininely possible.

The men stuff their dungaree pant legs into the tops of their shoes. So do the women. If they roll them up above their shoes, the women do the same thing. "For protection," they explain smugly, for either practice. The women buy the men's wool sox, then boil them down to size. They scrub their lapel and cap ornaments with cleanser so that they will look "salty"—like the men's. They found out how to get a high shine on their shoes by copying the men. First it was wax polish and water—then wax polish and alcohol; the women deviated slightly by substituting scented cologne for the alcohol. They slant their utility hats at precisely the same angles. Their garrison hats have been squashed on the sides to match the current fad of the men. Women with small feet are green with envy because they can't wear the Marine field shoe as some of their more fortunate bunkmates do. On their utility jackets, their names are blocked out—it's G.I.

"Knock it off," "shove off," "boondocks," "decks," and a hundred other expressions in the Marine vernacular have become as much a part of their conversation as though they had always talked that way. It goes further than the superficial characteristics. They have the same pride in the Corps—the same loyalty. They work just as hard.

The men have watched the progress of the women Marines with mingled emotions. Some have been amused, others impressed, most have been surprised. Wherever the women have been on the job, their presence resulted in requests from their commanding officers for more of the same. Not only are they releasing men, they are filling the gaps and shortages in manpower that followed the general expansion of the Corps. Haste and need for bigger jobs made it necessary for the men to operate with shortages for the smaller, less-demanding jobs. Someone to drive a truck, a girl to act as liaison officer between Clearance and Operations, someone to do a bookkeeping job, women to paint, keep store, work at the post exchange, do a weather map—these are the "mother's helpers" jobs the women are doing—and their energy and efficiency came as a vast relief to men who chafed impatiently to peer through a rifle sight at the enemy.

Marine Flyers Use Rockets at Rabaul

MAJOR ALBEN C. ROBERTSON and his Marine torpedo plane squadron made the first airborne rocket attack against the Japs at Rabaul, their planes being equipped for firing the missiles from mechanisms on both wings. First Lieutenant Ray T. Lemmons, one of the Marine flyers, told how he released his rockets against a cargo ship and followed through with two smashing direct hits of his bombs. The attackers dropped into Rabaul harbor from 12,000 feet and made a low broadside approach on the 450-foot ship.

"We fought through unusually heavy ack-ack," the Marine Major said, "and gained a lot of speed in a long downward glide. I was doing over 300 miles an hour when I lined up on the ship's superstructure. Some of my rockets exploded in the water just a few feet short of the ship. At the speed I was going, I was almost on top of the ship before I jerked the bomb lever. Other rockets and bombs smashed home, throwing up a high column of smoke."

A 1937 graduate of the Naval Academy, Major Robertson spent four years as a ground officer, seeing duty in China and the Philippines, and transferred to Marine Aviation in December, 1941. He received his wings in July, 1942. Now on his second tour of combat duty, he is credited with 14 bombing raids against the Japanese at Bougainville and Rabaul.

Lieutenant Lemmons said: "Coming out of the dive, I sighted in on the ship's side and let the rockets go. There was a boom, then a swishing sound I could hear over the engine. A second later I pulled the bomb lever. The rockets and bombs smacked the ship like the old one-two in boxing. The delay on the bombs gave me time to get out of range."

The pilot cut sharply to avoid hitting a mountain and in doing so exposed the body of his plane to a battery of antiaircraft guns. "Those Japs weren't kidding with that ack-ack," he said. "I felt one piece of shrapnel whip past my face. When I landed, I found another piece in my chute right under me."

The shrapnel also damaged his plane so that he had to land without flaps or brakes.

The "bazooka bombs" are set on either wing and fired by a mechanism in the pilot's cockpit. So far, they have been used in the South Pacific only on Marine Grumman Avengers and make the torpedo bombers an even more versatile aerial weapon than before, adding rockets to its former armament of torpedoes, bombs, and machine guns.

Observation vs. the Jap

By Captain William H. Whyte, Jr., USMCR

THERE are probably few officers who have not at one time or another been plagued by the claims of company commanders that they have discovered in their unit a veritable genius at observation—one who can smell Japs thousands of yards away, spot them without glasses at five miles, and who, in short, really "shows up that bunch of goldbricks at the OP."

The following remarks cannot hope to supply an antidote to this inevitable calumny, but they do represent some thoughts on methods of training and use of observation personnel to pierce the formidable screen compounded of dense jungle and the Japanese genius for camouflage.

When your unit is on the defensive or displacing forward at fairly slow rate you can set up a rather elaborate OP. One paradox is that although the additional time allows your men to make a quite artful job of concealing it, the prolonged periods at the same location tend to make them careless about maintaining the initial camouflage discipline.

But however well dug in and concealed your OP is, it is worth nothing if communications to the rear are cut. Always before you must be the question, "How useful will the OP be if the enemy shells us heavily?" Since your phone line is apt to be the first casualty in a shelling you must have developed alternate means of communication. Prime requisite for this is a covered route of approach, or if not covered, at least concealed. Of course, your only available OP location may be in a very exposed spot, and in such case your ingenuity must provide the answer, even if it involves digging a communication trench.

The number of men per shift and the duration of the reliefs will depend on the accessibility of the CP and the number of men available for duty at the time. To keep your men from going stale you will probably have shifts no longer than 24 hours, and, to prevent too much going back and forth, no shorter than 12 hours.

Because the Japanese find in the jungle an admirable aid to their mastery of camouflage and camouflage *discipline*, your OP's may not spot very much daylight enemy ground activity. This should inspire them to watch more closely but the actual effect is more often plain boredom. When a man, having watched fruitlessly on and off for long periods, doesn't really expect to see anything, his eyes may be on the ground to the front, but his mind is probably wandering around the old home town in the U.S.A.

While we found our men's powers of observation deteriorating rapidly after 15 minutes, *when there was no activity to be seen*, when something suspicious was observed, not only the observer but all hands turned to watching the suspect area, their interest aroused at being finally able to observe something other than the fluttering about of white cockatoos.

The first step in making your men good reporters is to make them fill in every item in the OP Journal correctly, growls about "paper-work" notwithstanding, for this drives home to the men the necessity for accurate designation of the object seen, time, direction, etc., and also gives you a record to make periodic checks on the accuracy of their reports. But above all you must teach your men to restrict themselves to reporting what they *see and hear, and not to go on to the process of interpreting the implications of it.* Everyone likes to give out a wealth of authoritative information, and the wish being father to the thought, they unconsciously start describing more than they actually saw. If the observer fancies himself a whirlwind at identifying planes and thought it sounded like a Jap plane, it is amazing how quickly he will recall the big red circle insignia on its wings. Give him a few more moments' reflection and he'll almost be able to reproduce the Japanese characters on the fuselage. In an instance of this failing one of our OP's reported ". . . group of enemy digging in at. . . ." More careful scrutiny revealed the "enemy" group as a herd of native cattle. Since the moving objects had been in hostile territory, the observer felt justified in *assuming* they were enemy. Nip this sort of thing in the bud by practical exercises in observation to show the men how misleading both their senses and their memories can be.

Equipment:

Maps, Photos: You will naturally have at the OP the best map or maps of the area, one of these being kept as a situation map for the "briefing" of new reliefs. Aerial photos and mosaics are equally valuable, particularly obliques. Some OP's were provided with Atlas-gridded panoramic photos taken from the spot at which they were located, a similar copy being kept at the CP. However, if the OP men can't designate the location of an object, personnel at the CP, without the benefit of actual observation of the area, are certainly no better qualified to translate the Atlas Grid reference into military grid coördinates. Such photos are useful, but certainly not essential.

Charts: You will want a plane identification manual, and, if you're near the sea, the ONI Naval Vessel charts. Otherwise, however, don't clutter up the OP with a multiplicity of charts on armored vehicles, uniforms, etc.

Phone: One of the most important, and frequently most overlooked, pieces of OP equipment is the EE-8A phone. Get your men to learn from the Communication section the proper way to make minor adjustments. Indoctrinate them to constantly watch the terminal wires to see that they have not worked loose, and how to recognize by the urn of the crank when the line is shorted, or dead. If they master these few details they can save a weary wire team and themselves much trouble.

Compass; Range Card: In the initial erection of your OP a compass is indispensable, but once established, a range card is a preferable means of determining direction. Immediately upon selection of the site, its coördinate should be determined to the *nearest 10 yards*. A range card can then be made out and fastened to a board, box, or some other flat surface, on which to anchor it to magnetic north.

THE use of a range card is indispensable at night but a range card is not enough. The observer who uses it to find that the enemy gun is located "on high ground, range 2-3 miles, azimuth 230 degrees" leaves the exact location of the gun to be figured out at the Command Post by further cross-checking and intersection, and hence is not doing his full job. He should become so familiar with the terrain that he can instantly identify any landmark by its map coördinates. This is very difficult in Pacific areas where there are no convenient steeples and houses as guides, but it can be done by diligent comparison of the map and the ground. Always make it a point not only to demand your OP men make this study, but also examine each observer personally after having moved to a new sector, and make him give you the map location of every feature you point out on the ground. This pays dividends when speedy location of enemy activity is necessary.

We were lax in making this study on one occasion and paid for our negligence. A patrol leader, who, although excellent in other respects, was notorious for his inability to read a map, had just come back from a skirmish in one of the deep ravines knifing into Mt. Austen. He had plenty to report but he could describe his route only in relation to a queer shaped tree several miles away in enemy territory known as "The Windmill." As this elusive tree, only barely discernible above the mass of jungle in the distance, could not be spotted on vertical aerial photos, we had to locate it on our maps by a tedious process of sending men out to the flanks to get azimuths for intersection. Only after much cross-checking could we finally locate the tree on the map and thus reconstruct the patrol's route. The point is, however, that had we been on our toes such landmarks would already have been plotted in as SOP. As it was, several valuable hours were wasted doing detail work that should have been routine.

In respect to optical equipment your basic item in this line are of course field glasses. Teach your men the correct use of them, particularly the judging of distances and elevations by means of the mil scale. A practice "range" can be set up anywhere in a few minutes by determining the exact distances to prominent objects; the men can then experiment estimating ranges by noting the mil scale readings in relation to the width of the trees, height of men, etc. In such a way they can learn to appreciate the full potentialities of field glasses.

In addition to your spotting scopes and glasses, obtain the use of one of the mortar platoon's aiming circles, for there are a variety of uses to which they may be put, especially in accurate determination of major traverses. The Japs are usually well supplied with some very tricky optical equipment; be sure to grab anything you can for your section. However, the quality of the optical equipment is dwarfed in importance by the manner in which it is used. Prime factor in its use is a sound searching technique. We placed our main reliance on the standard eye search of overlapping zones. When the regular observer, using this method, spotted something suspicious, the job of observing this particular area was farmed out to another member of the OP team. Were the regular observer to devote his entire attention to one suspicious point, over-all observation of the sector would become nonexistent.

WE used such supplementary "pin-point" observation when our OP location gave us an excellent view of the beach road between the Japanese held villages of Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. However, despite the fact the enemy had just finished unloading four transports along that same beach, a week's constant observation netted us the sight of exactly one Jap. (Later, it was revealed the Japs had constructed a parallel road farther inland to avoid just such observation.)

On another occasion the path of two unexploded enemy 37mm. shells gave us enough evidence to be sure a Jap 37mm. gun was located on a certain small area of the beach of Pt. Cruz. For three days we had men in shifts keep a scope trained on this spot, but no movement was observed. However, when our offensive rolled past this spot, not one, but two Jap 37's were found there!

The above examples may seem rather negative illustrations but they should serve to point out that observation against the Japs is an extremely tough business. It will take much patience—many long hours of watching for the little things: the small clump of too much foliage—the bush swaying against the wind, etc., to pierce the screen the enemy works behind.

Offensive Situations:

When your unit is displacing forward your OP team must have a well defined SOP if it is to function efficiently. They must travel light and fast, be able to set up shop in quick time, and displace forward when necessary with a minimum loss of time.

An important factor in gaining this efficiency is the OP personnel's coördination with the communication wire team. Your OP men, although anxious to occupy the best observation spot, must remember that they are the vanguard on the unit's axis of signal communication. They must be able to make the best of this limitation, for if they go wandering off to the flanks to set up their OP the unit will soon have no wire left. This situation calls for close coördination by you with the signal officer. By making a preliminary map reconnaissance of possible OP locations, the two of you should be able to hash out a signal axis that is mutually satisfactory. You should also endeavor to have him assign the same wire group each time so that your OP team and the line crew will learn to work together.

Three men make a good number for the OP team. Two can observe properly; but in case of cut communications—so frequently the case—there must be an additional man to carry important messages back.

Coördination of Observing Agencies:

No single OP location is ever perfect and for that reason you have only begun to exploit the observation potential of your battalion when you establish your OP. To insure full coverage of your unit's area it is vitally necessary that you coördinate the activities of the other observing agencies with your own.

YOUR chief allies will be the OP's of the Weapons Company mortar platoon. For one thing, they are connected to the CP by wire communications, but more important, they are primarily concerned with observation of approaches to the position, a coverage an over-all spot

like your own frequently lacks. Naturally you have no command power over the determination of their location, but unless there is to be duplication of effort, you must work closely with the mortar platoon leader to insure economical distribution of the OP's.

The artillery OP's, even if their coverage of the sector duplicates yours, are valuable to you for cross-checking reports, particularly in getting additional azimuths for inter-section. Be sure, however, that you survey their locations in correctly on your map if your intersections are to be accurate.

Like the Battalion OP, the Regimental OP will more than often be capable only of covering a fraction of the regiment's front. At any rate at both the Regimental CP and OP there should be a map with *all* observation agencies plotted in, and indicated on it the areas they cover. Prompt drafting of the "Observation Plan" will reveal immediately any deficiencies and blind spots in the Regiment's observation, and the proper OP's to contact when cross-checking reports.

The Regimental OP, like the Artillery OP's, can often be of great help in furnishing extra "legs" needed to complete intersections. Although the two OP's each belong to a different echelon they should be able to exchange information directly between each other when the situation demands it, and not "hoard" it as the sole possession of their own unit.

You should now have on one of your maps the exact locations and sectors covered, not only of the organic agencies of your unit—the Bn and Mortar OP's, but also those of the Artillery and Regimental OP's and adjacent units' OP's. The blind spots will be immediately apparent and can be hashed out with Battalion Commander, the Bn-3, and the company commanders in determining the location of the unit's listening posts, security patrols, and outguards.

You must however, be always ready to change your plans to meet new dangers. We woke up 0500 one morning to find a large Jap force had quite unfortunately broken through the lines on our left and was fast approaching our left rear. The five odd OP's covering the front areas were of absolutely no use, and until we had a string of makeshift "one-man OP's" lining the ridges, rumors and false reports had the Japs located in every bush and gully, and ranging in size from a company to a regiment. It was a salutary lesson in the need for all-round observation.

Let us suppose that we have now set up our OP, ascertained the locations of the other OP's in the sector, and have checked to see that all blind areas are covered. Our task now is to see that the proper set-up exists at the CP for the processing and checking of the information that will flow in from them.

FIRST requirement is a map at CP with the exact location of all OP's indicated to the nearest 10 yards if possible. Second, and toughest, requirement is to have the handling of all reports concerning locations centralized in the Two section. The Two officer is the only one who has the machinery to integrate this information and place each report in its proper place so that an up to date digested and cross-checked picture of the situation is available to the unit. It is amazing after an action to find out how much information of the enemy had been available but never acted upon, because many of the small items were independently acted upon or "lost in the shuffle" and hence never found their way to the situation map, where together they would have been quite significant.

One help in avoiding the "dispersing" of information is to have the mortar sound-powered phone man near the Two Section phone. More important, however, is to have your commanding officer adopt an SOP that all observation reports (including friendly units) be immediately turned over to the S-2 section. If the S-2 officer doesn't have the sense to see that the cross-checked information is disseminated to the right parties he should be replaced rather than that the Two Section be bypassed. As in every Intelligence function it is not the individual report which counts, but the mass. See that you control that mass.



The Flying Angels

BETWEEN the quick and the dead fly the "Twin Engined Angels," the PBY Catalina flying boats.

Originally brought to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area in December, 1942, for patrol work, the Catalina crews almost immediately engaged in rescue work. From January 1, to August 15, 1943, official records show 161 flying personnel brought to safety.

Typical of the men who praise the Navy's pilot recovery program is Major Robert G. Owens, USMC.

Over Rabaul, Major Owens was in a burning plane. He had just downed his seventh Zero when his own plane was hit. His first reaction was to bail out. He even started to crawl out onto the wing but changed his mind when he saw he was directly over the city. Getting back into his burning plane, he decided to try to get past Cape St. George, New Ireland. By some miracle the fire went out. On the horizon he saw a PBY returning from a rescue mission; and when his plane motor started to fail, Major Owens radioed the PBY to stand by for a water landing.

A majority of the mercy missions of "The Flying Angels" are made under extremely dangerous conditions, but the work goes on. Many a Jap plane will go down in the future because the Catalinas are seeing to it that Allied airmen are living to fight another day.

New River

Camp Lejeune is Corps' East Coast Combat College

By Corporal Harold A. Breard, USMC

CAMP LEJEUNE, situated on New River at Jacksonville, N. C., is a Marine combat college. Besides being the Corps' East Coast training and replacement center, it is its largest all-purpose base.

It has schools for officers and enlisted personnel, for men and women, for whites and Negroes, for fighters and specialists. The teachers include many South Pacific veterans, who are passing on the lessons they learned in vanquishing the Japs at Guadalcanal and elsewhere.

Fighters are trained at the base in all phases of warfare, with emphasis on ship-to-shore assault, jungle operations, and beach defense. Specialists—like engineers and quartermaster and communications personnel—get practice in establishing and maintaining communications and lines of supply under conditions they will encounter in combat. Navy medical officers and corpsmen are shown the latest methods of caring for the sick, tending and evacuating the wounded, and maintaining the health of personnel in the war zone. Seabees, Navy combat engineers, are taught to utilize their construction ingenuity in restoring airfields and bases seized from the enemy. Coast Guardsmen learn to handle and maintain the various landing craft used by the Marines in establishing beachheads. And clerks attached to the different branches of the Corps are instructed in the inevitable paper work that accompanies the administration of military forces.

While all of the courses offered by the schools are primarily directed toward the annihilation of the enemy, the students are learning much they will find handy and useful in civilian life. Clerks learn office operations and administration; quartermaster personnel learn to deal with distribution problems and the handling of warehouses; communication personnel gain experience in telephony, telegraphy and radio; and no doubt some of the motor transport operators and mechanics and cooks and bakers trained at the base will apply the wartime instruction received to peacetime pursuits.

The Corps' only training center for Negroes is at the base. The first recruit arrived in August, 1942. Since then thousands have undergone "boot" and advance training for service in the field.

All training activities of women Marines were transferred to the camp in July, 1943, and "girls in green" are now a familiar sight on the base, working shoulder to shoulder with the men. They have taken over not only clerical assignments in freeing men to fight, but more rugged tasks, such as truck driving, as well.

Upon completion of recruit training, the women specialize as motor transport operators and mechanics, as cooks and bakers, as messengers, and as clerks in the various departments of the Corps. Schools for this specialized training are maintained, as is a school for noncommissioned officers and a class for reserve officers.

There are thousands of acres within the trapezoidal borders of the Camp Lejeune reservation – 83,094 of land and 23,887 of water. Fronting 10 miles along the Atlantic Ocean and extending back approximately 15 from the coast, it has an area of 167.13 miles.


Its sandy coastal wastes and tangled lowlands provide realistic training terrain for the type of war the Marines are waging against the Japs. Moreover, there is adequate space for range firing of the various weapons utilized by the Corps—rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, carbines, mortars, howitzers, antiaircraft guns and coastal batteries.

RIFLEMEN, special weapons operators, artillerymen, searchlight operators, engineers, amphibian tractor operators, tankmen, motor transport operators and mechan-



THE COMMANDANT VISITS NEW RIVER

Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, recently made a four-day inspection tour of the New River training base at Camp Lejeune, N. C. Here he inspects an 81mm. mortar, accompanied by (left to right) Major General Henry L. Larsen, commanding general; Colonel William L. McKelvey, Jr., commanding officer of Instructors' Group, Replacement Battalions; and Colonel Victor F. Bleasdale, Training Center Chief of Staff.


Activities at
Camp Lejeune

ics and other quartermaster personnel, telephone, telegraphy and radio operators and maintenance men and other communications personnel, war dogs and war dog handlers —all of these are trained for their particular tasks, then trained to coöperate as a team on combat problems.

Furthermore, the fitness of enlisted men for officer training is determined at Camp Lejeune; specialists commissioned directly from civilian life are indoctrinated*; and applicants for the Corps' college training program are screened.

The War Dog Training Company was organized at the base January 7, 1943. The first platoon of dogs and handlers sent out participated in the Bougainville assault in November, 1943. Six of the dogs were cited for outstanding performance of duty. The dogs are taught to carry messages and to smell out hidden enemy. The handlers train with the dogs from the outset and go with them into the field.

Two and a half years ago the site of the camp was a wilderness. Today it is dotted with more than 1,400 brick or concrete buildings and almost as many more frame and temporary structures. It was selected April 10, 1941, by a board appointed by the Commandant to recommend a location for an East Coast base for the Fleet Marine Force. Within 20 days construction was under way.

While the camp was being translated from plans into actuality, Marines who avenged Wake Island in the Solomons and soldiers who helped rout Rommel in North Africa were maneuvering on the reservation. The Marines were commanded by Brigadier General Holland M. Smith, now a major general in command of an amphibious unit in the Pacific war theater.

Since then thousands of Marines and supplemental naval personnel have been prepared for combat at the base. By the time the treacherous Japs rained destruction on Pearl Harbor, the First Marine Division was training at the camp. It left a few months later under command of Major General A. A. Vandegrift, now a lieutenant general and Commandant of the Marine Corps, to deliver the first successful offensive blow for the United States in World War II.

The first phase of construction, devoted principally to temporary buildings, was completed in September, 1941. On the 15th of the month, the Marine Barracks and Training Center were officially opened. Command was delegated to Brigadier General Allen H. Turnage, now a major general on duty in the South Pacific.

The emphasis in 1942 was on permanent construction. With the building program virtually completed that year, 1943 was devoted principally to perfecting organization of training plans. At the beginning of the year the base was organized into three commands, Marine Barracks, Training Center and Fleet Marine Force, all under the camp's commanding general.

CAMP LEJEUNE'S first commanding general was Major General Julian C. Smith, who, as a colonel, chairmanned the board that selected the site. Later he commanded the Second Marine Division in its annihilation of the Japs in the bloody Battle of Tarawa. His successor was Brigadier General James L. Underhill. The present commanding general is Major General Henry L. Larsen, former military governor of Samoa.

Besides countless brick and concrete buildings, Camp Lejeune has innumerable frame structures and huts. Most of the frame buildings and huts are in Tent Camp, where replacement and other units are organized and trained for combat duty, and at Montford Point, where Negro Marines receive all of their training. The vast majority of the permanent structures are at Hadnot Point, administrative center of the base. However, there are a number of such buildings at the Rifle Range and at Courthouse Bay, where amphibious training is given.

Hadnot Point has five regimental areas. The barracks were designed to quarter a Fleet Marine Force division and several battalions of special troops. They are presently being utilized for headquarters personnel, various schools, and women Marines.

A few statistics should aid in rounding out the picture of the base. It is served by 117 miles of roads, most of them hard surfaced; 17 bridges; 51 miles of sewers; 9 sewage pumping stations; 5 sewage treatment plants; 51 wells; 2 water treatment plants; 200 miles of electric distribution lines; 6 electric substations; 83 miles of telegraph lines; 6 telephone exchanges; 14 miles of railroad; 18½ miles of steam mains; 12 central heating plants; 5½ miles of gas lines; and a large sanitation plant.

The needs of the camp are filled from an industrial area of considerable size at Hadnot Point. Situated there are a power plant, a cold storage plant, a bakery, a commissary, repair shops, a reclamation plant for salvaging and reprocessing vital materials, a laundry, warehouses, and railroad sidings.

The railroad that serves the area is owned and operated by the Marine Corps. The administrative personnel and trainmen are Marines.

THERE are two residential areas on the New River reservation, Paradise Point for officers and Midway for higher ranking noncommissioned officers and civilian employees of the camp. Supplemental housing for the latter is provided by a trailer camp at Hadnot Point.

Visitors are accommodated at the Officers' Guest House at Paradise Point and at the Hostess House at Hadnot.

In order that the younger children of both service and civilian personnel might attend classes near home, a grade school, modernly housed and with a competent faculty, is maintained on the base. It is conveniently situated between the two residential areas.

Post Exchanges, with barber shops attached, are scattered over the camp; and clubs, with fountain service, bowling alleys, billiard and table tennis facilities and games of various kinds are operated for the enlisted personnel.

There is a main camp theater at Hadnot Point and a combination theater-gymnasium in each of the areas of the base. Movies are presented nightly at the camp theater and in many of the areas, and a camp talent radio program is broadcast weekly from the former. The theater-gymnasiums are also utilized for basketball, dances and other athletic and social events.

*See "Indoctrination," MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, August, 1943.

Athletics available to personnel, in addition to basketball, include football, tennis, baseball and softball. Camp Lejeune had one of the foremost service elevens in the nation in 1943.

For those who seek diversion in books, there are libraries with the latest reading matter.

The spiritual welfare of all denominations receives adequate attention. Chaplains of all major faiths are on duty at the base. There are two large chapels at Hadnot Point, one for Catholics and the other for Protestants, and additional facilities for worship at Tent Camp, Montford Point, the Rifle Range, and Courthouse Bay.

The health of the camp's huge population is carefully guarded. There is a sick bay in each area and a spacious camp dispensary and one of the largest naval hospitals in the country at Hadnot Point. A field hospital serves Tent Camp. The naval hospital has a capacity of 1,400 bed patients, as well as out-patient facilities.

A malaria control program, initiated at the outset of construction, has eliminated primary cases of the malady at the base.*

*See "Malaria: Our Greatest Enemy," MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, December, 1943.

BEFORE the Marines moved in, the New River region was noted for its abundance of game, particularly ducks. It was a favorite spot with wealthy sportsmen, who built hunting lodges and summer homes in the area in the years following the Civil War.

The history of the region dates back to Colonial days. The first white men to visit the section, in all probability, were Henry Morgan and his pirate band. They used the treacherous New River inlet as a hideout.

New River was the scene of naval action in 1862, when Lieutenant William B. Cushing, in command of a Union steamer, raided the town of Jacksonville. As he headed his ship back toward the sea, it was sunk by Confederate shore batteries; but the lieutenant and his crew escaped in a captured schooner.

The camp, being the type of base it is, is appropriately named. The late Lieutenant General John Archer Lejeune, 40 years a Marine, World War I hero, Commandant from 1920 to 1929 and superintendent of Virginia Military Institute from 1929 to 1937, was the Corps' foremost educator.

The base was named Camp Lejeune as 1942 drew to a close, shortly after the general's death. In March, 1944, "New River" was eliminated from its official designation, so the base is now called simply "Camp Lejeune, N. C."

Uniform Regulations

CHANGES in uniform regulations as outlined in Circular Letter No. 625, 8 February 1944, are listed below, followed by a résumé of the regulations pertaining to the wearing of the uniform upon discharge or release from active duty, as reviewed in Letter of Instruction No. 654, of 7 February 1944.

Since the grades of commissioned warrant officer and warrant officer have been established by an Act of Congress, superseding the former ranks by which warrants were designated, the following insignia of rank have been authorized:

For commissioned warrant officers: one gold bar, broken across the center with a ¼ inch scarlet enamel stripe. For warrant officers the insignia is the same, with the exception that the scarlet enamel stripe is to be ⅛ of an inch wide.

Other uniform changes include the addition of a muffler of the same color as the overcoat and a trench coat as an optional article of the uniform for officers. The coat known as "Overcoat, Field, Officer's, (O.D. No. 7), (Trench Type)," recently standardized in the Army, or one as near thereto in material, color (green), and design will suffice.

The trench coat may only be worn in the United States in inclement weather; it may be worn overseas in lieu of either overcoat or raincoat. The directive which requires that reserve and retired officers on active duty during the present emergency equip themselves with both overcoats and raincoats, has been modified to state that trench coats only are required overseas. The adoption of the trench coat in no way affects the present status in the United States of either the standard overcoat or the short overcoat.

A blue cloth belt has been authorized for optional wear by all officers with the blue dress coat in lieu of the Belt, Officer's, Model 1935.

The chevron of the first sergeant is identical with that worn by enlisted men of the first pay grade, line, except that a lozenge has been inserted in the center.

The wearing of the Citation Device for all organizations cited in War Department general orders is authorized, such Citations Device to be worn in a manner similar to that prescribed for the wearing of the Presidential Unit Citation, *i.e.*, on the left breast between personal decoration ribbons and service medal ribbons, except that when medals are worn on the uniform, the device will be worn on the right breast above the pocket flap.

REGULATIONS pertaining to the wearing of the uniform state in effect that it shall be unlawful for any person not a member of the United States armed forces to wear any part of the uniform or any garment similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of any branch of our armed services, *except:* (1) Those honorably released may wear at ceremonies the uniform of the highest grade they have held when on active duty; (2) Those honorably discharged may wear their uniforms from the place of discharge to their homes within three months after the date of discharge; (3) Members of military societies composed entirely of honorably discharged officers and enlisted men may wear, upon occasions of ceremony, the uniform duly prescribed by such societies to be worn by the members thereof; (4) actors in any theater or movie while actually engaged in representing therein military or naval characters not tending to bring discredit to our armed services.

Uniforms worn by officers or enlisted men of the National Guard or by members of the military societies or the instructors and members of the cadet corps shall include some distinctive mark or insignia.

Marine Corps Occupational Technicians

They Will Help Marines Return to Civil Life

By Captain Milton E. Hahn, USMCR

Classification Division, Headquarters, USMC

CORPORAL JOHN JONES, USMC, will be discharged soon. For the past two months he's been worrying about what will happen to him when he steps back into civilian life. He has insurance to think about, the Veteran's Administration has arranged for his pension for partial disability, but the papers haven't cleared yet, and most important of all, what about a job? A United States Employment Service representative has assured him that work will be waiting, but will it be the kind of work which he will like and in which he can continue to advance after the war?



Jones wants to talk to someone who speaks "his language" about the whole affair. Marines in the hospital have passed scuttlebutt back and forth; they have argued politics and the state of the nation, but Jones wants some facts. More than this, however, he wants to talk to someone who will help him confirm his own ideas about himself and give him sound suggestions of what to do when he is an "ex-leatherneck." Who was that Rehabilitation officer who talked to him last week? So Jones goes to the office of the Rehabilitation officer.

An NCO greets Jones when he enters the office. This is good—Jones doesn't open up too well with commissioned officers or civilians. He states his business and is asked to sit down. The two begin to review the various separation forms and procedures in which Jones is interested. With these routines complete, the NCO leans back and asks,

"What are you going to do for a job?"

Jones plunges in. He tells of his doubts, the desire to stand on his own feet, and the limitations placed on him by his partial disability. The NCO discusses with Jones the information on his Classification Card—education, civilian and military work experiences, and vocational interests. At Jones' request, he is given an interest test.

Two days later Jones drops in again to discuss his conclusions with the NCO. He has a clearer picture of his aptitudes, abilities, and interests, and on what jobs they may be used. He asks for more specific information about civilian agencies, methods and places for finding a job and opportunities for further education. Jones is sincerely grateful for the help given by another Marine—the NCO. He is much better prepared to step out of GI clothes into civvies. He feels that the Marine Corps has not let him down.

What about the NCO? Where did he get his information? Why is he able to act as an expert—a professional counselor? The answer lies in the careful selection of unusually well-qualified Marines with experience in Classification for advanced training. Men like the NCO who have handled the inflow and original assignment of recruits and further assignment at Parris Island and San Diego and in the field; with additional training they are now handling the outflow of discharged Marines. At the present time one or more of these specialists is in each Reserve District. The number will be increased as more men are needed.

The mission of men like the NCO is one of passing on useful information and providing professional assistance on personal problems. These occupational technicians are not interested in "sweetness and light"—Marines with whom they work are not "cases," but individuals. They know their jobs, work hard, and are advising only when they are asked. To realize the enthusiasm these men have for their duties, one must meet them.

The civilian backgrounds of these men are in keeping with their new duties—psychologists, school administrators, personnel managers. Their educational backgrounds cover many "name" universities of the country—California, Wisconsin, Harvard, Fordham, Virginia, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and others.

THE appointment of Rehabilitation Liaison officers within Marine Corps Reserve Districts focused attention on the need for enlisted specialists to perform certain duties which, for various reasons, the Rehabilitation officer could not perform personally. When the Rehabilitation officers moved into the field in February, 1944, they were charged with the responsibility of:

1. Facilitating discharges through prompt and proper accomplishment of all necessary forms.
2. Informing Marines about to be discharged, of their rights, duties, and opportunities.
3. Orienting Marines relative to conditions in civilian life.
4. Performing liaison duties between Marines about-to-be-discharged and civilian agencies.
5. Developing a system for follow-up of discharged Marines.
6. Disseminating proper publicity to inform the public of Marine Corps rehabilitation activities.
7. Aiding Marines in a self evaluation relative to apti-

tudes, abilities, and interests, which are all important in getting, keeping, and advancing on a civilian job.

Because most reserve districts cover more than one state and usually include several points of discharge, enlisted specialists were established in Marine Corps allowances. It was determined by the officers in charge of Classification and Rehabilitation Divisions* that enlisted personnel be trained to deal with items 1, 2, 3, and 7 above. The brunt of the personal interview load could not possibly be met by the Rehabilitation officers.

The Marine Corps did not have a pool of qualified psychologically trained vocational counselors on which to draw. It was necessary, therefore, to identify individuals with civilian backgrounds upon which technical training could be superimposed in a relatively short period of time. Qualifications for selection included:

1. College graduation.
2. A concentration of college course work in psychology, sociology, and related fields.
3. An Army General Classification Test standard score of 120.
4. A minimum percentile rank of 70 on the Ohio Psychological Examination (Ohio State University SLA freshman norms).
5. Minimum age 25.
6. Graduation from the specialized training course for Classification Specialists (SSN 275).

Additional desirable qualifications included:

1. Civilian experience as a counselor on educational-vocational problems.
2. Previous extended military experience.
3. Graduate work in personnel psychology.

The curriculum prepared for the specialized training program at Classification Section, Marine Barracks, Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, was aimed particularly at the seventh item in the responsibilities of Rehabilitation officers: "To aid Marines in a self evaluation relative to aptitudes, abilities, and interests which are all important in getting, keeping, and advancing on a civilian job."

Heavy emphasis was placed on this point for several reasons. In the first place, it is believed that civilian agencies, with their loads of civilian war workers in addition to military separations, will face serious personnel problems. Qualified personnel technicians are scarce in civilian life. The Marine Corps Rehabilitation-Classification enlisted specialists can give more individual attention to Marines than can the civilian agencies. A second consideration was that use of Classification procedures and records in the Marine Corps demanded that occupational technicians be thoroughly grounded in these records and procedures. Marine Corps occupational technicians are all graduates of the Classification specialist course at Parris Island or San Diego recruit depots. This training helps to fit them for interpreting data from the Marine's classification card and service record book, In the third place, the Marine Corps occupational technician is working with Marines about-to-be-discharged under conditions where the Marine has ample time to consider his problems. After discharge, the need for an immediate job will prevent many veterans from spending the time with civilian agencies necessary for proper vocational planning. A last but important point is the need for administration and interpretation of various tests and inventories by persons qualified to perform these tasks. Such services are not readily available through civilian agencies in many localities. Graduates of the training course for occupational technicians are described as follows:

OCCUPATIONAL TECHNICIAN

Specification Serial Number 262

"Assists Marines in employment and educational problems involved in the separation from military to civilian life.

"Studies individual cases to determine civilian or military occupations which Marine might pursue, considering such factors as training, experience, interest, aptitudes, abilities, handicaps, and environmental condition of assignment or employment; administers or prescribes tests to assist in determining interests, skills, capacity, and occupational aptitudes; notes interests of individual as revealed by hobbies, participation in sports, musical participation, and the like; interprets results of tests and other data, analyzes Marine's military occupational specialties for characteristics convertible to other military or civilian work; recommends fields of civilian employment and gives information on civilian agencies that are prepared to offer employment services or suggests field of study for additional training or education. May refer Marine to proper authorities within the Marine Corps for further consultation."

The training of enlisted specialists provides a pool of Marines competent to perform duties of a technical nature in addition to separation routines. There is no intention that these specialists duplicate the functions of other agencies or compete with them. It is felt that the services rendered by these specialists will reinforce the work of other organizations and lighten their load as well as contribute to outcomes such as morale and better understanding of civilian problems which are difficult for non-Marine organizations to achieve.

That's how the NCO got the training that enabled him to help Corporal John Jones with his problems in returning to civilian life. He, or an officer or NCO like him, will be ready to help you, too, when your turn to be mustered out comes.

*Lt. Col. R. W. Rickert, Officer in Charge, Classification Division, USMC Hq., Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. C. B Rhoads, Officer in Charge, Rehabilitation Division, USMC Hq., Washington, D. C.

Decorations and Commendations

NAVY CROSS

MAJOR GENERAL ALLEN HAL TURNAGE, USMC, Commander of the Third Marine Division in the Bougainville campaign, was decorated with the Navy Cross by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., USN, Commander of the South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, in ceremonies before several thousand combat-clad Marine troops.

The ceremonies took place on a parade ground adjacent to the coconut grove camp of the Third Division. The troops, led by Colonel Robert Blake, USMC, marched in review past General Turnage and other high-ranking officers who had also won decorations.

The others receiving awards were Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commanding Officer of the First Marine Amphibious Corps, awarded the Distinguished Service Medal; Brigadier General Alfred H. Noble, USMC, Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the First Marine Amphibious Corps, awarded the Legion of Merit; and Colonel James M. Smith, USMC, of Handley, Texas, presented both the Legion of Merit and the Silver Star.

The citation for Major General Turnage read as follows:

"For extraordinary heroism and distinguished service in the line of his profession as Commander of the Landing Force during the landing and establishment of a Beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, during the period from November 1 to November 27, 1943.

"Throughout the landing and actions necessary for the attainment and consolidation of the final beachhead line, General Turnage frequently exposed himself to fire and displayed the highest degree of bold, aggressive, and fearless leadership.

"His conduct was an inspiration to the officers and men of his command and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF A SECOND NAVY CROSS

BRIGADIER GENERAL MERRITT A. EDSON, USMC: As Commanding Officer of the Tulagi Combat Group during the landing assault on enemy Japanese-held Tulagi Island, British Solomon Islands, August 7 to 9, 1942, and in personal command of the First Marine Raider Battalion during the initial operation, General Edson advanced the attack of his battalion and its supporting units with such skill, courage and aggressiveness that he was an inspiration to the entire Combat Group and was directly responsible for the capture of Tulagi Island.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

MAJOR GENERAL ROY S. GEIGER, USMC: Major General Geiger successfully seized and held an important position on the west coast of Bougainville, extending it for the construction of airfields vitally necessary to further operations in the Solomons, despite extremely difficult terrain, dense jungle and unfavorable weather.

CORPORAL REID C. CHAMBERLAIN, USMC: Corporal Chamberlain, having escaped from Corregidor on the day of its surrender, served with extraordinary heroism with the Fourth Marine Regiment in the Philippine Islands at the outbreak of the war and fought on both Bataan and Corregidor.

CORPORAL CHARLES S. EASTON, USMC: (Army) Corporal Easton, though wounded, led his squad in charges against well-established enemy positions and was credited with wiping out three machine-gun nests that blocked the advance of his company at Bairoko Harbor, New Georgia, on 20 July 1943.

PRIVATE GERALD L. AYERS, USMCR: (Army) Severely wounded, while bringing well-aimed fire to bear on strong enemy positions, Private Ayers discovered an enemy machine gun about to open fire and passed word back to his comrades and directed fire of his platoon upon it, thus saving the lives of many of the men in his company.

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF A SECOND LEGION OF MERIT

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN P. CONDON, USMC: Lieutenant Colonel Condon's conduct in personally leading his unit ashore during the Bougainville offensive and setting up the installations of his command despite unfavorable conditions of terrain and enemy gunfire clearly demonstrated professional attainments and marked capacity for command.

LEGION OF MERIT

COLONEL WILLIAM S. FELLERS, USMC: Colonel Fellers, as Assistant Chief of Staff of a Marine Division in the Solomon Islands, performed his duties as administrator and coördinator for the release of combat equipment to the Army, materially assisting the division to attain its high state of combat efficiency.

COLONEL CHRISTIAN F. SCHILT, USMC: Colonel Schilt succeeded in developing a hard-hitting command, consistently aggressive in the performance of numerous hazardous missions, while Commanding Officer of the Strike Command and of the Search and Patrol Command, Solomon Islands, from April 1 to July 25, 1943.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES C. MURRAY, JR., USMC: Lieutenant Colonel Murray's suggestion in the planning of amphibious operations in the Solomon Islands proved distinctly effective in the Choiseul Island attack and contributed to the success of the Allied landing on Bougainville.

MAJOR ARTHUR R. STACY, USMC: As Commanding Officer of Service Squadron and Group Engineering Officer of a Marine Aircraft Group on Guadalcanal from October 16, 1942 to March 14, 1943, Major Stacy was responsible for and efficiently handled transportation, supply and basic upkeep of his squadron and was in direct control of maintenance of all aircraft of the group and attached Army, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons.

GOLD STAR IN LIEU OF SECOND SILVER STAR (ARMY)

SERGEANT LAWRENCE H. FLYNN, USMCR: While rescuing a wounded comrade, Sergeant Flynn was wounded

Admiral Nimitz Decorates Tarawa Heroes

By Technical Sergeant Fred Feldkamp, USMC

IN AN impressive military ceremony held "somewhere in the Pacific," March 1st, heroes of Tarawa were decorated for their gallantry by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. One hundred and seventy-one individual awards were made.

Marine officers and enlisted men who distinguished themselves in the battle at Tarawa received the following decorations—Navy Cross, the Legion of Merit, the Gold Star, Silver Star, and Commendation from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

After congratulating Major General Julian C. Smith, Commanding General of the Second Marine Division, which took Tarawa, Admiral Nimitz addressed the officers and men of the division.

"We have assembled today to honor those among your number who have particularly distinguished themselves in battle against our enemy in the Pacific," he began. "The whole world knows of the gallant performance and achievements of the men who fought at Tarawa. Nothing can sufficiently express the nation's gratitude for the deeds of its sons in battle. There is no yardstick to measure your sacrifice and no tangible remembrance which would be adequate reflection of your country's appreciation."

Commenting on the action at Tarawa, the Admiral said:

"The capture of the Gilbert Islands paved the way for our more recent successes in the Marshalls. At Tarawa American forces knocked down the front door to the whole Japanese defensive system in the Central Pacific. All the men who took part in this action have earned for themselves a permanent niche in the hall of military fame.

"The memory of those who died at Tarawa and Makin so inspired your brothers-in-arms of the Army and Marine Corps that they quickly wrested Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls from the enemy," the Admiral continued. "From Hawkins Field at Tarawa—named in honor of your own Lieutenant Hawkins who heroically gave his life—sprang many of the planes which supported the Marshalls action with an avenging fury.

"The Second Marine Division has unstintingly carried out its tasks in the drive which has eliminated enemy control of the sea over thousands of square miles and brought us measurably closer to the Japanese homeland. You shared in the historic beginnings of the ocean highways we are opening across the Pacific. Most of you will share in our future progress along that road until our combined power has brought about the unconditional surrender of Japan. . . .

"I now present these awards," the Admiral stated in conclusion, "in the name of the President of the United States who, were it possible, would have the keenest pleasure in pinning these medals on you. I want each of you to consider that your medal has been presented to you by the commander in chief."

Twelve officers and men of the Second Marine Division who were awarded the Navy Cross were:

Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe, Los Angeles, Calif.

Major William C. Chamberlin, Seattle, Wash.

Captain Charles R. Durfee, Rapid City, S. D.

First Lieutenant William H. Sanders, II, Princeton, W. Va.

Second Lieutenant Joseph Barr, Omaha, Nebr.

Platoon Sergeant Walter Fieguth, Sacramento, Calif.

Sergeant Edward R. Godwin, Vicksburg, Miss.

Corporal Herbert D. Crotts, Siler City, N. C.

Corporal Orville E. W. Broeker, Riverside, Ill.

Private First Class John M. Gross, Racine, Wis.

Robert L. Winters, Hospital Apprentice, First Class, Portland, Oregon.

Private James W. Tobey, Merkel, Texas.

Present with Admiral Nimitz and Major General Julian C. Smith commanding general of the Second Marine Division, at the ceremony were:

Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, commanding general of the Fifth Amphibious Corps.

Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson, USMC, assistant commander of the Second Marine Division.

Brigadier General Leo D. Hermle, USMC, assistant division commander at Tarawa.

Colonel David M. Shoup, USMC, commanding officer of one of the first units to land on Tarawa.

Captain P. V. Mercer, USN, Chief of Staff to Admiral Nimitz.

but unhesitatingly assumed command when his platoon leader became a casualty and directed a brilliant attack.

SILVER STAR

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TOM T. FLAHERTY, MC, USN: Attached to Marine Air Group Twenty-five, operating in the Solomon Islands Area on September 14 and 15, 1943, Lieutenant Commander Flaherty courageously remained at his post despite continual bombing and strafing of the field by enemy aircraft, supervising and aiding in the loading of the wounded who were under his care.

CAPTAIN JOHN KOVACS, USMC: Captain Kovacs, gravely wounded on November 24, 1943 while leading his men against a strongly entrenched and skillfully concealed Japanese position at Bougainville, continued the assault until the enemy position was overwhelmed.

LIEUTENANT ROBERT J. CRONIN, ChC, USNR: After a landing had been effected on Puruata Island, British Solomon Islands, on November 1, 1943, Lieutenant Cronin, attached to a Marine Raider battalion, crawled through Jap-held jungle under constant tank, machine-gun and sniper fire to administer the Last Sacraments of the Catholic Church to a dying Marine.

FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM K. NEILL, USMCR: (Army) While in action at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on July 20, 1943, Lieutenant Neill pushed forward to overcome hostile resistance and capture an enemy position well in advance of adjacent units.

FIRST LIEUTENANT JOHN A. SABINI, USMC: First Lieutenant Sabini was wounded three times on Bougainville November 9, 1943, when he deliberately offered himself as a target for Japs so that his men might ascertain where a Jap contingent was hidden.

SECOND LIEUTENANT CURTIS A. TATUM, USMC: (Army) On New Georgia, Solomon Islands, July 20, 1943, Lieutenant Tatum led his platoon aggressively against extremely heavy opposition and directed the platoon's fire in the destruction of two hostile machine-gun emplacements which he had personally located.

GUNNERY SERGEANT HARRY F. ERICKSON, USMC: (Army) While in action at New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on July 9, 1943, Sergeant Erickson, manning a gun whose crew members had been pinned down by enemy fire, maneuvered it into a position from which he disposed of an enemy machine gun and killed its entire crew.

SERGEANT NEAL H. CHURCH, USMC: Sergeant Church was one of several Marines who volunteered to clear an adjacent area, during the occupation of New Georgia on July 8, 1943, where the enemy was endangering personnel and vital installations of our landing operations.

CORPORAL HAROLD W. SMITH, USMCR: In action at Enogai, New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on July 10, 1943, Corporal Smith, although critically wounded, refused evacuation and remained with his squad, skillfully leading his men and firing his weapon in an attack on a strong enemy defensive position.

CORPORAL JOHN J. SMOLKA, USMC: While serving with a Marine battalion during action against enemy Japanese forces on Guadalcanal on September 26, 1942, Corporal Smolka, on two occasions while under heavy fire from hostile machine guns and rifles, stood on an exposed stretch of beach near the mouth of the Matanikau River and communicated by semaphore to a United States Navy destroyer off shore.

CORPORAL STANLEY SHULER, USMC: While serving with a parachute battalion during the invasion of Gavutu, Solomon Islands, on August 7, 1942, Corporal Shuler, although he received serious wounds in the chest and arm while executing an important reconnaissance assignment, persisted in his task until he obtained valuable information and returned to his command with an excellent report of his detailed observations of the hostile forces. Proceeding to the first aid station with another wounded Marine, he drove off two attacking Japanese and undoubtedly saved his companion's life.

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS AUDREY G. WINN, JR., USMCR:

The Bronze Star Medal

THE establishment of the Bronze Star Medal by executive order of the President of the United States was announced on February 25, 1944, by Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.

This medal is for award to any person who, while serving in any capacity in or with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard of the United States, on or after December 7, 1941, distinguishes, or has distinguished, himself by heroic or meritorious achievement or service, not involving participation in aerial flight, in connection with military or naval operations against an enemy of the United States.

The Bronze Star Medal shall take precedence next after the Navy and Marine Corps Medal and next before the Air Medal. The required achievement or service is less than that required for the Silver Star Medal or the Legion of Merit but must nevertheless be accomplished or performed in a manner above that normally to be expected and sufficient to distinguish the individual among those performing comparable duties. The Bronze Star Medal may be awarded to recognize minor acts of heroism in actual combat or single acts of merit, or meritorious service, either in sustained operational activities against an enemy or in direct support of such operations.

No more than one Bronze Star Medal shall be issued to any one person but a gold star in lieu thereof may be awarded for each succeeding award to the same individual. The Bronze Star Medal or the gold star in lieu thereof may be awarded posthumously.

Authority to award this new medal has been delegated to those commanders in chief and fleet commanders who already had authority from the Secretary of the Navy to award other decorations. No authority for award to civilians or foreign personnel has been delegated.

(Army) Acting as an ammunition carrier, Private Winn constantly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire in order to carry ammunition to a machine-gun crew in a forward position on July 20, 1943, at New Georgia, Solomon Islands.

Private First Class Hughie McSweeney, USMC: (Army) At Enogai, New Georgia, Solomon Islands, on July 10, 1943, Private McSweeney refused to leave the scene of action until the mission was completed when he was wounded during a fierce charge on an enemy light machine-gun position in the way of his company's advance.

Private Lloyd B. Abbott, USMCR: (Army) When all of the other men in his squad were suddenly pinned down by heavy enemy fire in attacking a strong Japanese defensive position on Enogai, New Georgia, on July 7, 1943, Private Abbott pressed forward alone and succeeded in establishing an advanced position.

Private Robert A. Yates, USMC: Private Yates answered a call for assistance and worked tirelessly to uncover his comrades buried in the debris of a demolished dugout when a direct bomb hit it on October 13-14, 1942, on Henderson Field, Solomon Islands.

DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

Captain Archie G. Donahue, USMCR: Captain Donahue, while attached to a Marine Fighting Squadron during action against the enemy in the Solomon Islands Area from May 13 to June 7, 1943, participated in numerous patrols, escort missions, and strafing attacks and with complete disregard of personal safety accounted for seven of the hostile planes encountered.

Captain Elton Mueller, USMCR: While in aerial combat with the Japs in the Southwest Pacific between January 11 and 15, 1943, Captain Mueller joined six fighters that left the flight to engage the enemy and personally accounted for the destruction of two enemy planes when a large group of Japanese Zeros attacked the dive bombers which were being escorted on a vital mission by his flight of twelve fighters.

Captain Taylor R. Roberts, USMCR: While participating in aerial attacks against the enemy as pilot of a dive bomber, Captain Roberts took part in numerous dive bombing and strafing attacks against enemy shipping, troop positions and airfield installations and scored a direct hit on an enemy destroyer.

First Lieutenants Howard J. Finn, USMCR; Samuel Richards, Jr., USMCR; and Stanley T. Synar, USMCR: As members of Marine Fighting Squadrons in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from May 2 to June 16, 1943, these pilots engaged in numerous patrols, escort missions and strafing attacks, often in the face of heavy concentrations of antiaircraft fire, and in their daring attacks, accounted for at least nine enemy planes.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MEDAL

Warrant Officer William S. Dugger, USMC: When a Navy Corsair in the act of taking off crashed into three Army P-38's and all four planes burst immediately into flames, Dugger led 15 men to the blazing craft and unhesitatingly assisted in extricating the trapped pilot from the burning wreckage.

SECOND AIR MEDAL

Captain Dayton A. Swickard, USMC: Captain Swickard took part in numerous sorties made against enemy shipping and ground installations in the face of stout defense with resultant heavy damage to Jap bases and ships.

AIR MEDAL

Majors George F. Britt, USMC, and Robert B. B. Fraser, USMC: As Commanding Officers of Marine Fighting Squadrons in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from March 18 to June 7, 1943, these men, through their expert leadership and proficient training tactics, were greatly responsible for the excellent records of their squadrons in destroying thirty-four hostile fighters and several others probably destroyed.

Major Frank E. Hollar, USMC: As flight leader of a Marine Aviation Squadron, Major Hollar, flying precariously low in the face of blinding searchlights and concentrated antiaircraft fire, succeeded in carrying out his flight's mission.

Captains William A. Cantrell, USMC, and John P. Golder, II, USMC: As fighter pilots in action against the Japs in the Solomon Islands Area between February 4 and September 9, 1943, these men took part in numerous strikes against enemy shipping, airfield installations and troop concentrations, often against severe antiaircraft fire.

Captains William E. Crowe, USMCR, and John R. Burnett, USMCR: While participating in aerial flight as members of Marine Fighting Squadrons in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from March 19 to June 18, 1943, Captains Burnett and Crowe engaged in numerous hazardous patrols, escort missions and strafing assaults on hostile shore installations and ships and destroyed three bombers.

Captains William M. Lundin, USMCR, and John P. McMahon, USMCR: While participating in aerial flight as pilots of fighter planes in Marine Fighting Squadrons during engagements with enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from June to July 1943, skillfully attacked the enemy on numerous patrols, escort missions and fighter interceptions destroying seven hostile aircraft.

First Lieutenants William J. Bedford, USMCR; William M. Johnston, USMCR; Wallace E. Sigler, USMCR; and Julian Willcox, USMCR: While participating in aerial flight as members of Marine Fighting Squadrons in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands Area from May 2 to June 16, 1943, these pilots engaged in several hazardous patrols, escort assignments and strafing attacks, in the face of heavy concentrations of enemy antiaircraft fire, and with accurate fire destroyed four enemy craft and probably three.

First Lieutenants Carol Bernard, USMCR; Kenneth H. Dieffenbach, USMCR; Justin J. O'Connor,

USMCR; WILLIAM W. ROGERS, JR., USMCR; and EDWARD A. WALSH, USMCR: In aerial flight as pilots of fighter planes attached to Marine Aircraft Groups and Marine Scout Bomber Squadrons, these men took part in numerous successful bombing attacks against enemy shipping and heavily fortified air bases in the South Pacific during April through July 1943.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS HOWARD L. CAVANAGH, USMCR; VINCENT W. CARPENTER, USMCR; LINCOLN F. DEETZ, USMCR; CHARLES C. LANPHIER, USMCR; and JACK W. PETIT, USMCR: In aerial flight as members of Marine Fighting Squadrons in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands on April 7, 1943, these pilots engaged large flights of enemy Zeros, dive bombers and fighters and unhesitatingly launched daring attacks against them, destroying five enemy planes.

SECOND LIEUTENANTS HENRY W. HOLLMEYER, US MCR; CHARLES J. O'MALLEY, USMCR; and EDGAR C. VERNON, USMCR: As pilots of fighter and dive bomber planes in combat against enemy Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands, these men took part in numerous strikes against enemy aircraft, shipping and heavily fortified airbases.

MASTER TECHNICAL SERGEANT TROY M. SHELTON, USMC; and SERGEANTS RICHARD J. BARCLAY, USMC, and CHARLES E. SHOWALTER, USMC: While participating in aerial flight as members of a Marine Fighting Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group, and Marine Scout Bombing Squadron, these men took part in numerous important missions consisting of numerous searches, hazardous patrols over enemy lines, and attacks on hostile surface vessels.

General Porter Dies

MAJOR GENERAL DAVID DIXON PORTER, USMC (Ret.), 66-year-old descendant of one of the most famous families in American naval history and retired adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps, died February 25 in the Naval Hospital in Philadelphia after a lingering illness.

After brief funeral services at his home in Philadelphia, the General's body was transferred to Washington where military rights were conducted February 29 at St. John's Church preceding interment at Arlington Cemetery.

General Porter was promoted to major general on his retirement in 1937. Appointed a second lieutenant in 1898, he was promoted through the various ranks until he became a brigadier general in 1934. The coveted Congressional Medal of Honor was awarded to him for extraordinary heroism in the Philippines during the insurrection in 1901. This belated honor was bestowed by the President of the United States in April, 1934.

A letter of commendation was presented General Porter in 1920 by the Secretary of the Navy for services rendered during World War I in connection with the demobilization of the Corps at the close of the war. The late general also wore the Spanish Campaign Medal; Brevet medal, 1900-1901; Philippine Campaign Medal; Cuban pacification medal with numeral 4 for service in Panama, 1902; Haiti and Dominican Republic, 1921; Victory Medal.

General Porter was born in Washington, D. C., son of Colonel Carlile Porter, USMC, and a grandson of the famous Admiral David Dixon Porter. He was the seventh in a line of seamen, dating from the earliest days of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

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SUBSCRIPTION FORM

The Secretary-Treasurer,
Marine Corps Association,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington 25, D. C.

Place .....

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Letters of Commendation

By Secretary of the Navy:

Major General Seth Williams, USMC.
Private Robert C. Wrigley, Jr., USMCR.

By the Commandant:

Captain William C. Mann, USMCR.
Captain Richard G. Rees, USMCR.
First Lieutenant Frank J. Haas, USMCR.
Master Technical Sergeant Douglas G. Woodland, USMC.
Sergeant W. L. Timmons, USMC.
Private First Class Martin P. Donlon, USMCR.

By the Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force:

Colonel James D. Waller, USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Burger, USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. Forney, Jr., USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur J. McNenny, USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Nels H. Nelson, USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, USMC.
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick L. Wieseman, USMC.
Major Ethridge C. Best, USMC.
Major James C. Murray, Jr., USMC.
Captain Andrew S. Macreadie, USMCR.
Captain Richard R. Woodward, USMCR.
First Lieutenant Joseph S. Gardner, USMC.
First Lieutenant Oliver D. Keep, USMCR.
First Lieutenant Jack R. West, USMCR.
Second Lieutenant Paul F. Brandenburg, USMC.
Chief Warrant Officer Anthony G. Yelanich, USMCR.
Gunnery Sergeant Robert C. Loney, USMC.
Platoon Sergeant Isaac N. Hutchin, USMC.
Sergeant Bill M. Love, USMC.
Corporal Bernard M. Somers, USMC.
Corporal Russell L. Hurlburt, USMC.
Private William D. Beasley, USMC.

From Headquarters, First Marine Amphibious Corps:

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S. Wade, USMC.
Major Robert W. Thomas, USMC.
Captain Emanuel Yalowitz, USMC.

From Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Wing:

Staff Sergeant Robert M. Barr, USMC.
Sergeant Robert M. Coons, USMCR.

From Commanding General, Headquarters, First Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force:

First Lieutenant Joseph A. Fournier, USMCR.

From Headquarters, Commander Aircraft, Solomon Islands:

Marine Gunner Albert T. Linkus, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant Paul L. Brink, USMCR.
Master Technical Sergeant Benjamin A. Carr, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant Joseph A. Corvi, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant Jack Bently Crawford, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant Wendell C. Lowry, USMCR.
Master Technical Sergeant Kenneth A. Meaders, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant R. K. Mustaine, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant Wayne M. Proctor, USMC.
Master Technical Sergeant John L. Verdino, USMCR.
Technical Sergeant Keith B. Gruse, USMCR.
Technical Sergeant Vincent T. Gulfo, USMC.
Technical Sergeant Soloman S. Lightman, USMCR.
Technical Sergeant Donald L. Loveless, USMCR.
Technical Sergeant Arthur C. Roberts, USMC.
Technical Sergeant John W. Roney, USMC.
Technical Sergeant Joseph J. Zim, USMC.
Staff Sergeant Willard F. Brady, USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Gordon A. Gibb, USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Robert D. Holden, USMC.
Staff Sergeant Frank M. Hopkins, Jr., USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Hosea T. La Fleur, USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Claude E. Snapp, USMCR.
Staff Sergeant Philip J. Todisco, USMC.
Staff Sergeant R. W. Wallace, USMC.
Sergeant Ancel E. Edmondson, USMCR.
Private First Class Royce Bordelon, USMCR.
Private First Class Paul Nance, USMCR.

From Commanding General, Headquarters, Defense Force, Samoan Group:

Private James R. Thomas, USMC.

From Headquarters, United States Army Forces, South Pacific Area:

Major George W. Herring, USMC.
First Lieutenant George E. Leppig, USMCR.
Sergeant Kenneth W. Kutter, USMC.
Sergeant Robert R. Tharp, USMC.

From Commanding General, U. S. Army Headquarters, XIV Corps:

Ninth Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force.

From Major General N. F. Twining, USA:

Technical Sergeant Clarence W. Sullivan, USMC.

Combat Stars

A REVISED LIST of all naval operations and engagements since December 7, 1941, for which naval personnel are authorized to wear bronze or silver stars on area service ribbons has been issued by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, jointly with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Under the regulations accompanying the new list, the use of numerals and clasps for certain types of duty has been discontinued. In lieu of these, stars will be worn for action or duties designated by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations as hazardous enough to merit such an award.

In general, the prerequisite to wearing a star on an area service ribbon is honorable service in a ship, aircraft unit, or shore-based force at the time it participated in actual combat with the enemy in a designated operation or engagement. In addition, a commanding officer may recommend that a star be authorized for hazardous duty that did not result in actual combat.

The operation or engagement stars authorized to date are:

A. FOR ASIATIC-PACIFIC AREA SERVICE RIBBON:

PEARL HARBOR ..... Dec. 7, 1941
WAKE ISLAND ..... Dec. 8-23, 1941
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS OPERATION
Dec. 8, 1941, to May 6, 1942
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES ENGAGEMENTS
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
Makassar Strait ..... Jan. 23-24, 1942
Badoeng Strait ..... Feb. 19-20, 1942
Java Sea ..... Feb. 27, 1942
PACIFIC RAIDS—1942
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
Marshall-Gilbert Raids ..... Feb. 1, 1942
Air Action off Bougainville ..... Feb. 20, 1942
Wake Island Raid ..... Feb. 24, 1942
Marcus Island Raid ..... Mar. 4, 1942
Salamaua-Lae Raid ..... Mar. 10, 1942
CORAL SEA ..... May 4-8, 1942
MIDWAY ..... June 3-6, 1942
GUADALCANAL-TULAGI LANDINGS
(Including First Savo) ..... Aug. 7-9, 1942
CAPTURE AND DEFENSE OF GUADALCANAL
Aug. 10, 1942, to Feb. 8, 1943
MAKIN RAID ..... Aug. 17-18, 1942
EASTERN SOLOMONS
(Stewart Island) ..... Aug. 23-25, 1942
BUIN-FAISI-TONOLAI RAID ..... Oct. 5, 1942
CAPE ESPERANCE (Second Savo) .. Oct. 11-12, 1942
SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS ..... Oct. 26, 1942
GUADALCANAL (Third Savo) .... Nov. 12-15, 1942
TASSAFARONGA (Fourth Savo)
Nov. 30 and Dec. 1, 1942
RENNELL ISLAND ..... Jan. 29-30, 1943
ALEUTIANS OPERATION
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
Komandorski Islands ..... Mar. 26, 1943
Attu Occupation ..... May 11 to June 2, 1943
NEW GEORGIA GROUP OPERATION
June 20 to Oct. 16, 1943
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
New Georgia Rendova-Vangunu
Occupation ..... June 20 to Aug. 5, 1943
Kula Gulf Action ..... July 5-6, 1943
Kolombangara Action ..... July 12-13, 1943
Vella Gulf Action ..... Aug. 6-7, 1943
Vella LaVella Occupation .... Aug. 15 to Oct. 16, 1943
Action off Vella LaVella ..... Oct. 6-7, 1943
PACIFIC RAIDS—1943
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
Marcus Island Raid ..... Aug. 31, 1943
Tarawa Island Raid ..... Sept. 18, 1943
Wake Island Raid ..... Oct. 5-6, 1943
NEW GUINEA OPERATION .. Sept. 4, 1943 to ——
TREASURY-BOUGAINVILLE OPERATION
Oct. 27, 1943 to ——
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO OPERATION
Dec. 15, 1943 to ——
GILBERT ISLANDS OPERATION
Nov. 20, 1943 to ——

B. FOR EUROPEAN-AFRICAN-MIDDLE EASTERN AREA SERVICE RIBBON:

NORTH AFRICAN OCCUPATION
(Only one star for participation in one or more of the following)
Algeria-Morocco Landings ..... Nov. 8-11, 1942
Action off Casablanca ..... Nov. 8, 1942
Tunisian Operations .... Nov. 8, 1942, to July 9, 1943
SICILIAN OCCUPATION ..... July 9-15, 1943
July 28, to Aug. 17, 1943
SALERNO LANDINGS ..... Sept. 9-21, 1943

For the operations listed above, the Fleet Commander who exercised operational control will designate the ships, aircraft units, and shore-based forces which participated.

In addition to these actions and operations, participants in attacks on enemy submarines which have resulted in the positive or probable sinking of the submarine merit a star on the appropriate area service ribbon. Also, the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations may from time to time, when justified by the intensity and significance of the operation or engagement, authorize the award of a star to personnel of ships or aircraft for the following services:

(*a*) Patrols or service of maintenance, supply, mine-laying, mine-sweeping, and other special operations which have resulted in an engagement in which a ship or aircraft has suffered damage from the enemy or has destroyed or severely damaged an enemy ship or aircraft.

(*b*) Duty that did not result in actual combat with resultant damage to or from the enemy but which is considered equally hazardous.

For the award of stars in these two categories of action, Fleet Commanders will make recommendations to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations who will designate and announce those operations which merit an award.



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BOOK REVIEWS

Any books reviewed may be obtained at publishers' prices from The Marine Corps Association, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

THE CURTAIN RISES. By Quentin Reynolds. New York: Random House. 353 pp. $2.75.

HERE is a war correspondent's book that covers more territory than most, and covers it better. Quentin Reynolds had a roving commission from *Collier's* and made the most of it. His book starts in Miami, jumps across the Atlantic and Africa to Iran, continues to Moscow, jumps back to the Middle East, and carries on through Sicily and the beach of bloody Salerno.

The Curtain Rises will do two things for the American public and should do a third. It will give them a new insight into the contemporary life of our little-known ally, Soviet Russia. It will tell them much that they will want to know about their fighting sons in North Africa and Italy. It should disturb them somewhat and jar them out of the complacency that is still too widespread in America.

Six days after leaving Miami, Reynolds' plane was crossing the snow-capped mountains of Iran and landing in the heat of its capital, Teheran. Here he gained a close view of the little-known but vitally important activities of the American troops making up the Persian Gulf Service Command under General Donald Connolly. There is nothing glamorous in the job these boys are doing. They work in a climate in which a temperature of 129 degrees is not unusual and their work is the hardest kind of physical labor. Ships arrive in the ports loaded with war materials for Russia. Their job is to unload it, put it on trains and trucks, transport it north, deliver it to the Russians and then return and do the job all over again. Here is Lend-Lease in action. General Connolly tells his troops: "The Russian front is an extension of the American front. Every weapon we can put into the hands of a Russian may mean an American life saved."

From Iran, Reynolds flew to Moscow. The six short chapters that he gives to his Russian experiences are particularly interesting because he writes of the people rather than of the State. He throws no new light on Soviet foreign policy nor on the strategy and tactics of the war. He does, however, give an excellent picture of everyday life in wartime Moscow. He was there for Easter and his reports of the Easter services in both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches show a remarkable resurgence of religious life in the Russian people.

Reynolds was very favorably impressed with our Ambassador Standley who has, he says, "the rugged, uncompromising honesty that the pioneers must have had." He feels that Standley has done more to promote friendly American-Russian relations than any one man. He praises him, particularly for Standley's courageous outspokenness about the failure of the Russian press to acknowledge the help being received from America through Lend-Lease and the resulting clarification of the international atmosphere on that important subject.

Reynolds returned from Russia to North Africa just in time to observe the closing phase of the Sicilian campaign and to participate in the landing at Salerno. His story of the landing is the most thrilling part of the book and also the most informative. He gives a splendid picture of General Mark Clark and the masterful way in which he planned and led the first real invasion of the Continent. General Clark, on the flagship crossing the Mediterranean, had a quiet air of confidence but no illusions of overconfidence. He knew that the Germans would be expecting a landing at a point near Naples and that they would likely be ready for it. The landing was a gamble for Italy. The stakes were high and General Clark knew that a failure would be very costly indeed.

The landing was not a failure but a brilliant success. How well that success will be developed still remains to be seen. Italy has been knocked out of the war in a political sense but our troops are still meeting strong opposition and have not progressed far on the road to Rome.

Significant is the conclusion of Reynolds on his return to America. He feels that our people still do not realize what we are up against in the Mediterranean and European theaters of operation. He thinks the talk of an imminent German crack-up is little more than wishful thinking. Our combat generals, he says, think that the German army is as strong as ever. He concludes: "Once we really take Italy and have air bases in Northern Italy, the real job of invading Germany will come. The great air invasion of the past few months has been the prelude. I can't forget what General Montgomery said, 'The war has finally begun.' I think he is right. The preliminaries are over. The actors have learned their lines. The dress rehearsal has been held. The orchestra has played the overture. The play is about to begin. The curtain rises."

C. P. MOREHOUSE.

* * *

LEND-LEASE: WEAPON FOR VICTORY. By Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. 356 pp. $3.00.

THE Administrator of Lend-Lease has in this book given a clear and detailed account of his stewardship. The narrative is expository, simply and directly written, and as objective as it could be under the circumstances. To tell of the growth of Lend-Lease means virtually to summarize the course of the war almost from its very beginning in the European phase. The early part of the book is valuable already as history because it sets down so much that is already being forgotten; the slow and reluctant change that took place in public opinion, the shock of the fall of France, the terrible imminence of complete disaster to Britain after Dunkirk.

The author shows how step by step the need for Lend-Lease grew and the conception of its purpose widened. Originally we sent ordnance, the tools of war, then raw materials and food; we aided factories in Australia to produce arms by forwarding machine tools and equipment; we opened routes of transportation by air, land, and sea to establish means of communication. Finally we trained and supplied armies of Allied countries to fight against a common enemy.


Mr. Stettinius points out the immediate value of Lend-Lease in the prosecution of the war; more important, this book reveals the impact of Lend-Lease on our own economy: it was the money of Lend-Lease that aided in expanding our own plants and our own agriculture, quickened our industrial processes, and prepared us for full-scale participation in the war with a minimum of delay. He further takes up the matter of Reverse Lend-Lease, which has simplified supply, and the effect that Lend-Lease has had on fusing the efforts of the Allies and making our prosecution of the war a truly united action.

He has chosen to summarize the effect of Lend-Lease in the



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statement of Senator George, Chairman of the Finance Committee:

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P. D. CARLETON.

* * *

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc. 253 pp. $3.00.

THIS book is a companion volume to *The Road to Teheran*, reviewed in our March issue. To the reader who has read only biased information and outright propaganda against Russia during the last twenty years, it is a startling disclosure and might arouse some suspicion as to its authenticity. Professor Sorokin, however, is one of our leading sociologists and has been at Harvard for a number of years and what he has to say must be given serious consideration. He probably knows Russia as well as any other permanent resident of the United States and has been in this country long enough with the position which he occupies to have a comprehensive idea about our institutions and ways of doing things. He certainly has no bias for the Communist régime nor for the Czarist governments, both of which repeatedly imprisoned him. He regards the sweep of events in Russia during the past one hundred years as a gradual progress toward democracy and freedom. He has great admiration for the Russian people and their culture and possibly at times allows this to influence his judgment.

Most of the book is devoted to Russia, as that is the picture we Americans are most concerned about. In general it is a comparison of the sociological aspects of the two nations; the author finds many likenesses. In his pursuit of likenesses between the two peoples at times he appears to find likenesses where they possibly do not exist. His comparison of the two countries leads him to the general conclusion:

"Owing to the operation of certain impersonal factors, the two nations (apart from the destructive stage of the Russian Revolution) have had a unique record of long, unbroken peace and coöperation. I have indicated the nature of these factors—namely, the virtual absence of any irreconcilable conflict between the fundamental values of the two countries, and the positive fact of their essential sociocultural similarity or congeniality. I have pointed out these factors continue to operate. This presages still closer coöperation in the future—a welcome destiny, beneficial to both peoples and to the rest of mankind."

These conclusions are borne out in general by Mr. Dulles in *The Road to Teheran*.

In view of the fact that Russia is well on the way to being the predominant power in the eastern hemisphere and that affairs of the postwar world will be greatly influenced by Russia, the serious reader can learn a great deal from *The Road to Teheran* and *Russia and the United States* which will assist him in forming an idea of the shape of things to come in Europe. Neither of the books spare the faults of Russia and both tend to allay our fears that a strong Russia might be as bad for the peace of the world as a strong Germany. C. H. M.

MAP READING FOR THE SOLDIER. Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944. 101 pp. $1.00.

MAP READING FOR THE SOLDIER, like the earlier *Scouting and Patrolling* in the same series, is a new type of textbook in military education. The purpose is simple: to use every new mechanical aid in making the material clear and vivid; to present the material in a series of simple and easily understood steps that are illustrated by homely examples; finally, to write the text itself in an informal style that draws on the experience of the war and the soldier himself to drive home its points.

This text, for example, has excellent photographs and cartoons to illustrate the tools of map reading and the methods of using them; it uses an effective technical device to introduce the soldier to aerial photographs: a map in which the contour lines merge with an aerial photograph; it develops the whole idea of reading or seeing a third dimension in the two-dimensional map by building a map of the soldier's palm; it illustrates grid coördinates by setting a grid over the picture of a pin-up girl's picture, and defines military symbols by setting them on pictures of the actual objects. The style is that of a man talking earnestly and quickly to someone that he knows and likes.

Map Reading For the Soldier is meant not to supplant but to supplement the regulation Field Manuals on map reading; it is a primer and not a reference book, and admirably conceived and executed for its essential purpose. P. D. C.

* * *

A PICTORIAL GUIDE TO MANY LANDS. Edited by W. J. Turner. New York: Hastings House. 312 pps. $5.00.

IN these days when travel is entirely out of the question, a book such as *A Pictorial Guide To Many Lands* is a suitable substitute for globe-trotting. The book is gorgeously illustrated with 48 plates in color and 173 other photographs, many of them full-page. The many lands referred to are really the Commonwealth and Dominions of the British Empire, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, East Africa, and miscellaneous other colonies. A section of the book is devoted to each.

The first section, very suitably for Americans, is devoted to Canada and is written by Lady Tweedsmuir. Her approach to a traveler's description of Canada in which she stresses Canada's ability to maintain a free democratic way of life in spite of the dual language system and other complicated factors is very appropriate.

The articles on Australia and New Zealand are of special interest to members of the Armed Forces who have been on duty there. The point of view of the authors stress the fact that the people of these isolated English-speaking regions are different and self-contained as a result of their long separations from other kindred races. Australia is described as "a nation rich in natural beauty, rich in the vital quality of its people, a nation standing today at the threshold of great achievement, social and artistic." In the article on New Zealand, emphasis is placed on the ability of the white people to get along and cooperate with the Maoris and the social experimentation which has been going on for some decades.

The article on South Africa, as well as those on the African colonies, stress the great natural resources of the countries and the difficult racial problems involved where the ratio of blacks to whites often runs as high as 50 to one.

The article on India presents more of the accomplishments of that vast region under British rule and gives considerable interesting material about the art and culture of India.

While it may be claimed by some critics that the book at-



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Al Schmid

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tempts to show British influence in its best light, nevertheless, it would be hard to find a more pleasing book to read or even to look at pictures in than the *Pictorial Guide To Many Lands.*

C. H. METCALF.

★ ★ ★

WHY SEAPOWER WILL WIN THE WAR. By Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr. New York: Frederick Fell, Inc. 319 pps. $3.00.

THE question raised by the title of this book is not fully answered by its contents. The author is no doubt a capable writer as well as a highly experienced naval officer but his putting together a unified argument to prove the question raised is somewhat defective. The book is composed almost entirely of articles written by the author for the Associated Press and for other publications. The articles are collected under title headings but the subject matter of the articles is quite often not connected with the chapter heading. This proves a bit annoying to the reader at times; however, the book has considerable food for thought and is, among other things, a sound answer to our over enthusiastic air exponents who would have the Navy scrapped and use nothing but air power and to those who have argued that the aircraft carrier is useless. A great deal of the matter was written soon after the events of the past two years and for that reason quite often is outdated by subsequent events, and the statements as well as conclusions are not always in accordance with facts which have been determined since the writing of the articles for the current publication. The writer feels that it is very unfortunate that Admiral Stirling, who undoubtedly is perfectly capable of putting together a well organized book on the subject matter, did not take time to do so.

CLYDE H. METCALF.

★ ★ ★

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD. By Boris Skomorovsky and E. G. Morris. New York: Books, Inc., distributed by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1944. 194 pp. $2.50.

THE siege of Leningrad was longer than that of Moscow or Stalingrad, but less spectacular. The long struggle of its people, the bitter defense of its citizens' armies, the daring means used to get supplies into the city and the products of its factories out to the rest of Russia have never received adequate attention. The book, which by its title should tell of the siege, is an inadequate account, and in many ways a disappointment for the American reader. The author has written a collection of sketches of the people of Leningrad in their surrounded city, and told us something of the life there, but against the general ignorance in America of what happened in and around Leningrad, these sketches seem unrelated and sometimes bewildering; the American reader has no measuring stick by which to appraise the endurance, the courage, or the hatred of the Germans which the citizens of Leningrad showed.

Some phases of the siege stand out: the cold brutality of the Germans shown in reprints of selections from captured diaries; the complete union of all forces within the city; that is, the fusing of individual strengths into one communal whole. The most striking feature of the book, however, is that chapter which tells in detail of the determined effort the citizens made to keep alive for themselves and within themselves learning and their cultural heritage. During the worst parts of the siege, the theater, the university, and the schools were kept active and vital.

P. D. C.

WEAPONS FOR THE FUTURE. By Captain M. M. Johnson, Jr., USMCR, and C. T. Haven, Fighting Forces Series, Washington: Infantry Journal, 1943. 152 pp. $.25.

THE authors of *Weapons for the Future* (originally published in 1942) review the military history from a somewhat new angle: the weapons with which the colonies and the United States have fought their wars and the means they used to manufacture and procure them. They point out that the United States has entered upon every war in its history not only with an untrained army but also with few weapons and with very scanty means of procuring them. Our manufacturing plants have never been adequately tooled in peacetime to produce military weapons in a crisis; consequently we have fought every war with arms bought elsewhere; unnecessary confusion has been caused by the variety of calibers and types employed. Inevitably because of our lack of foresight, our own plants have hit the full tide of production only after the war has been under way for some months or even years.

In the latter part of the book the authors argue that during peacetime adequate funds should be supplied the War Department for extensive experimentation and that a certain number of civilian plants should be kept in constant if slight production of military arms so that in a crisis they can supplement the production facilities of the government arsenals.

The justice of their premises is demonstrable, but their argument is not altogether satisfactory nor complete since the authors do not answer very fully the two counterarguments sure to be offered against their program: the danger of obsolescence of weapons manufactured during peacetime and the danger of freezing too soon manufacturing patterns. P. D. C.

* * *

AL SCHMID—MARINE. By Roger Butterfield. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 142 pp. $2.00.

SERGEANT AL SCHMID is one of those typical American boys who never set out to be a hero but found himself one almost overnight. He won his spurs on the Tenaru River in Guadalcanal when he was not even supposed to be there. He talked his way out of a field hospital, where he had been sent with a badly infected leg, to get into the big fight he knew was coming. When the rest of his machine-gun squad was killed or wounded in battle, Al stayed on, picking his targets, loading, and firing his machine gun singlehanded. When it was almost over, a Jap grenade exploded in his face, blinding one eye and driving bits of steel into the other and the rest of his body. But there were at least two hundred dead Japs in front of Al's gun. For this exploit, Schmid won the Navy Cross, a gold medal, and his childhood sweetheart as a bride. In this book, Roger Butterfield, senior editor of *Life*, tells the story in a simple, straightforward manner. C. P. M.

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5th Division Selects Shoulder Insignia

THE shoulder insignia for the Fifth Marine Division has been chosen by a board of division officers and men from among 588 submitted by Marines of the Fifth and other units as well as civilians.

A maroon crusader's shield encircled by a gold border forms the background. In the center is a gold V symbolizing both the division number and victory.

Superimposed on the gold V is a blue spearhead signifying the rôle played by Marine divisions in spearheading offensive operations.

★ ★ ★

Former Commandant Nominated As Envoy

ON March 9 President Roosevelt nominated General Thomas Holcomb, recently retired as commandant of the Marine Corps, to be U. S. minister to the Union of South Africa.

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MILITARY DIGEST

Japan and Germany*

UNDER the title, "The Greatest Victory of German Propaganda," Captain Andrew Kamarck, FA, reviews in the March, 1944 issue of *Field Artillery Journal* the secret influence of German propaganda on Japan, culminating in the Pearl Harbor attack.

Captain Kamarck's thesis is that Japan, influenced by German propaganda, entered the war because of an even worse miscalculation than that of Mussolini, who attacked France in June, 1940, because he believed that the war would soon be over. Japan, it is indicated, believed the German claims that Russia was on the verge of defeat and that Britain could not hold out long thereafter. The Japanese seizure of every possible Allied and American possession in the Pacific was at once an attempt to capitalize on the supposed weakness of Germany's enemies and to seize the rich spoils of the Far East before Germany herself could get them.

Captain Kamarck makes out a convincing and carefully documented case. He begins with Japan's failure to seize an earlier opportunity in 1940 when, after the conquest of the Netherlands in May and the collapse of France in June, the Dutch, French, and British Far Eastern colonies were defenseless and ripe for picking. At that time, too, the United States had scarcely begun large scale rearmament. Japan had a priceless opportunity to seize the entire Western Pacific, yet she did nothing toward this goal because she was unprepared to do so.

By fall the British position had strengthened and the Japs realized that they had lost their immediate opportunity. They recognized that their hopes of permanently acquiring the rich loot of the Pacific were dependent on a German victory in Europe and therefore Japan signed the pact allying herself with Germany and Italy. However, they also realized from the experience of Mussolini that if they were to share in the spoils of a German victory they must beat Germany to those spoils.

Germany, on her part, realized that if Japan could be induced to attack the United States it would divert American aid from Russia; and German strategy at that time was directed toward an early elimination of the Russian army to enable them to give the final blow to England.

In order to convince the Japanese that their opportunity had come it was necessary for the Germans to convince their honorary Arayan allies that the defeat of Russia was imminent. German propaganda in the summer of 1941 was therefore directed toward this end.

Beginning in June German reports built up a picture of an irresistible advance and great victories in Russia.

The climax of this propaganda campaign was reached October 9 when Dr. Otto Dietrich, the Reich press chief, summoned all the correspondents in Berlin and categorically declared that Russia had been conquered with the annihilation or encirclement of the Northern, Central and Southern Russian armies. Dr. Dietrich claimed, "The military decision has already fallen. For all military purposes Soviet Russia is done with. The British dream of a two-front war is dead."

This stupenduous claim perfectly exemplified Hitler's statement that a lie, to be believed, must be a big lie. The whole world believed Dr. Dietrich's enormous lie.

The Japanese leaders at once held a series of emergency meetings to determine policy. It is probable that the decision to enter the war was made on October 15 when the Privy Council met in the presence of Emperor Hiro hito. The following day the cabinet of Prince Konoye resigned and a new cabinet, headed by General Tojo, was organized to lead Japan into war.

The final stroke of Japanese duplicity was Japan's double-crossing of her own ally, Germany. With the supposed imminent Russian collapse a German invasion of England might be anticipated in the spring, but to wait for this would be too late for Japan—by that time the weather would be unsuitable for campaigning in the south; also the experience of Italy was worth profiting by. To make sure that she would receive her share of the spoils Japan kept her plans a secret, not only from her enemies, but also from her ally; the timetable proves that the Japanese attack was as much a surprise to the Nazis as to the United States and Britain. If the attack had been coördinated with Berlin the Nazis would also have struck at us the same day. Actually the Germans and Italians, taken by surprise, did not declare war until December 11, and not until January 14, 1942, did Nazi submarines begin sinking ships off the American east coast.

Captain Kamarck concludes, "Nazi propaganda has won some notable victories in the war, but unquestionably the greatest victory of all was the seduction of Japan into the war. The Japanese entrance into the war diverted the forces of the Nazis' enemies and enabled the German army to recover from the disastrous over-extension of its lines in Russia, unimpeded by attack from the west. As for Japan, its gullibility toward German propaganda has plunged it into a war which can end only in utter ruin."

* * *

Naval Strategy*

THE job that still faces the U. S. Navy in the Pacific is many-sided. One part of that job is to hunt down the Japanese fleet. Another part is to keep closing in on Japan with seizures of sea and air bases nearer and nearer to her. A third part is to wage continuous warfare upon Japan's shipping with submarines and planes. A fourth part is to open sea routes to the Philippines and to China, so that armies and supplies can move across a bridge of ships to Asia to fight the concluding battles of this war. The Navy, with its big job still ahead, already has given evidence of the power and ability to finish that job. . . .


As to sea-air combinations, America has gone far beyond Japan in developing task forces with planes from aircraft carriers as first-line striking power. The U. S. has a margin

*From *The Field Artillery Journal*, March, 1944.

*From the *United States News*, March 3, 1944.



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of two to one in big carriers and four to one in converted or auxiliary carriers. . . . Attacks on the Marianas with hundreds of carrier-based planes may point to attacks on Japan with thousands of such planes in the future. As to amphibious warfare, America has expanded her facilities and perfected her methods. Today, 65,000 naval landing craft are built or being built. . . . Mobility and power are the total result of these advantages. That result is proved by the Navy's ability in the last five weeks to strike heavy blows in rapid succession at thousands of miles apart in the Pacific. . . .

* * *

Our Men Measure Private Takahashi*

IT was probably in the days of the Boxer Rebellion, when troops of several Western powers operated in China, that the ferocity and willingness to die of Japanese soldiers first made a widespread impression on the rest of the world. In the swift Japanese drive Jiro Takahashi—the typical Japanese private—proved himself an experienced, well-trained fighter with an almost fanatic zeal to die for his Emperor.

But now the legend of his invincibility has been shattered in the South Seas, the Marshalls and Gilberts, and the weak points of the Japanese soldier are being shown up. Translated from the unlovely jargon that fighting men employ, Johnnie Yank thinks that Jiro Takahashi is a brave and excellent soldier, but, oh, so stupid.

Since Pearl Harbor we have learned how to employ Jiro's weakness for our own ends. We have found that if you confront him with something unexpected he reacts improperly; that if you cut him off he will fight to the death like a cornered rat; but that if you should outflank him, leaving a way of retreat open, he will normally take it, even though he starves to death in an attempt to escape.

Items like the following are indicative of the fact that something strange is happening to the Mikado's soldiers, supposedly one of the world's grimmest combatants:

An American soldier on Namur Island in the Marshalls reported that veteran marines were disgusted with the task of wiping out Japanese soldiers, most of whom were said to be hovering on the fringe of insanity from the effects of the terrific sea bombardment.

On February 3 General MacArthur's communiqué carried an amazing item about the Australian advance up the Rai coast of New Guinea toward Saidor:

"Enemy dead are constantly being encountered showing extreme starvation and exhaustion." Japanese troops caught between Americans and Australians were described as "disintegrating into the mountains."

Major General William H. Rupertus on Guadalcanal asserted that his opposite number, Lieutenant General Idao Matsuda, "has shown himself a clever soldier but has been handicapped by troops crazy to die for the Emperor's sake."

The fundamental weakness of Jiro Takahashi—a drafted peasant—and of his officers, is that they have little individual initiative. Their Shinto religion makes for excellent discipline which results in letter-perfect obedience to orders, but it militates against individuals taking tactical

*By Frank L. Kluckhohn, in *The New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1944.

advantage of situations, or even of using their common sense.

Japanese machine gunners will not open up even though pounded for hours with mortars—which is held to be the mark of a good soldier; but their weapons have no traverse mechanism and they are only able to maintain a fixed field of fire. Their own officers do not trust them to use their heads.

The Japanese are often high-strung and find the most difficulty during an artillery bombardment. Apparently it is one thing to die and another to endure screaming shells that explode in all directions. Thus, the Japs' frantic charges, in which death apparently is sought, frequently follow heavy bombardments. Those last charges at Attu, in the central Solomons and on New Britain smack more of madness than intrepidity.

The willingness of the Japanese to withdraw when strategically outflanked, as demonstrated on Kolombangara Island, south of Saidor, clearly indicates that we will not have to take all the islands on the way to Japan. Similarly, the willingness of the Japanese soldier to obey unquestionably offers an argument against the theory that we will have to clean up Japanese conquered lands one by one. Once Tokyo is captured or throws in the sponge, the Japanese will obey a surrender order.

* * *

Pacific Mandates*

SENATOR TYDINGS was speaking at a forum and somebody asked him about the Pacific islands, so he said he thought the United States should "accept" a mandate for the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana islands. . . . As for the Marshalls and Marianas, why, obviously, we are going to have to stay there for a very long time, and several other island spots, too. You can call this by the name of mandate, or you can call it conquest. It makes no difference what you call it. All the approaches to Hawaii for thousands of miles we will have to man for what is left of this cycle of history. This means Wake and Midway, the Marshalls and the Carolines, including Truk, and the Bonin islands lying north of the Marianas, and close in to Japan. China must get back Formosa and the Japanese must be expelled. There is a string of islands between Formosa and Japan which China must administer alone or jointly with us, and we will have to take and administer the Kuriles alone, or jointly with Soviet Russia. Australia and the Empire will have to take and hold the southern archipelagoes, but Australia has not the resources to build adequate island defenses on more than the immediate approaches to the continent. It must secure its theater, but cannot help us in the broader reaches of the ocean. . . .

All the islands are simply war islands, strong points for aggressive war in the hands of Japan, as Japan has amply demonstrated; strong points for defense of the United States, as we will amply demonstrate if we don't go balmy sometime this century. With the rapid perfection of the armed plane and transport, the islands will become a network of highways to Asia, with bases as fixed and as routine as the airfields between San Francisco and New York. Certain of them will have to become fortresses, where

*Royce Brier in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, February 29, 1944.

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a fleet of planes or a fleet of warships, or both, can be harbored and serviced. There are only two Pacific nations industrially capable of maintaining this network—Japan, which has done it and is losing it, and the United States. So far as we can see now, only two Pacific nations will be industrially capable of it in the future—a revived Japan and the United States. If we don't do it, we merely hand it to Japan—and then it becomes a network of highways to America. Thus our settlement on these islands is inevitable.

* * *

Up Front Down Under★

COLONEL PICKETT'S original article contains much worthwhile technical data for artillerymen on range finding, weapon positions, etc., in addition to the following practical information of value to everyone headed for the South Pacific.

In the good old days we felt that an OP had to be adjacent to the gun position; then the idea occurred to some bold thinker that a better place for an OP might be up where one could see the target area.

The forward observer has to combine initiative, tact, experience, profound judgment, knowledge of gunnery, physical agility and endurance, determination and ability to subsist on roots, herbs, and vitamin pills for days.

In order to get some unbiased, experienced opinion on what the forward observer should carry with him on his way up front through the jungle I called upon seven lieutenants to submit lists of what they were going to take with them on a jungle exercise. The exercise took place in an area in a rainbelt averaging around 300 inches a year. It took hours to get the guns into position; beyond them no vehicle could go, and the forward observer and his party took from two to three hours to reach an OP 2,900 yards beyond the guns.

The reports of these observers were unanimous in stating the necessity of borrowing porters to lug some of the equipment, returning these men to the battery after reaching the OP. They also held out for three or four wire section men to put in most of the initial communications for them. The outfit of impregnated clothing was thrown out with a hoarse cry. The gas mask, too, took an awful beating on the trail and caused more annoyance to the wearer than any other article worn. It should be checked with the supply sergeant.

Using rocket launchers, rockets, and flares at a jungle forward OP would be almost as good as putting up a blue and red neon sign reading "Forward Observer" in Japanese. The chap who suggested a tommy gun for close defense reported that about halfway up to the OP he became the victim of an illusion that he was lugging a 37mm. gun.

The aiming circle should stay behind. It's not essential if one has an M2 compass. All toilet articles were scratched except a washrag and an ounce bottle of citronella. Likewise the air mattress is discarded. For digging down to safe levels for shelter substantial tools such as pioneer sets are included in spite of their weight.

The observers were willing to give up the dispatch case,

★By Col. Christiancy Pickett in *The Field Artillery Journal*, February, 1944.

though taking most of the usual contents. Some suggested a clip-board.

The recommended list, based on consensus of opinion:

(a) *Carried by Forward Observer Himself:*

FIELD EQUIPMENT
- Helmet, steel
- Belt, web, with holster, first aid pouch, and magazine pockets
- Canteen, cup and cover
- 1 spoon to eat C rations (no other mess equipment)
- Field bag
- C rations (1 day)
- Knife, hunting
- Flashlight with blue hood
- Shelter half, pole, rope, pins

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
- Raincoat
- Mosquito headnet (carry in field bag
- Extra pair light wool socks
- Either a field jacket or a light wool undershirt
- Washrag
- Bottle citronella or other mosquito repellent
- Calcium hypo to chlorinate water
- (Opinion is divided as to whether a blanket and mosquito bar are worth the trouble of carrying them)

TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT
- M2 Compass
- Field glasses
- Range table (book)
- Clipboard with paper, a piece of grid sheet, and the prearranged code
- Protractor with range scale on bottom
- Coördinate square
- Range-df fan (1/40,000 with "Jeep Board")
- Map or photomap *if any*
- Pins, pencils, erasers

(b) *Each enlisted member of party to carry* the same field and personal equipment listed above, and in addition a fair share of technical equipment listed below.

TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT CARRIED BY MEN ASSISTED BY LOANED PORTERS
- 1 telephone with two extra batteries
- 1 axe
- 1 pickmattock, pioneer type
- 2 shovels, pioneer type
- 1 machete or cane knife
- 1 wireman's kit
- 4 test clips
- 1 SCR-610 (parts carried by porters)
- W-110 wire according to distance to OP

One more suggestion: After a few trips through muddy, mountain trails wearing GI shoes I tried a pair of suction-cup, rubber-soled tennis shoes and found the footing much better. I fell on my ear only two or three times per mile.

It behooves us to keep track of directions and distances travelled during every minute of our trip forward, else we will arrive at the OP with a very vague idea of the direction of the guns and their distance from us. We watch the sun, when we can see it, in order to get the general direction of curves and twists in the route. For distance we count steps, and reduce these to yards by applying various factors according to the difficulty of the footing and the slope. (Attempts to get a rough check on the total distance by keeping track of the amount of wire laid proved that this method is very unreliable. Men's estimates of the amount of wire they had on the drums which they brought with them were grossly inaccurate.)

A few more pearls of advice for forward observers have been received from people fresh back from New Georgia: do not walk on any trail after passing the infantry regimental CP, for the Japs frequently cover them with fire from light machine guns; do not wear field glasses or any other item of equipment that identifies you as an officer, for that draws all the snipers' bullets.

Lastly, when you begin to see people around you who weren't there last night, including Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell and your father-in-law, it is time to give in and send for your relief number. After all, there are three officers in the battery not counting the executive, and they must all take their turn on this harrowing job.


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Air Umbrella*

SEVERAL military critics have recently written that, when the invasion takes place in Northern Europe, an "Air Umbrella" will be essential to success. The use of that

*From *The Aeroplane* (London), December 31, 1943.

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


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term is most unfortunate, for it implies the antithesis to the correct employment of air power, since it denotes putting a screen of fighters over the heads of the troops to prevent their being attacked from the air.

The first task of the air forces when used in support of an army should be to obtain mastery in the air. That having been done, aircraft can unhindered turn their attention to ground targets.

Our army has been making very slow progress in Italy and a contemporary suggests that it has been receiving less effective support from the air than the Luftwaffe has been able to give to the German army. He must have ignored the official reports, as in every one of them the commanding general paid tribute to the support he received from the air.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder appreciated that, when it was necessary for the air arm to blast ground forces out of an established position, the use of a great weight of the biggest type of bomb was advisable. Such a method has come to be known as the "Tedder Carpet," but it is quite different from what is usually known as air support for the army.

The acquisition of aerodromes in Italy from which to deliver heavy attacks on the industrial areas in Austria and Southern Germany would undoubtedly be of much more value than for the army to fight its way through Italy and then scale the Alps. Every day that German factories escape heavy attack they are turning out weapons which can be used to prolong the war.

Victory will not finally be ours until our armies are in occupation of German soil. An invasion of Northern Europe may be quicker than an advance from the south but depends upon the amount of resistance the German army is able to offer. The best means of breaking down that resistance is by bombing Germany's war industry.

Thus allied strategy should aim at providing air bases as quickly as possible from which the heaviest possible scale of bombing attack can be delivered at German industry. The army is responsible for getting forward to seize and hold the necessary air bases. It must be given every assistance by the air force, but not by means of an "Air Umbrella."

* * *

Allied Strength in Pacific

NEW YORK'S *PM* reports on the news conference of Admiral Nimitz: "A very optimistic picture of the growing Allied strength in the Atlantic and Pacific is painted in Washington and London. The growing strength has enabled us to: (1) Make virtually useless as naval bases the Japanese bastions of Truk in the Carolines and Saipan in the Marianas. (2) Cut off 10,000 Japanese troops in the remaining enemy-held Marshall atolls. (3) Reduce the number of sinkings by U-boats from one out of every 181 ships in 1941 to less than one out of every 1,000 in the last half of 1943."

The Pacific information was disclosed recently by Admiral Nimitz who declared at Secretary Knox's press conference that the U. S. Navy was sufficiently strong now "to meet the Japanese fleet at any time." Knox said our fleet had grown from 344 units—representing larger combat units only—before Pearl Harbor, to 900.



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
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★

Historical Records

IN every paper in the country every day the Marines are making headlines—and history. The whole nation is proud of the Corps—and of every single Marine—for the momentous part they are playing in this, the greatest war of all time.

After the war, when the veil of military secrecy can be lifted, there will be a tremendous amount of interest displayed in every phase of the activities of the Marine Corps. More than ever, the heroes of the present battles will be honored, for then their tales may be fully told.

In order that the deeds of the Corps may be properly preserved, the Historical Division of the Marine Corps at Headquarters in Washington is urgently in need of all types of current reports from the field. These reports may take the form of records of events, war diaries, operation reports, narratives about certain sequences of events, maps, sketches, photographs, etc. The material may be in its original form or reproduced by photostat, micro-film, printing or other form of reproduction so long as it is valuable as source material. Unless such records are compiled as the war progresses and are forwarded to the Historical Division, they will probably never be available and the history of the negligent organizations will be lost.

In his Circular Letter Number 626, dated 9 February 1944, the Commandant states specifically: "Persons of all ranks are urged to write or cause to be written such reports of events of which they were leaders and forward them through their appropriate senior officers, who, in turn, if the reports are considered worthy of becoming part of the record of the organization, should forward them to Headquarters. It is further necessary that all such reports be written in such a way as to present the events that have transpired in an interesting manner. Writers of all reports should bear in mind that they are designed to become part of the permanent records of the Marine Corps and may be researched by future interested parties for a hundred years or more. They should, therefore, be written in a language that is free from all local or current slang and should contain no phraseology of any kind that will not be readily understood by readers far removed in space and time from the events being described. All reports should be forwarded to this Headquarters at the earliest opportunity and not retained by headquarters of higher units for their sole use.

"The Historical Division will examine and evaluate all historical reports received at this Headquarters as soon as possible after their receipt, and in the event that the reports do not accomplish the purpose for which they were submitted, the officer in charge of the Division will communicate direct with the commanding officer submitting the report, pointing out wherein the report is inadequate and cause it to be again submitted, containing the necessary additions."

See announcement of
THE MARINE CORPS READER
on page 42 of this issue

Books for Marines

TARAWA: The Story of a Battle

By Robert Sherrod

This is probably the most vivid picture yet published of any battle in World War II. Marines do not have to be told that Tarawa was a grim business, but even those who were there will learn more about it from this starkly realistic book. The author, able member of the staff of *Time,* landed with one of the early waves and lived through the thick of the action. **$2.00.**

BANZAI NOEL

By Captain Garrett Graham, USMCR

This book, which might well be sub-titled "Memoirs of a Metallic," gives the reader a sidelight on the war in the Pacific such as none other does. The author comments freely on a wide variety of subjects, from life under daily bombing on Guadalcanal to the manners, morals, and allure of South Sea maidens. The book is remarkable for its vigor, its high spirits, and its utter honesty. **$2.00.**

THE CURTAIN RISES

By Quentin Reynolds

One of America's favorite reporters tells what is going on in the "other war" in Russia and Italy, with a sidelight on the important but seldom reported activities of American troops in Iran and the Middle East. **$2.75.**

TEN ESCAPE FROM TOJO

By Commander McCoy and Lt. Col. Mellnik

The first full story of Japanese cruelty; the epic of the heroes of Bataan and Corregidor, told by two of the survivors and released with pemission of the Joint Chiefs of staff. **$1.00.**

LAST MAN OFF WAKE ISLAND

By Colonel Walter L. J. Bayler, USMC

The only eye-witness account of the last-ditch fight of the Marines on Wake Island. **$2.75.**

. . . AND A FEW MARINES

By Colonel John W. Thomason, Jr., USMC

A collection of dynamic stories of Marines all over the world by the master story writer of the Marine Corps. **$3.00.**

JOE FOSS, FLYING MARINE

As told to Walter Simmons

The story of the greatest American ace of this war and his Flying Circus at Guadalcanal, told vividly in the first person. **$2.50.**

HISTORY OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS

By Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf, USMC

The standard history of the Marine Corps from 1775 to the opening of World War II. **$3.00.**

HERE IS YOUR WAR

By Ernie Pyle

The North African campaign as seen through the eyes of one of America's most popular war correspondents. **$3.00.**

AL SCHMID—Marine

By Roger Butterfield

The senior editor of *Life* tells the story of the Marine private who stayed with his machine gun after the rest of his squad was killed or wounded, until there were 200 dead Japs in front of it. **$2.00.**

RETREAT, HELL!

By William Martin Camp

A well-written novel of the Fourth Marines in China and at Bataan and Corregidor, written in forthright style and giving a rugged and accurate picture of the Philippine campaign. **$3.00.**

MARINES AT WAR

A collection of notable Marine Corps art—paintings, sketches, etc.—many of them made under combat conditions. **$3.00.**

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Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps **WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**



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